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ABSTRACT
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT: HUME, KANT, AND THE
CURRENT DEBATE

Robert Kyle Whitaker
Marquette University, 2020

The epistemological issue of disagreement comprises several related
problems which arise in relation to disagreeing with another person. The central
questions at issue are: (1) Can a body of evidence confer rationality on opposed
propositions? (2) What is the relevance of unshareable evidence to disagreement?
(3) What are one’s epistemic responsibilities in the context of disagreement?
I consider several arguments from the recent disagreement literature which
suggest that reasonable disagreements between people who have shared their
evidence and are epistemic peers--i.e., they are equally informed about the
disputed issue, and are roughly equal with respect to intelligence, thoughtfulness,
carefulness, alertness, and so on--are not possible. I also consider several
arguments which suggest that one may rationally persist in one’s views in spite of
peer disagreement. In the course of considering these arguments, I discuss the role
of “evidential seemings,” seemings of the form “It seems to one that evidence E
supports proposition p”; their analogous relationship to perceptual seemings; and
how such seemings might be outweighed by higher-order evidence provided by
peer disagreement.
I propose that the most difficult and interesting aspect of the peer
disagreement problem is prolonged disagreement with a recognized epistemic
peer, which may undermine one’s evidential seemings in the form of Parity: in the
context of peer disagreement, both parties may be aware that things would seem
just the same to them as they do if in fact the other party were correct and they
were mistaken. This presents a localized skeptical problem that affects what one
should believe in the context of such a disagreement, because prolonged peer
disagreement puts one’s own evidential seemings into conflict.
I propose and discuss three possible solutions to the Parity Problem, one
inspired by David Hume, and two inspired by Immanuel Kant: (1) Practical
considerations stemming from the underdetermination of one’s views by the
available evidence as well as one’s larger epistemic goals can justify maintaining
one’s view. Alternatively, judgments that someone else is an epistemic peer may
be classified as either (2) empty regulative theoretical judgments (a Kantian
category), or (3) non-theoretic judgments (analogous to judgments about taste). In
either case, rational disagreement under Parity is possible.

i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Robert Kyle Whitaker

I would like to thank my dissertation director, Prof. Michael Wreen, for his
patient guidance throughout this project. My ability to write and assess arguments
is in large part due to him, as he was my professor for graduate logic and several
courses on analytic philosophy. Any argumentative errors that may remain in this
work are likely due to my failing to consider his advice more carefully.
I also want to thank Dr. Noel Adams and Dr. Stanley Harrison for serving
on my dissertation committee, and for the positive influence--both professional
and personal--they’ve had on me during my graduate studies. Dr. Adams
introduced me to Søren Kierkegaard, and Dr. Harrison to C.S. Peirce, two
philosophers from whom I will continue to learn for the rest of my life. I am
indebted to Drs. Adams and Harrison for these introductions, and for representing
those great philosophers so well.
I would like to extend special thanks to Dr. Paul Moser for serving as
outside reader on this project. I have benefitted greatly from his work in both
epistemology and philosophy of religion, as well as from the graduate seminar on
Kierkegaard that I was fortunate to take with him. In many ways he serves as a
model for me of Christian philosophy done well: with rigor, inclusion, and guided
by a genuine faith. I am grateful for this example.
There are many others who were not engaged directly in this project, but
whose influence has in one way or another contributed to its completion. Thanks
are due to all of those who have taught me to think clearly, and shown me by
example the difference that philosophy can make with respect to forming a good
character. These people include Dr. Cynthia Gayman, Dr. Rory Goggins, Dr.
Theresa Tobin, Dr. Nancy Snow, Dr. Bronwyn Finnigan, and many others.
In addition, I must thank my fellow Marquette graduate students, whose
friendships have sustained me through this process, especially Nick Oschman,
Brett Yardley, and Shaun Blanchard. I have learned as much from them about how
to be a scholar as anyone, and they’ve all provided much needed levity and
kindness.
Finally, to my family. My parents, George and Linda Whitaker, first told
me that I was capable, and guided me to many of the ideas that still occupy my
attention. They gave support of every kind at every stage of my studies, and never
once was any condition attached. And to my wife, Emily, the biggest thanks of all.
Her contributions are too many and too varied to name. Completing a dissertation
while remaining mentally healthy is a difficult task, and my accomplishment of it
is due almost solely to her.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................... i
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 1: CAN EVIDENCE SUPPORT OPPOSED PROPOSITIONS? ....... 10
1.1: Peter van Inwagen on Evidence and Exclusivity ....................................... 10
1.2: Richard Feldman’s Uniqueness Thesis ...................................................... 19
CHAPTER 2: PRIVATE EVIDENCE ................................................................... 33
2.1: Van Inwagen on the Use of Private Evidence ............................................ 33
2.2: Feldman on the Relevance of Private Evidence ......................................... 40
2.3: Christensen on the Symmetry of Private Evidence .................................... 46
CHAPTER 3: THE PERCEPTUAL ANALOGY .................................................. 54
3.1: Perceptual Seeming in the Disagreement Debate ...................................... 54
3.2: Implications of the Analogy ....................................................................... 62
CHAPTER 4: THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE AND DEFEAT OF SEEMINGS .... 69
4.1: Rosen on the Contingency of Evidential Seemings ................................... 69
4.2: The Epistemic Parity of Seemings ............................................................. 81
CHAPTER 5: THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF DISAGREEMENT ITSELF ..... 95
5.1: Idealization, Independence, and Bootstrapping ......................................... 95
5.2: Christensen on Symmetry between Apparent Peers ................................ 103
CHAPTER 6: HIGHER-ORDER EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY .................. 110
6.1: The Meta-Evidence Principle ................................................................... 110
6.2: Disagreement and Testimony ................................................................... 122

iii

6.3: The Problem of Possible Rational Disagreement ..................................... 130
CHAPTER 7: PEERHOOD, CONFORMISM, AND NONCONFORMISM ..... 140
7.1: Defining Peerhood .................................................................................... 140
7.2: Responding to Parity: Conformism and Nonconformism ........................ 149
CHAPTER 8: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS I: HUME’S CONTRIBUTION ........ 161
8.1: A Humean Approach to Disagreement .................................................... 162
8.2: Moffett’s Millian Solution to Peer Disagreement .................................... 172
8.3: Hume Again ............................................................................................. 180
CHAPTER 9: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS II: KANT’S CONTRIBUTION ....... 187
9.1: Kant’s Categories of Judgments and Disagreement ................................. 187
9.2: Conclusion ................................................................................................ 196
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 200
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................ 206

1
Introduction

The literature on the epistemology of disagreement contains several questions that
must be clearly distinguished. A survey of this literature yields many similar but distinct
emphases with respect to what the debate over rational disagreement is fundamentally
about. If we ask, “What is the guiding question in this debate?” the answer is: There is no
single guiding question. Rather, there is an array of related questions. Five of the
fundamental questions are:
(1) Can a single body of evidence support opposed conclusions drawn on the
basis of that evidence?
For example, Richard Feldman asks: “…how exactly can there be reasonable
disagreements? And how can there be reasonable disagreements when the parties to the
disagreement have been confronted with a single body of evidence?”1
(2) Can one’s evidence for a proposition always be shared, and if not, what effect
does unshareable (“private”) evidence have on the justification of one’s belief in a
proposition?
For example, Peter van Inwagen, one of the earliest framers of what has become
the disagreement debate, discusses what he takes to be a relatively common form of
evidence:
… there seem to be plausible examples of “having evidence” that do not conform
to the courtroom-and-laboratory paradigm of evidence.… There are, therefore,
arguments by example for the conclusion that… evidence is not
always of the public sort, that some evidence is not exportable, that some
evidence cannot be passed from one person to another.2
(3) When is it reasonable for one to hold onto a belief in a disputed proposition?

Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on
Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise Antony (Oxford University Press, 2007), 201.
2
Peter van Inwagen, “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted
Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 25-6.
1
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For example, John Pittard writes: “…when can we reasonably maintain a
confident belief in some proposition despite the fact that many people who seem as
qualified as ourselves to assess the proposition’s plausibility hold it to be false?”3 He
continues:
It is obvious that the discovery that someone disagrees with my belief that p
should at least sometimes cause me to be less confident in my disputed belief. The
primary area of controversy in the epistemology of disagreement has to do with
the conditions under which the prima facie threat posed by disagreement can be
reasonably resisted… Can… partisan, dispute-dependent reasons be a good basis
for doubting the reliability of my disputant? This question serves as the primary
point of contestation in debates over the epistemic significance of disagreement.4
Along the same lines, David Christensen asks:
How should I react when I discover that my friend and I have very different
beliefs on some topic? Thinking about belief in a quantitative or graded way, the
question concerns cases in which my friend and I have very different degrees of
confidence in some proposition P. Should my discovery of her differing degree of
belief in P lead me to revise my own confidence in P?5
Thomas Kelly puts it similarly: “…once you and I learn that the other has arrived at a
different conclusion despite having been exposed to the same evidence and arguments,
how (if at all) should we revise our original views?”6
(4) How should one’s beliefs be affected by the beliefs of others?
Adam Elga frames the question more generally: “How should you take into
account the opinions of an advisor? ... How, exactly, should we be guided by outside

3

John Pittard, Disagreement, Rationality, and Religious Belief, Doctoral Dissertation, Yale University
(2013), 3.
4
Ibid., 9-10.
5
David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 116, no. 2
(2007): 188.
6
Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman
and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 112.
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opinions?”7 This is a question about testimony rather than disagreement per se, although
disagreement between epistemic peers is what is prompting the question in this debate.
Similarly, Marc Moffett frames the issue as a matter of competing demands of rationality
regarding one’s epistemic relationship to others. If critical scrutiny of one’s views by
one’s peers is conducive to the justification of one’s beliefs, which seems plausible, he
asks how one can avoid the problem of having one’s view swamped by the contrary
views of one’s.8
(5) Is it reasonable to maintain both one’s own belief in the face of disagreement,
and also the reasonableness of one’s disputant?
Feldman asks:
Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence reasonably maintain their
own belief yet also think that the other party to the disagreement is also
reasonable?9
The concept of peerhood occupies a central place in the debate, and its primary
importance is its role in the present question.10 For example, for Michael Bergmann, the
central issue reflects both the sharing of a single evidence base and the peer-status of
one’s disputant:
The Question: Can two people – who are, and realize they are, intellectually
virtuous to about the same degree – both be rational in continuing knowingly to

Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41, no. 3 (2007): 478–79.
Marc Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry,” Episteme: A Journal of Social
Epistemology 4, no. 3 (2007): 352–67.
9
Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 201.
10
As we will see, what exactly peerhood amounts to is a contentious question. For present purposes, we
can say that to be a peer is a context-dependent (i.e., not global) relational property whereby two or more
knowers are similarly qualified to assess the evidence relevant to some disputed question. “Similarly
qualified” is of course vague, and various commentators will argue for different interpretations. The two
main divisions here are between those who prefer to define peerhood from the “bottom up”--so that two
people are peers if they are roughly equal with respect to various relevant epistemic factors such as
intelligence, thoroughness, background knowledge, etc.--and those who prefer to define peerhood from the
“top down,” so that A and B are peers iff A is equally likely as B to judge correctly about the truth value of
p, where p is some disputed proposition. These notions of peerhood will be discussed in Chapter Seven.
7
8
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disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they
can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational
too?11
Clearly, these questions differ in important ways, though they also overlap. Many
commentators discuss most of these questions at some point, or at least they take their
arguments to have implications for all five questions. In my view, these questions can be
reduced to a central three Main Questions (MQs):
(MQ1) What expectations can one reasonably have of a body of evidence for a
proposition?
(MQ2) What is the relevance of private evidence to peer disagreement?
(MQ3) What are one’s epistemic responsibilities in the context of disagreement?
(MQ1) encapsulates the concerns of question (1). It will be the subject of Chapter One.
(MQ2) encapsulates the concerns of question (2). It will be the subject of Chapters Two
through Six. (MQ3) encapsulates the concerns of questions (3) through (5). It will be the
subject of Chapters Seven through Nine.
The question of whether a single body of evidence supports more than one
proposition of a competing set of propositions is answered in various ways in the
literature on peer disagreement. The most notable figures who discuss it are Peter van
Inwagen and Richard Feldman. As they frame the issue, the central question is whether
two people could reasonably believe opposed propositions on the basis of the same
evidence. Both van Inwagen and Feldman deny this possibility. Their reasons for this are
discussed and critiqued in Chapter One. Both hold that evidence, of metaphysical
necessity, can support only one of a competing set of propositions, a principle known as

11

Michael Bergmann, “Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure,” Episteme 6, no. 3 (2009): 336.
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the Uniqueness Thesis. I argue that the Uniqueness Thesis is false, as it is far too strong,
has counterintuitive consequences (even on weaker versions), and assumes things at issue
in the disagreement debate.
Chapter Two considers the possibility of private evidence. Private evidence is
evidence that cannot be shared, despite one’s best efforts. It may include the felt truth of
some proposition, or the seeming to one that some piece of evidence supports p rather
than ~p. I call these latter sorts of experiences “evidential seemings.” I argue that private
evidence in the form of evidential seemings may justify one in maintaining one’s view in
the face of disagreement, and whether it does depends on the confidence one has in one’s
own private seemings, on the evidential value of disagreement itself, and on the
confidence one has in the peer status of one’s interlocutor.
Evidential seemings are often compared in the disagreement literature to
perceptual seemings, such as the sense that one is experiencing a green expanse when
standing in front of the quad in the springtime.12 This comparison is the subject of
Chapter Three. There I argue that evidential seemings share broad structural similarity
with perceptual seemings, including being non-doxastic, pre-theoretical, sui generis,
basic, generative of prima facie justification, and incapable of non-circular justification
themselves. I argue that such seemings have evidential significance in a similar way that
perceptual seemings do, and that this significance does not disappear on the discovery of
disagreement, though the seemings do of course remain defeasible.

12

I borrow this example from Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of
Knowledge, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 1.
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Chapters Four and Five tackle the related questions of (1) the evidential value of
and the defeasibility of evidential seemings, and (2) the evidential import of disagreement
itself. The goal of these chapters is not to determine what one should do in the context of
disagreement, but rather to assess (a) what weight the mere fact of disagreement, or
agreement, should have in one’s total evidence for some proposition, and (b) whether it
may serve as a defeater for one’s felt sense of what a body of evidence supports. I
consider and reject several ways in which disagreement may defeat one’s evidential
seemings, such as by providing evidence of the contingency of one’s belief (à la Gideon
Rosen), or by creating epistemic symmetry between peers so that a peer has no way to
identify which peer’s seemings are correct (à la David Christensen and Adam Elga). I
argue that the fact of disagreement itself does not necessarily provide counterbalancing
evidence regarding what one should believe about a proposition. Chapter Four also
introduces the Parity Problem: in a case of prolonged disagreement with a recognized
peer, each party may be aware that things would seem just the same as they do if in fact
the other party were correct and he/she were mistaken. This presents a skeptical difficulty
that affects what one should believe about p in the context of such a disagreement, and
may in fact undermine one’s justification for one’s prior beliefs. This is because
disagreement under Parity puts one’s own evidential seemings into conflict.
Chapter Six considers the role of higher-order evidence in peer disagreement in
two forms: (1) as meta-evidence (i.e., evidence of there being evidence for a proposition),
and (2) as the possibility that there is evidence, even if that possibility is not actually
instantiated. In conjunction with (1), I also consider in this chapter the relationship
between disagreement and testimony. The first section considers the claim, advanced by

7
Richard Feldman, that “evidence of evidence is evidence.”13 The idea here is that the fact
of disagreement itself gives one extra evidence for or against some proposition that one
would not otherwise have, because disagreement gives one evidence that there is
evidence with respect to p. This fact itself is claimed to have evidential force, even if one
is not aware of the evidence possessed by the other party. I argue that meta-evidence may
not in fact constitute evidence for a subject that is directly relevant to the disputed
proposition. However, I do hold that there is something important about meta-evidence:
insofar as one is dealing with a perspective that is constituted by certain features of
epistemic excellence, the views of a person with that perspective may count as evidence
for a disputed proposition.
The second section considers the relationship between disagreement and
testimony. I suggest that a virtue theory of testimony can help to clarify whether negative
testimony (disagreement), or any other form of testimony, carries evidential weight, and
that such a theory helps to justify the critique of Feldman’s argument in the previous
section. Finally, the third section discusses the problem of possible rational disagreement.
There is some reason to think that if actual peer disagreement presents a problem for
maintaining a view rationally because the disagreement provides higher-order evidence
that one’s judgment of the first-order evidence is mistaken, then this problem can be
generalized to include merely possible disagreement as well. If it can, then general
skepticism looms as a possibility. I argue that this problem does not actually have the
force that has been claimed for it. Thus, even if peer disagreement creates a localized
skeptical problem, this does not entail generalized skepticism.

13

See Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 208.
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Chapter Seven considers the notion of peerhood. An influential view of peerhood
advanced by Adam Elga, according to which epistemic peers are those who are equally
likely to be correct or mistaken, is critiqued and rejected. In its place, a more commonsense approach to defining peerhood is defended. The approach is based on similarities
between people with respect to various factors that make one a good assessor of evidence
for a proposition, such as intelligence, carefulness, time spent considering the evidence,
sobriety, etc. The chapter then turns to both the Conformist and Nonconformist responses
to the rational disagreement problem.
The Conformist view holds that one ought to conform one’s view to one’s peer’s
view. The Nonconformist view holds that one is typically justified in maintaining one’s
own view in the midst of peer disagreement. I argue that both views, as presented, have
problems. Conformist views (e.g., David Christensen, Richard Feldman, Adam Elga)
place too much emphasis on the evidential value of disagreement itself, mistakenly taking
the fact of disagreement to have some overriding power that it does not always have.
They also tend to assume (e.g., Christensen) that peer disagreement is epistemically
similar to disagreement with a superior, which is unwarranted. Nonconformist views
(e.g., Thomas Kelly, Marc Moffett, Michael Bergmann), on the other hand, tend to
underestimate the significance of epistemic parity produced by long disagreement with
someone one takes to be a peer. Thus, I argue that the strength of the Conformist view is
parasitic on the power of the Parity Problem. Likewise, the burden of the Nonconformist
view is to overcome that problem and provide a clear explanation of how one remains
justified in one’s view in cases of prolonged disagreement after full disclosure of
evidence with a recognized epistemic peer.

9
In Chapters Eight and Nine, I offer three proposed solutions to the problem of
rational peer disagreement under Parity. The first, inspired by David Hume and Marc
Moffett, is presented in Chapter Eight. There I argue that (1) owing to the nature of
judgments that someone is an epistemic peer, judgments that are at best inexact estimates,
an objectively rational solution to the peer disagreement problem is not to be had, but that
(2) nonetheless it can be reasonable to maintain one’s view in a peer disagreement given
one’s overall epistemic goals.
The second and third solutions, inspired by Immanuel Kant and William Alston,
are presented in Chapter Nine. These solutions concern the nature of peerhood
judgments--i.e., judgments that someone is an epistemic peer. I argue that Kant’s
classifications of judgments provide two ways in which peerhood judgments may allow
for the possibility of rational disagreement, disagreement such that each peer may
justifiably believe that the other is responding rationally to the evidence, despite coming
to an opposed conclusion. I argue that peerhood judgments may be classified as either (1)
empty regulative theoretical judgments, or (2) non-theoretic judgments (analogous to
judgments about taste). In either case, rational disagreement under Parity may be
possible. I conclude with a critique and defense of these solutions, and some reflections
on where they leave us with respect to the peer disagreement problem.
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Chapter One – Can Evidence Support Opposed Propositions?
1.1 – Peter van Inwagen on Evidence and Exclusivity
In his paper “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” Peter van Inwagen introduces the
issue of peer disagreement by distinguishing between what he calls “weakly exclusivist”
and “strongly exclusivist” positions on religious disagreement.1 He then extends the
discussion to philosophical, political, and other forms of disagreement. He calls any
religion an “Ism,” and says that an Ism is “weakly exclusivist” if
(1) it’s logically inconsistent with all other Ism’s, and
(2) according to Ism, its adherents are rational to accept its teachings.
(1) and (2) together entail that it is rational for the adherent of an Ism to believe that the
teachings of all other Ism’s are at least partly wrong. Note that this does not entail that
one should believe that the adherents of other Ism’s are irrational. An Ism is “strongly
exclusivist” if
(A) it is weakly exclusivist, and
(B) according to Ism, its adherents (or anyone in their epistemic situation) are not
rational to accept the teachings of any other Ism.
Note that this still does not require that Ismists must believe that adherents of other Isms
are irrational, though they may believe that.

Peter van Inwagen, “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted
Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 10-28.
1
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Nearly everyone, van Inwagen argues, holds weakly exclusivist views about
controversial issues in politics, art, science, philosophy, religion, etc. But what about
strong exclusivism? If one were strongly exclusivist, one would hold that
(1) There are positions inconsistent with my own,
(2) I am rational to hold the view I do, and
(3) Anyone else in my epistemic position would not be rational to hold any view
inconsistent with my own.
Van Inwagen believes that there are lots of strong exclusivists too; he mentions
Darwinists, critics of Holocaust deniers, lots of political activists, various religious people
(regardless of whether their religion actually teaches that it is strongly exclusivist), etc.
But philosophers, too, often hold strongly exclusivist views. Consider this principle:
If it is rational for S to accept p, then it cannot also be rational (in the same
circumstances) for S to accept ~p.2
Similarly:
If S is deciding whether to accept p, to accept ~p, or to suspend judgment about p,
it cannot be true both that it would be rational for S to accept p and to accept ~p.3
And another:
…if it is rational for a person whose total evidence is E to accept p, then it would
be rational for anyone whose total evidence was E to accept p.4
Van Inwagen calls this last principle “obviously correct.” These are intuitively
compelling principles, accepted by many philosophers. The principles have the following

2

Ibid., 20. Paraphrase.
Ibid. Paraphrase. This is similar to--though less restrictive than--what Richard Feldman calls the
“Uniqueness Thesis,” which is the view that a body of evidence can support at most one among a variety of
inconsistent propositions. This thesis will be discussed below.
4
Ibid., 22.
3
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implication: philosophers who hold them are committed to the view that all other
philosophers with whom they disagree about some contentious proposition are irrational.
More precisely, they entail that any philosopher who shares their exact epistemic
situation, and who still disagrees, is irrational. Such colleagues would, in van Inwagen’s
words, be “comparable to ordinary, educated people of the present day who believe that
cigarette smoking does not cause lung cancer or that the positions of the stars and planets
at the moment of one’s birth determine one’s fate.”5
Van Inwagen states the argument for these principles as follows:
…a body of evidence cannot have the power to confer rationality on both a
proposition and its denial. And…it is rational for one to accept a proposition at a
certain moment if and only if one’s total evidence at that moment bears this
impersonal ‘confers rationality on’ relation to that proposition.6
This argument appeals to a metaphysically necessary property that evidence has of itself.
Hence, what it is rational to do in a case of disagreement depends on this property of
evidence: it cannot “confer rationality on” inconsistent propositions. From this it follows
that:
If two people have the same evidence, and if one of them accepts a certain
proposition and the other accepts its denial, at least one of them is not rational…7
But this just is strong exclusivism. So it seems that weak exclusivism entails strong
exclusivism. This is significant because almost everyone holds propositions (especially in
philosophy, politics, morality, etc.) in a weakly exclusivist way.
This leaves anyone who holds a view regarding a controversial proposition (i.e.,
nearly everyone) with three options:

5

Ibid., 19.
Ibid., 20-21.
7
Ibid., 21.
6
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(I) Doubt or deny one’s own rationality;
(II) Claim that at least some others who deny one’s own view are less intelligent,
less rational, or in some other cognitive way deficient with respect to
seeing the truth of p; or
(III) Claim that at least some others who deny one’s own view are in inferior
epistemic circumstances, i.e., lack some evidence that one possesses.
But of course in real-world cases none of these options are very attractive. Van Inwagen
is fond of referring to his longstanding disagreement with David Lewis over the
compatibility of free will and determinism. It’s just obvious, he thinks, that both he and
Lewis were rational, in similar epistemic circumstances, comparably intelligent, and so
forth. And yet it also seems obvious that both he and Lewis were rational to hold the
views they did, even after they disagreed and shared evidence. So the argument for the
principles above must be mistaken in some way. Yet it is hard to see what is wrong with
it. Van Inwagen thus concludes his essay in a state of uncertainty, unable to believe that
either he or David Lewis is less rational than the other, and yet unable to see how they
could be equally rational with respect to a single evidence base.
But there are questions to be raised in regard to van Inwagen’s argument for his
principles. His argument, in full, is:
Consider any person as he is at a certain moment. That person has available to
him, at that time, a body of evidence, his total evidence at that moment. Call it E.
Of metaphysical necessity, E has the following property (of itself, regardless of
who may have it) with respect to any proposition p: either (i) it would be rational
for anyone to accept p on the basis of E, or (ii) it would be rational for anyone to
accept the denial of p on the basis of E, or (iii) it would be not be [sic] rational for
anyone to accept either p or the denial of p on the basis of E. This ‘or’ is
exclusive. It cannot be that it would be rational to accept p on the basis of E and
rational to accept the denial of p on the basis of E. Loosely speaking, a body of
evidence cannot have the power to confer rationality on both a proposition and its

14
denial. And, finally, it is rational for one to accept a proposition at a certain
moment if and only if one’s total evidence at that moment bears this impersonal
“confers rationality on” relation to that proposition.8
In essence, van Inwagen is claiming that a person cannot be justified in believing p on the
basis of E unless anyone else who possessed E would also be justified in believing p on
its basis. The last sentence of his argument also commits him to evidentialism, which
holds that rationality is solely a matter of believing what the evidence supports.
This argument has several problems. First, van Inwagen defines “E” as the total
evidence that is available to a person at a moment. “Available” is vague. Presumably,
“available” does not imply that one can express all of his evidence, either to himself or to
another, since this would rule out private evidence--evidence that cannot be shared with
another, such as one’s felt sense that E supports p--which van Inwagen himself seems to
think is possible and relevant to whether one is rational to accept p. Also, one’s private
evidence, if such there be, intuitively would be a part of one’s total evidence pertaining to
p at a time. So, if E does not need to be entirely expressible (and thus includes private
evidence), then why think that it must be either rational or (exclusive) irrational for
anyone to accept p on its basis? Presumably van Inwagen thinks that if some bit of
private evidence supports p for one person, then it would support p for any other person
who possessed it. This implies that someone else could possess another person’s private
evidence. But how could this be? By definition, private evidence cannot be shared.
Perhaps van Inwagen may reply here that he is not suggesting that someone could possess
the private evidence of another, but that if they could, then it would support p just the
same. I’m not sure this is coherent, since it seems to me to be logically necessary that
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someone cannot possess the private evidence of another. But even if van Inwagen could
somehow avoid incoherence here, his point ceases to be relevant to real-world cases of
disagreement, since in such cases no one can in fact obtain anyone else’s private
evidence.
To put the point a bit differently, imagine that two parties to a dispute share all of
their evidence, including the private “seemings” of the form “It seems to me that this
evidence supports p.” Obviously, they differ in at least two ways: (1) with respect to their
positions on p, and (2) in the indexical sense that when one says “It seems to me that this
evidence supports ~p,” the “me” depends on who is saying it. Can they be said to have
the same evidence in that case? Clearly not, since one has the private evidential seeming
that the evidence supports p, and the other has the private evidential seeming that the
evidence supports ~p. These are different evidence sets. Since there is no epistemological
puzzle about the rationality of believing opposed propositions with different evidence
sets, the disagreement problem does not arise here if we allow for private evidence. So
insofar as van Inwagen accepts the possibility of private evidence, which he seems to do,
he cannot consistently maintain that E must “confer rationality on” only one of the three
stated assessments of E (that it supports p, supports ~p, or supports neither p nor ~p).9
However, let’s assume for the sake of argument that E is the same for the two
disputants. Would the claim that E must either support p, support ~p, or support neither p
nor ~p follow in this case? This would follow only if one takes E to be everything that is
relevant to deciding the rationality of one’s doxastic attitude toward p. But this is too
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strong--there are considerations other than E itself which are relevant to the rationality of
one’s assessment of p, including (1) factors that are “unavailable” to one in the moment
of a disagreement (and so not a part of E by van Inwagen’s definition of E), and (2) one’s
interpretation of E, which is not itself reducible to E. A word of explanation about both
(1) and (2) follows.
(1) As van Inwagen defines E, it clearly does not include any consideration
pertinent to p that is unavailable to one at a moment. But it seems that considerations that
are not available to one can make a difference with respect to what it is rational for one to
believe about p. Consider an atheist and a theist disagreeing over a particular miraculous
claim. The theist recalls believing on good evidence in the past that there is a successful
refutation of Hume’s argument against the rationality of belief in miracle reports, even
though he cannot remember what the refutation is or where he learned it. This
information is unavailable to him at the moment of the disagreement, and yet it seems
relevant to the rationality of his assessment of the miracle claim. Alternatively, one may
be in an epistemically lucky situation without realizing it, say by asking for directions in
a neighborhood where people tell the truth about such things, but in a city where most
people lie. This would make a difference with respect to the rationality of one’s believing
the directions one is given. Or, perhaps someone could have a “neural quirk,” to borrow a
phrase of van Inwagen’s, that makes them better at discerning the truth about p than other
people, though they don’t know this about themselves. These possibilities suggest that
factors other than what is included in E could be relevant to whether it is rational for one
to believe p on the basis of E.
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(2) Van Inwagen states that the ability of a body of evidence to “confer rationality
on” the doxastic attitude that one takes toward a proposition is a metaphysically
necessary property of the evidence itself, “regardless of who may have it.” What could
this mean? Presumably, van Inwagen has in mind the objectivity of justification
mentioned above: to be justified in believing p on the basis of E, E must objectively
support belief in the truth of p--i.e., anyone else who possessed E would also be justified
in believing p on its basis. But is this the right way to view how evidence supports a
proposition? Jason Decker has argued, convincingly in my view, that it is not.10
Decker describes this view as the “pan balance model of evidential support,”
because it assumes that we determine whether an evidence set supports a proposition in
the same way that we determine which of two objects weighs more by putting the objects
on a scale. We drop some evidence into the pan on one side of the scale, which represents
p, and some into the pan on the opposite side of the scale, which represents ~p, and the
lowest pan at the end of this process is what the total evidence supports.11 However, as he
says,
It is at best elliptical--and, at worst, a category mistake--to say that a body of
evidence supports a proposition. A body of evidence isn’t the right sort of thing to
support a proposition.… only an interpreted body of evidence can serve such a
role.12
Decker gives two examples to illustrate his point. The first involves someone having an
identical total evidence set with his counterpart on Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth: “For

Jason Decker, “Disagreement, Evidence, and Agnosticism,” Synthese 187, no. 2 (2012): 753–83. In the
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Inwagen’s claim here about evidential support.
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every experience you have had, your twin has had a phenomenally identical
experience.”13 Now suppose that you come to think that your experiences are caused by
mind-independent “material” objects, while your Twin Earth counterpart comes to adopt
a Berkeleyan perspective. Decker thinks it is obvious that both you and your counterpart
could be rational in your views, even if only one of you may be correct. However, van
Inwagen’s view of evidence would insist that at most one of you could be rational.
Alternatively, Decker offers another case: two people are looking, under the same
conditions, at an image like the famous duck-rabbit, which may be seen in two ways.14
One forms the belief that what they are looking at is only a duck; the other forms the
belief that what they are looking at is only a rabbit. According to van Inwagen, at least
one of them is irrational. But surely neither is irrational. “It’s not a failure of rationality,”
Decker says, if either of the people fails “to be lucky enough to see that the [image] can
be carved up in a second way.”15 The reason is that evidence cannot tell us how to
interpret it. Decker goes on to give a somewhat crude description of what he means by
“interpretation,” but this need not concern us here. The upshot is that van Inwagen’s view
of evidence ignores the fact that evidence must be interpreted in order to support a
proposition, and that therefore we cannot say that evidence can have support-properties
“of itself.” Further, it won’t help to say (as, for example, Richard Feldman has said) that
one’s interpretation of the evidence should itself be supported and hence become part of
E, because (a) this won’t always be possible, as in the duck-rabbit case, and (b) even if it
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were possible to find some extra evidence for one’s interpretation of E, that evidence
would also need to be interpreted.
So, as stated, van Inwagen’s argument that evidence can confer rationality on only
one view will not work. Given that he offers no further support for this view, I will here
set it aside, and turn to a closely related view of Richard Feldman’s.
1.2 – Richard Feldman’s Uniqueness Thesis
in his widely influential 2007 paper “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,”
Richard Feldman begins by noting that many people--e.g., his own students--take a
tolerant attitude toward those with whom they disagree.16 They seem to think they can
“agree to disagree” about an issue, and that all parties can remain reasonable. But what
does this attitude amount to?17 Feldman notes two ways of failing to reasonably disagree:
intolerance (viewing one’s interlocutors as opponents to be beaten or mocked), and
relativism (viewing all sides of a dispute as somehow equally correct). Each fails to take
seriously the views of their interlocutors. So what sense is there to “reasonable
disagreement”?
Feldman distinguishes two questions:
Q1 Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence have reasonable
disagreements?

Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations
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Q2 Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence reasonably maintain their
own belief yet also think that the other party to the disagreement is also
reasonable?18
Feldman thinks that affirmative answers to these questions cannot be defended. “As will
become apparent,” he writes, “open and honest discussion seems to have the puzzling
effect of making reasonable disagreement impossible.”19
In this context, the cases under consideration are restricted to those in which the
interlocutors hold that each party’s specific beliefs are reasonable, and not merely of
practical value, or tied to desirable behavior. With the case so restricted, Feldman
distinguishes four ways that reasonable disagreement might be possible.
First, different conclusions can be drawn from the same evidence. For example,
consider the case of Righty and Lefty. A detective has strong evidence incriminating
Righty and (presumably equally) strong evidence incriminating Lefty of the same
crime.20 Further, the detective knows that only one suspect could be guilty (though,
presumably, he does not know that it must be either Righty or Lefty). One may think that
the detective would be reasonable to draw either the conclusion that Righty is guilty or
the conclusion that Lefty is guilty. But, Feldman argues, this isn’t right: any decision by
the detective in this case is arbitrary; the reasonable thing to do is to suspend judgment.
This suggests what Feldman calls the Uniqueness Thesis:
UT: …a body of evidence justiﬁes at most one proposition out of a competing set
of propositions…and…it justiﬁes at most one attitude toward any particular
proposition.21
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Feldman takes this to rule out a “yes” answer to Q1. As he says, “If The Uniqueness
Thesis is correct, then there cannot be any reasonable disagreements in cases in which
two people have exactly the same evidence.”22
Second, reasonable people may weigh evidence differently because of differing
initial assumptions about evidence. Imagine, for example--this is my case, not Feldman’s-that two jurors are analyzing four pieces of evidence in a murder trial: (1) the murder
weapon with the defendant’s fingerprints, (2) the known fact that the defendant hated the
victim, (3) the known fact that the victim was depressed, and (4) a suicide note
apparently in the victim’s handwriting. It seems as if this body of evidence is consistent
with both the proposition “The defendant is guilty” and the proposition “The defendant is
innocent,” and further that a juror could be justified in believing p (guilt) or in believing
not-p (innocence) on the basis of the same evidence. This would be because the evidence
admits of multiple consistent relative weights, depending on how the jurors weigh
handwriting analysis versus fingerprint analysis. Thus, rational disagreement with a
single evidence base seems plausible.
However, Feldman argues that this only pushes the disagreement back a step: now
the issue is which initial assumptions are true--in this case, which actually is more
reliable, fingerprint analysis or handwriting analysis? Feldman says that the parties
should share their evidence about that and come to a conclusion:
These different starting points help support the existence of reasonable
disagreements only if each side can reasonably maintain its starting point after
they have been brought out into the open. And this idea can support the tolerant
attitude…only if people can think that their own starting point is reasonable and
that different and incompatible starting points are reasonable as well. I cannot
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understand how that could be true. Once you see that there are these alternative
starting points, you need a reason to prefer one over the other.23
The third way that reasonable disagreement might be possible is that both parties
to a disagreement can have a bit of unshared, or “private,” evidence that makes their view
reasonable. Perhaps, Feldman suggests, this is what we suspect is going on when we take
the tolerant attitude. As he says,
If we take (Q1) and (Q2) to be about cases in which all the evidence is shared,
then the answer to both questions is ‘no.’ But if we take the questions to be about
cases in which the evidence is shared as fully as is realistically possible, then the
answers are ‘yes.’ We might say that the reasonable disagreements are possible in
those cases in which each side has private evidence supporting its view.24
But Feldman argues that this won’t work either. There is an analogy here with
perception: imagine that two people are facing a quad; one sees the dean standing there
and the other doesn’t. The reasonable thing here, Feldman thinks, is to suspend judgment
once the parties realize that something strange is going on, not to conclude that they’re
having a reasonable disagreement owing to private evidence.25 As he says:
Each may have his or her own special insight or sense of obviousness. But each
knows about the other’s insight. Each knows that this insight has evidential force.
And now I see no basis for either of them justifying his own belief simply because
the one insight happens to occur inside of him. A point about evidence that plays
a role here is this: evidence of evidence is evidence. More carefully, evidence that
there is evidence for P is evidence for P. Knowing that the other has an insight
provides each of them with evidence.26
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Fourth and finally, perhaps it is possible to have a reasonable disagreement (so, an
affirmative answer to Q1), but not to think that one is having one (so, a negative answer
to Q2). As Feldman says:
One way or another, then, the conclusion drawn is that the other person does not
have a reasonable or justiﬁed belief. And the idea is that both parties to the
disagreement can reasonably draw this conclusion. Thus, both parties have a
reasonable belief, yet they reasonably think that the other side is not reasonable.27
But, again, any reasons for thinking that one is cognitively superior can themselves be
discussed and become part of the shared evidence. So here again, the best option would
be to suspend judgment, not to insist on reasonable disagreement.
Apparently, then, there cannot be reasonable disagreements. So what should we
say about situations where it seems like there are? Feldman says there are two options:
(1) The “hard line”: evidence can only support one view, and so whoever takes
that view is reasonable, and everyone else is not. Feldman thinks the hard line view is
probably appropriate in many cases (e.g., astrology, climate change, evolution, racism,
etc.), but it is apparently inappropriate in many others (e.g., most complex moral,
political, scientific, and religious disputes). Take, for example, the question of the
existence of God: the theist and atheist may both take the hard line view and conclude
that the evidence supports only her view, and so the other is mistaken and unreasonable.
But is there any reason to suppose that one is more correct to do so than the other?
Feldman thinks not.
(2) The skeptical alternative: we should suspend judgment in cases of peer
disagreement, i.e., become agnostics about a great many things. This is Feldman’s own
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stated view in this article (in some of his later work, he backs away from this
conclusion).28 Feldman insists that this is “a modest view, in the sense that it argues for a
kind of compromise with those with whom one disagrees.” But it also:
implies that one should give up one’s beliefs in the light of the sort of
disagreement under discussion. This is a kind of modesty in response to
disagreement from one’s peers. This is also a skeptical view, in the limited sense
that it denies the existence of reasonable beliefs in a signiﬁcant range of cases.29
Because Feldman here advocates the “skeptical” response to peer disagreement,
he is usually classed as a “Conformist,” one who thinks that the rational response to peer
disagreement, once evidence has been shared, is to suspend judgment about p. Several
points Feldman makes here will be discussed in later chapters; here I want to focus on the
Uniqueness Thesis (UT), which is very similar to van Inwagen’s view of evidence noted
above.
First, what can be said in support of UT? In Thomas Kelly’s discussion of it in
“Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” he mentions UT while discussing the
“Equal Weight View.” 30 The Equal Weight View recommends that in cases of peer
disagreement with shared evidence, one should accord equal weight to one’s own view
and the view of one’s peer--i.e., one should split the difference. Kelly describes a case in
which two parties consider evidence E and how well it supports hypothesis H. Assume
that we can assign a numeric value to our confidence in a proposition such that 1
represents certainty that the proposition is true, 0 represents certainty that it is false, and
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.5 represents suspension of judgment about the proposition--i.e., one takes the evidence to
be 50/50 for and against that proposition. Party A is reasonable, let’s say, to accord H a
credence of 0.7, and moreover, A knows that it would also be reasonable to be slightly
less confident in H on the basis of E, say, a credence as low as 0.6. Party B accords H a
credence of 0.6 on the basis of E, but knows that a slightly higher credence would also be
reasonable, say, as high as 0.7. Now suppose the parties realize their differing credence
levels. It seems that the Equal Weight View would recommend that they split the
difference and opt for a shared credence of 0.65. But, says Kelly, there’s no reason at all
to do this, since they both recognize that the other’s credence is a reasonable response to
the evidence. In order to rule out the possibility of cases like this and thereby save her
view, he argues, the Equal Weight Theorist will need to adopt UT.31 As he says:
Suppose that the Uniqueness Thesis is true. Then, if it is in fact reasonable for me
to give credence 0.7 to the hypothesis, it follows that you are guilty of
unreasonable diffidence for being even slightly less confident. On the other hand,
if you are reasonable in being slightly less confident than I am, then I am guilty of
being unreasonably overconfident. Hence, the description of [the case] offered
above is incoherent; [that] is not in fact a possible case.32
But, Kelly says, the case just described makes UT highly counterintuitive, since if one
has already allowed for some wiggle room in what she takes the reasonable credence for
H to be, then there is no reason for one to alter her view, UT notwithstanding. In order to
maintain her view, then, the Equal Weight Theorist must adopt a highly counterintuitive
principle (UT), which seems ad hoc. But some of Kelly’s phrasing here suggests a way to
alter UT to make it less counterintuitive. For example, he says:
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Clearly, the Uniqueness Thesis is an extremely strong claim: for any given batch
of evidence, there is some one correct way of responding to that evidence, any
slight departure from which already constitutes a departure from perfect
rationality.33
Later, he says:
Let us suppose for the sake of argument, then, that the Uniqueness Thesis is
correct: for a given batch of evidence, there is some one way of responding to that
evidence that is the maximally rational way.34
The emphasis on “perfect” or “maximal” rationality here is suggestive. If we view
rationality as a degree concept, then the door is open to notions such as “acceptably
rational, though not perfectly or maximally rational,” as responses to evidence. Along
these lines, we can adjust UT in the following way:
UT*: For any batch of evidence E, there is at most one maximally rational
assessment of that evidence.
This reformulation of the Thesis doesn’t entail a single rational view and a host of other
equally irrational views. Rather, there is a single most rational view, and a variety of
other less rational views. One might also build into this some constraint regarding the
natural limitations on human cognition to determine exact, fine-grained distinctions of
warranted credence. Perhaps, for example, it would be inappropriate to expect even
careful thinkers to correctly ascertain evidential assignments of warranted credence
between 0.65 and 0.7. Thus, the proponent of a graded, differential version of the
Uniqueness Thesis could build in allowances for human limitations, perhaps by
rephrasing the Thesis as:
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UT**: For any batch of evidence E, there is at most one maximally rational range
of assessments of that evidence, consistent with the reasoning capacities of human
thinkers.
Such a modified UT seems to avoid the sort of problem raised by Kelly’s case.
Unfortunately, it is not available to Feldman. Note that while UT** avoids the
counterintuitive implication that all views but one are automatically irrational, it still has
the consequence that all assessments of any evidence set that fall outside of a certain
range of credence levels regarding p are automatically suboptimal. The reasonableess of
this view depends on how narrow this range is. Unfortunately for Feldman, the range
would have to be quite narrow in order to justify his view that one should suspend
judgment about all issues disputed by epistemic peers. UT** simply isn’t restrictive
enough to support this conclusion, since it is plausible that two careful thinkers could
come to different conclusions about a set of evidence that are both within the maximally
rational range of interpretations of that evidence. This is what Kelly’s case shows.
What about the problems raised above for van Inwagen’s closely related view?
Does UT** avoid those? Recall that the problems with that view are:
(1) Considerations that are “unavailable” to one in the moment of a disagreement
can be relevant to the rationality of one’s assessment of p.
(2) Evidence must be interpreted in order to support a proposition; it has no
metaphysically necessary intrinsic support-properties.
With respect to (2), UT** does not include or depend on the claim that evidence
has intrinsic support-properties. Rather, the question of why there is at most one
maximally rational range of assessments of an evidence set is left open.
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With respect to (1), if UT** were to be used in the way that Feldman and van
Inwagen use UT--i.e., as a way to rule out the possibility of rational disagreement--then it
would fare no better than UT, since in order to support that conclusion, one must also
assume evidentialism, which both Feldman and van Inwagen do. But it is not necessary to
use UT** in this way, and on its own it says nothing about whether or not considerations
other than one’s total evidence may play a role in the rationality of one’s doxastic state
regarding p.
But there is still something counterintuitive about UT**. Say that it seems to me
that argument X supports p, and I assign p a credence of 0.7. However, I might also
recognize that owing to the limitations on how much weight I should accord my
“seemings” about such things, I may be off by as much as 0.1. It seems to you also that X
supports p, but you assign it a credence of only 0.6. But you also realize the same
limitations about your own “seemings,” and so you accept a range of 0.1 higher as still
consistent with the evidence, which in this case is exhausted by X. According to UT**
we may both be maximally rational in this case. This would not be allowed on UT or
UT*. However, if either of us has a private sense that is not extremely close to the private
sense of the other (within, say, a 0.1 credence assignment range), then UT** requires that
at most one of us can be maximally rational, even if it seems to both of us that we are
both doing everything that we should be doing in assessing the evidence that we have.
Applied to real-life disagreement cases, this is problematic, since often neither of us will
be in a position to know which of our private seemings is more accurate. If neither of us
can see how either of us could be doing any better than we are at assessing our evidence,
it seems odd to be forced to conclude that one or both of us is doing worse than we could
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with the evidence we have. Instead, we should conclude that we’re both within the
maximally rational range. But if this is possible, then UT** cannot do the work that
Conformists like Feldman need it to do, since it would allow for the possibility of more
than one maximally rational conclusion on the basis of a single set of evidence.
The Conformist may reply here that the distinctions we’re talking about are so
fine (0.7 vs. 0.6) that for most real-life issues, we’d likely consider that an agreement,
and so UT** would be irrelevant. But of course we could easily think of situations where
that fine of a difference would make a difference. It often happens that the divergence of
expert opinion on some issue is very slight, and yet it constitutes real disagreement
between them. It seems in such cases that we should allow that the experts who differ by
a slight amount between themselves may all have beliefs within the maximally rational
range allowed by UT**. The only motivation for saying otherwise would seem to be the
requirement that to be maximally rational in assessing our evidence, our assessment must
be accurate. But of course in a real case of peer disagreement, we won’t be in a position
to know this. So UT** cannot be used to decide between the private seemings of two
disagreeing peers, which was the purpose of UT from the beginning.
For his part, van Inwagen does offer an argument for an evidentialist
interpretation of rationality, which he borrows from W.K. Clifford. In his essay
“Listening to Clifford’s Ghost,” van Inwagen discusses Clifford’s famous essay “The
Ethics of Belief.”35 He asks, “Why does Clifford think that it is wrong to believe things
upon insufficient evidence?” And he answers that:
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The central nerve of Clifford’s reason for supposing this is…: Of all the forces in
the human psyche that direct us toward and away from assent to propositions,
only rational attention to relevant evidence tracks the truth. Believing things only
upon sufficient evidence is, therefore, the only device we have for minimizing the
extent of our false beliefs, or at least the only such device that has any prospect of
providing us with a useful set of true beliefs… If we form our beliefs on any other
basis – if we allow them to be formed by some factor that does not track the truth
–, we are, in effect, believing things at random.… Since there are a lot more ways
to be wrong than there are to be right, beliefs formed by a method that does not
track the truth will, to a high probability, be false.… A person who believes things
upon insufficient evidence, therefore, is not taking care to minimize the extent of
his false beliefs.36
Although Clifford is less concerned with being rational than with being ethical,
since his goal is to show that it is morally wrong to believe anything on insufficient
evidence, not merely that it is irrational to do so, his argument applies to rationality as
well as morality. This is because for Clifford, the only alternative to truth-tracking is
randomness. It thus follows that rationality entails truth-tracking, since believing things at
random is clearly not truth-tracking. To avoid the philosophical baggage associated with
the term “truth-tracking” associated with Robert Nozick, I’ll instead use the phrase
“based on evidence.”37 So a reformulated, Clifford-inspired maxim for rationality would
be: Rationality requires holding beliefs which are based on evidence. But is it right that
one is forced to choose between forming her beliefs in accordance with evidence or else
at random? I think not. The literature on Clifford is vast, and full discussion of it would
take us too far afield, but I’ll briefly point out a few ways that one may respond to
Clifford’s argument.38
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First, it can be argued that it may be rational to believe not on the basis of
evidence. The basic idea here is that sometimes evidence may not point decisively in one
direction or another, and that when this is the case it may be rational--if certain conditions
are met, and contra various commentators in the disagreement debate39--to choose what
to believe based on desires or practical concerns other than knowing the truth. This is a
straightforward denial of the maxim above. William James famously responded to
Clifford in just this way. He argued that it is neither immoral nor irrational to choose
what to believe on such a basis.40 If we go further and argue that it can in fact be
positively rational to choose on such a basis, given one’s overall epistemic goals, then we
can reject Clifford’s dilemma: evidence-based or irrational.41
Another avenue of response is to argue that non-evidential motivations may be
rational in the truth-capturing sense.42 For example, it may be that the desire for goodness
is itself productive of true beliefs more often than not, so that when one believes with the
end of the good in view, one is eo ipso believing in a truth-capturing way, even though
one’s goal in believing is not truth per se.43
Thirdly, one may argue that “evidence” is broader than Clifford imagined, so that
aligning one’s beliefs strictly in proportion to the evidence in his narrow sense is
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Publications, 1956), 1-31.
41
For a contemporary example of someone who argues this way in the context of the disagreement debate,
see Marc Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry” Episteme: A Journal of Social
Epistemology 4 (2007): 352–367. I will discuss Moffett’s view at length in Chapter Eight.
42
James sometimes speaks this way as well, e.g.: “to say… ‘Do not decide, but leave the question open,’ is
itself a passional decision,--just like deciding yes or no,--and is attended with the same risk of losing the
truth.” See James, “The Will to Believe,” 11.
43
This would be an example of a non-evidentialist, reliabilist approach to rationality. For an overview of
reliabilism, see Alvin Goldman and Bob Beddor, “Reliabilist Epistemology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, Winter 2015, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reliabilism/.
39
40

32
epistemically wrong-headed. On such a view, contra much of the modernist tradition,
desires and natural inclinations would be evidential, and therefore beliefs formed on their
basis may be rational.44 This would be a way of affirming the maxim stated above, while
insisting that it should be interpreted more broadly than Clifford does.
Fourth, one may hold that evidence is not required at all for at least some beliefs
to be held rationally. This would be an even stronger denial of Clifford’s maxim than the
one James tendered, since his reply at least assumed that the evidence had been assessed
and found indecisive. On this view, exemplified by so-called “reformed epistemology,”
sometimes no evidence is needed for rationality. Primary examples of such rationally
held, non-evidential beliefs include belief in other minds, belief in an external world,
basic perceptual beliefs, and more controversially, belief in God.45
All of these proposals are reasonable responses to the Clifford-inspired argument
offered by van Inwagen, and on any of them, the line between rationality and arbitrary
belief is not where Clifford takes it to be.
Thus, for now it seems that no version of the Uniqueness Thesis will do what van
Inwagen and Feldman want it to do: rule out the possibility of opposed rational responses
to the same body of evidence.
But what does it mean to have the “same body of evidence” in the first place? Is
full disclosure of one’s total evidence possible, or is there some sense in which some
evidence can remain private? This will be the topic of the next chapter.
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In certain places, Kierkegaard seems to take a view like this.
For helpful overviews of reformed epistemology, see Peter Forrest, “The Epistemology of Religion,” in
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2017,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/religion-epistemology/, Section 7; and Anthony Bolos
and Kyle Scott, “Reformed Epistemology,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d.,
https://www.iep.utm.edu/ref-epis/.
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Chapter Two – Private Evidence
2.1 – Van Inwagen on the Use of Private Evidence

Can evidence always be fully disclosed, or is there such a thing as private
evidence? Van Inwagen suggests some examples of such private evidence that he says
seem “plausible”:
I sometimes know that my wife is angry when no one else does, for example, and
I cannot explain to anyone how I know this--I cannot give what Plato would call
an “account” of what underlies my conviction that she is angry. It seems to me to
be plausible to say that in such cases my belief that my wife is angry is grounded
in some body of evidence, evidence that lies entirely within my mind and that I
cannot put into words. A second example is provided by the case of the chicken
sexer, beloved of epistemologists in the far-off days of my graduate studies…
Mathematicians are often intuitively certain that some mathematical proposition is
true, although they are unable to prove it. (Gödel, I understand, was convinced
that the power of the continuum was aleph-2.) Since they often later do discover
proofs of these propositions, it seems likely that, prior to their discovery of the
proofs, they had some sort of evidence for the truth of those propositions.1
Van Inwagen considers private evidence in the context of his disagreement over free will
with David Lewis. Given that Lewis was obviously rational, and that he had all the same
public evidence (arguments, distinctions, and the like) as van Inwagen, it follows, given
van Inwagen’s assumptions about evidence, that if the evidence did not point Lewis
toward incompatibilism, then it didn’t point van Inwagen toward it either. That is, of
course, unless van Inwagen had some evidence that Lewis lacked, of a sort that could not
be disclosed. Van Inwagen here admits that if this is even possible, then his earlier
attempt to demonstrate that strong exclusivism follows from weak exclusivism fails,

Peter van Inwagen, “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted
Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 25.
1
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since if one has private evidence, then one needn’t hold those with whom one disagrees
to be irrational--they simply, through no fault of their own, lack some evidence.2
It is worth pausing for a moment here over the connection between private
evidence and intuition. As described by van Inwagen, private evidence is a matter of its
seeming to one that something is the case, in a way that one is unable to express other
than with a locution of the form “It seems to me that…” Is this an intuition? I think it is,
in the sense of a pre-reflective judgment that something is the case. In that way, seemingintuitions are intellectual in that they are judgments with propositional content. In
Chapter Three, I will argue that, in the disagreement literature, seemings that some
proposition is true or false are treated as analogous to perceptual seemings, such as the
seeming that there is a green expanse in front of me. One may argue that this makes
seemings different from intuitions. For example, Joel Pust objects to the following
definition of intuition on the grounds that it is “indiscriminate”:
I: S has the intuition that p if and only if it seems to S that p.3
This is indiscriminate in the sense that it does not distinguish between intellectual and
perceptual seemings, and therefore implies that there are perceptual intuitions. According
to Pust, “Clarity is served by stipulating that such states are not intuitions even if they are
all species of some common genus.”4 Consequently, he prefers this definition of intuition:

2

One may reasonably wonder whether it is possible for two people to have the same private evidence, in
the sense that two competent chicken sexers could both have a private “seeming” that the chicken is a male.
As I understand it, private evidence is indexical, so while two people may have similar private evidence,
they cannot have the same private evidence. See Chapter One, pp. 14-15. It remains open, however, that
one’s private evidence may be epistemically equivalent to another’s. As we will see below, private
evidence in the form of propositional “seemings” bears a strong resemblance in this sense to perceptual
seemings.
3
Joel Pust, “Intuition,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2017,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/intuition/, Section 1.3.
4
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I*: S has the intuition that p if and only if it intellectually seems to S that p.5
While I have no philosophical objection to distinguishing between perceptual and
intellectual seemings in this way, for the purposes of clarity in what follows, I will use
the term “seeming” in the indiscriminate sense identified above. Nothing in my argument
will turn on whether perceptual seemings are intellectual. Consequently, I will also
generally avoid use of the word “intuition,” since it is not my aim here to wade into the
murky waters of whether intuition is doxastic, dispositional, or sui generis, or whether
intuitions should include perceptual states. In my usage, “seeming” can bypass such
issues.
In addition, intuitions/seemings are often treated as evidence by philosophers, van
Inwagen being a case in point. As Pust says:
… the view that intuitions are treated as evidence in philosophy is best thought of
as the view that, with respect to many core questions of philosophy, our
justification for believing an answer consists (at least substantially) in our having
suitable intuitions.… Put simply, the view is that the occurrence of an intuiting is
taken to provide the person in whom it occurs with prima facie justification for
believing the intuited. Alternatively, it holds that S’s having an intuition that p
prima facie justifies S in believing that p. Given a capacious view of evidence,
then, both the intuiting and the intuited are treated as evidence, the occurrence of
the former being treated as prima facie non-inferential justification for accepting
the latter and the latter as a potential inferential justification for further
propositions.6
I will follow this common usage here, treating both the having and the content of a
seeming as evidential in the sense that they provide prima facie justification for the
intuited proposition.

5
6

Ibid.
Ibid., Section 2.4.
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So perhaps van Inwagen has some private evidence for the truth of
incompatibilism--the sort of evidence that is exemplified by knowing when one’s spouse
is angry, or by “chicken sexers,” or by mathematicians who intuit mathematical
propositions prior to proving them, etc. Maybe so, but this is ultimately an unsatisfying
response.
Consider the implications: surely not all philosophical (or other) disagreements
are due to differing private evidence. As van Inwagen says:
Am I to believe that in every case in which I believe something many other
philosophers deny (and this comes down to: in every case in which I accept some
substantive philosophical thesis), I am right and they are wrong, and that, in every
such case, my epistemic circumstances are superior to theirs? Am I to believe that
in every such case this is because some neural quirk has provided me with
evidence that is inaccessible to them? If I do believe this, I must ask myself, is it
the same neural quirk in each case or a different one? If it is the same one, it
begins to look more a case of “my superior cognitive architecture” than a case of
“accidental feature of my cognitive architecture.” If it is a different one in each
case--well, that is quite a coincidence, isn’t it?7
I take it that “neural quirk” here is a stand-in for all forms of private evidence that one
might have, even though, technically speaking, a neural quirk would be the a cause of
private evidence, not private evidence itself. Ultimately, van Inwagen cannot believe that
he has such private evidence in every case in which he disagrees with a peer.8 Since he
cannot otherwise justify his superiority to Lewis, or Lewis’s to him, he is left with a
dilemma: either he and Lewis are both irrational, or both rational. It’s unlikely to be the
former, but he also thinks it cannot be the latter, owing to the arguments given above
about the nature of evidence. The implication here is that we should become agnostics

Peter van Inwagen, “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” 27.
Van Inwagen does not use “peer” language, though it is implied that Lewis is his epistemic equal with
respect to the question of free will.
7
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regarding a topic or proposition about which there’s a dispute among the informed. But
we can’t do that--literally, are unable to--and so we’re stuck believing that we’re rational
and that our disputants often are as well, although we have no way to justify this.
Fortunately, given the critique of the Uniqueness Thesis advanced above, we need
not follow van Inwagen into this dilemma, as it remains an open question whether a body
of evidence may support more than one conclusion.
But what about the possibility of private evidence? Is it reasonable to believe that
one’s view is correct while the view of one’s peer is mistaken, because one has some
private evidence that this is so? Two questions arise here:
(1)

Just what is this private evidence? What is its nature? Can we say anything
more about it that will help us understand why it is not communicable,
and/or how it provides justification?

(2)

Is it ever reasonable to rely on private evidence in a dispute with an
epistemic peer?9

To my knowledge, (1) has not been explicitly discussed at length in the disagreement
literature.10 It is often set aside, as in van Inwagen, in favor of focusing on (2). This is
understandable if, whatever private evidence turns out to be, it is never reasonable to rely
on it when disagreeing with a peer. In that case the concept of private evidence is of no
use to the peer disagreement debate. But the “if” of two sentences back is a big one. So I
think that (1) is worth considering in its own right. I will do so in the next chapter via a
comparison with perceptual seeming, which is used throughout the professional literature

9

Related to this is the question whether non-arbitrary criteria can be given for the application of private
evidence as a way to break the apparent epistemic symmetry between peers.
10
Even describing its relation to intuitions, as we did above, goes beyond what the major players in the
disagreement debate have said, with the exception of Gideon Rosen, whose views we will discuss below.
By and large, they are more focused on what one may reasonably do with one’s seemings than on the
seemings themselves. I think this is an oversight.
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on disagreement as an analogy with what I call evidential seeming--the seeming to one
that evidence E supports proposition p.
For the present, however, let’s consider (2) more closely. Here is van Inwagen’s
argument for a negative answer to (2), paraphrased:
Private evidence cannot be sufficient to justify a preference for one’s own view in
every case of belief in a disputed proposition.11 This is because one would be left
with a dilemma if this were the case: either the cause of one’s private evidence is
the same in each dispute, or the cause is different in each dispute. If it is the same,
then this is equivalent to saying that one is simply cognitively superior; i.e., it is
equivalent to denying that any disputant is one’s peer. If it is different in each
dispute, then this is too unlikely to be believed, since one would have to be
supremely lucky to have been born with access to all the private evidence one
would need to form all the correct beliefs about everything.12
One obvious response to van Inwagen here is to say that private evidence need not
justify a preference for one’s own view in every case, but rather only in those cases in
which one has done all she can to share her evidence and to consider that of her peer, but
to no avail, and yet it still really seems to her that she is correctly assessing the total
evidence. Perhaps van Inwagen’s and David Lewis’s disagreement over free will was just
such a situation. But how often do philosophers (or anyone else) take that kind of time to
really get to know one another and hash out an issue for a period of years? I suspect,
though I have no hard evidence on the matter, that this is rare, and that therefore full
disclosure even of the evidence that is shareable with respect to some dispute, is rare. If
this is right, then perhaps van Inwagen’s dilemma is not so bad, since a person would

In the context of van Inwagen’s discussion, the propositions in question are substantive philosophical
theses, and the disputants are other philosophers, but we can safely extend his argument to other sorts of
disputed propositions. Also, for the time being, I will limit the class of disputants to experts, since in those
cases, differences of opinion cannot so easily be chalked up to a lack of sharable information.
12
One could, I suppose, bite this bullet. I once heard Richard Swinburne, known both for his uses of
Bayesian probability theory in the examination of the existence of God and religious belief and for the
remarkable stability of his opinions, observe with apparent seriousness how unlikely it must have been for
him to have begun with all the correct beliefs.
11
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only rarely, if ever, find herself in a situation where she would need to fall back on the
likelihood of her having private evidence for some proposition.
But this is not a completely satisfying response. Even if it is rare to share all of the
evidence that one can, it surely happens, and in such a case it may still feel out of place to
chalk the disagreement up to having one’s own private evidence. This is because in the
imagined cases, one considers the interlocutor to be her intellectual equal, or in the jargon
of the disagreement debate, her peer. The situation is really this: person S has shared all
of the evidence that she can with a peer, and the peer has clearly understood all of that
evidence and the arguments offered in support of a view. However, S thinks that the peer
must still be mistaken because S has some evidence that she can’t articulate. To van
Inwagen, this sounds like unjustified confidence. He claims that this is because S would
not be able to use this same justification in every case of disagreement. It is for this
reason that he is hesitant to accept that private evidence can account for both his and
Lewis’s rationality, although they disagree. However, it seems to me that van Inwagen’s
hesitancy to rely on private evidence is really rooted in the fact that his disagreement is
with David Lewis, a man clearly at least his intellectual equal.13 This suggests that
considering someone a peer has some evidential force. Indeed, the more confident I am in
the peer-status of my interlocutor, the less comfortable I am likely to be with the notion

13

Elsewhere, van Inwagen says:
Look, it’s David Lewis we’re talking about here. I can remember a talented young philosopher
saying to me in the 1970s, following his first encounter with Lewis, ‘Lewis is so smart it’s scary!’;
and that has been more or less the response of all philosophers who have measured themselves
against that formidable mind. Nor could anyone suggest with a straight face that Lewis was
lacking in philosophical ability – not unless all human beings are lacking in philosophical ability.
And he was scrupulously honest: he may have believed one or two odd things, but he did believe
them, and believed them because he thought that they were straightforward objective truths.
See Peter van Inwagen, “Listening to Clifford’s Ghost,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 65
(2009): 25-26.
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that I am correct by virtue of some private evidence that I have.14 It is peerhood itself that
raises the question of when it is appropriate to rely on private evidence, because when I
recognize someone as my epistemic peer, I cannot so easily discount their private
evidence as less evidentially weighty than my own. This leads van Inwagen and others to
answer “no” to (2) above. Whether this response is warranted will depend on the
evidential value we assign to both private seemings (discussed in Chapter Four), and to
disagreement itself (discussed in Chapters Five and Six). For the present it is sufficient to
note that many commentators in the disagreement debate claim that there is a tension
between the reasonableness of relying on private evidence and considering an
interlocutor to be an epistemic peer. However, for all we’ve said so far, this tension does
not yet provide sufficient reason to reject the reasonableness of relying on private
evidence. So our answer to (2) for now is maybe, contingent on the answer to (1), which
is just to say that, contra van Inwagen, there is no prima facie reason to reject the
reasonableness of relying on private evidence in a dispute without a fuller account of the
nature of that evidence.
2.2 – Feldman on the Relevance of Private Evidence

14

And yet I am still likely to consider it. This suggests that our intuitions about peerhood are compatible
with the possibility of private evidence, since if the two were really incompatible we would presumably not
feel any temptation to consider private evidence when disagreeing with a peer. This is a point in favor of
one way of defining peerhood--as equality with respect to various “disagreement factors”--and against
another way of defining it--as equal likelihood to be correct. For if I took you to be equally likely to be
correct as me, then any private evidence either of us may have would already be accounted for in
calculating our likelihoods, and would therefore be irrelevant to our present disagreement. For further
discussion of these competing notions of peerhood, see Chapter Seven.
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Richard Feldman also discusses, and dismisses, private evidence.15 Following van
Inwagen and Gideon Rosen, whose view will be discussed below, Feldman understands
private evidence to be a kind of seeming or intuition. As he says, “The idea… is that the
seeming obviousness, or the intuitive correctness, of one’s position counts as evidence.”16
Recall here van Inwagen’s knowledge of his wife’s mood, or the intuition of the chicken
sexer. The defender of reasonable disagreement might argue that this sort of evidence
gives one sufficient reason to justify her view, even if a peer disagrees. But Feldman does
not think this will work either, for the simple reason that each party to the disagreement
knows--or can be brought to know--about the private insight of the other party.17 Here
Feldman gives an argument against the relevance of private evidence that echoes van
Inwagen’s argument with respect to (2) above. The argument is as follows:
(1) If the parties to a disagreement each have private evidence with respect to a
proposition p, then each may be brought to know that the other also has private
evidence.

Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations
on Atheism and the Secular Life, ed. Louise Antony (Oxford University Press, 2007), 206-209. In this
context, Feldman notes that “if all the evidence were shared, there could not be a reasonable disagreement.
This is the consequence of The Uniqueness Thesis” (207). But this is too strong: the defender of reasonable
disagreement need not concede this point. She needs only maintain the possibility of justifying evidence
that cannot be communicated. She need not grant the further claim that if it were communicated, then it
would also be justifying in the same way for the other party. In other words, private evidence supports the
possibility of reasonable disagreement whether or not the Uniqueness Thesis is true.
16
Ibid., 207. This way of framing the issue makes it seem as though one’s seeming is additional evidence
besides whatever arguments or observations led one to believe a proposition in the first place. This,
however, is not the only way to think about private evidence. Here is another: I have a low confidence level
in my ability to communicate certain elements of my experience, which suggests that they could in
principle be communicated better than I can manage, and that they certainly could be understood better if
the other person could simply share the experience. This difference--between my experience and their
understanding of my experience--is itself evidence to me of the following proposition: “I possibly possess
private evidence of the truth of p.” I cannot be sure that the other person ever really understands my
evidence, or I hers (indeed, the lower my confidence level in my ability to communicate my experience, the
stronger my evidence for private evidence). Nonetheless, my private evidence, if it exists, is a proper part
of my already accounted-for total evidence for p, prior to recognizing that it may be private. I’ll return to
this point below when I discuss David Christensen’s dismissal of private evidence.
17
If the reader has the strong reaction here that knowing about someone’s insight is obviously different
from having that insight, keep reading.
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(2) Knowing that there is evidence for a proposition itself constitutes evidence for
that proposition.
(3) If one’s disputant in a disagreement is taken to be an epistemic peer, then the
peer’s private evidence should be considered to be on par with one’s own
private evidence, unless one has some further reason to prefer one’s own private
evidence.
(4) Therefore, in the absence of a reason to prefer one’s own private evidence over a
peer’s, one should suspend judgment about the disputed proposition.18
Premise (1) is not intended to be controversial, and I do not wish to argue this point, so
I’ll stipulate that in most realistic cases of disagreement, each party can in fact be made
aware that the other claims private evidence. Premise (2) constitutes what I’ll call the
“Meta-Evidence Principle,” and will be discussed in Chapter Six. For the present, I will
grant this premise. Premise (3) is a ban on what Ralph Wedgwood has called an
“egocentric epistemic bias,” i.e., a tendency to prefer one’s own view or to weigh one’s
own insight more heavily simply because it is one’s own.19 This will be discussed below,
but it is on this point that I wish to focus my critique of Feldman’s argument against the
relevance of private evidence.
As I will show in the next chapter, private evidence is generally thought of in
terms of an analogy with perception: evidential seemings are taken to be analogous in
some sense to perceptual seemings. Feldman, for example, employs the perceptual
analogy in the case of the dean in the quad, mentioned above. Indeed, the case does much
of the argumentative work for Feldman, since it is designed to support the view that in
cases of straightforward perceptual disagreement, it is unreasonable to assume that it is
the other person whose eyes are malfunctioning. When I see the dean and you don’t, it is

This is a reconstruction of Feldman’s argument on pp. 208-209.
See Ralph Wedgwood, “Disagreement and the A Priori,” in The Nature of Normativity (Oxford
University Press, 2007): 261.
18
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inappropriate for me to conclude, owing to my perceptual seeming which I cannot fully
communicate, that you are in the wrong rather than me. As Feldman says,
I cannot reasonably say, “Well, it’s really seeming to me like the dean is there.
So, even though you are justified in your belief, your appearance is deceptive.” I
need some reason to think you, rather than me, are the one with the problem.…
To think otherwise, it seems to me, is to think something like this: “You have an
insight according to which P is not true. I have one according to which P is true.
It’s reasonable for me to believe P in light of all this because, gosh darn it, my
insight supports P.” If one’s conviction survives the “confrontation with the
other,” to use Rosen’s phrase, this seems more a sign of tenacity and stubbornness
than anything else.20
The perceptual case is especially powerful here because in that sort of case, the intuition
of equality between oneself and the other is very strong.
Even so, there are serious problems with the claim that a peer’s private evidence
should be considered as evidentially equivalent to one’s own [premise (3)]. First, we
should be clear about what each party knows. Feldman says: “Each may have his or her
own special insight or sense of obviousness. But each knows about the other’s insight.
Each knows that this insight has evidential force.”21 “About” is ambiguous here. It could
mean that each is aware of there being evidence, or it could also mean that each is
acquainted with that evidence. Clearly Feldman intends the former, and yet his
conclusion seems to follow only from the latter. Each knows that the other has an insight
or sense of obviousness, and each may assume or grant that that insight has evidential
force for the other person, but neither fact provides sufficient justification for either party
to conclude that the other person’s insight is on par with one’s own. How could it, when
neither knows--is acquainted with, or has in a strong sense--that evidence? In other
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words, the actual evidence here (whatever it is) remains private, even when the other
party is made aware of its existence. So here we have a clear dissimilarity: one’s own
seeming or insight or sense of obviousness on the one hand, and the peer’s report of a
seeming, insight, sense of obviousness, etc., on the other. The decision to accord the
peer’s private evidence, to which one does not have access, equal weight as one’s own is
itself an irrational decision, since it cannot be motivated by the evidence one actually
possesses. We do not need to deny that the peer’s claim of private evidence carries
evidential force (though we will complicate this claim later); but it does not follow that it
carries sufficient force to overcome the prima facie presumption in favor of one’s own
seeming.
This is made clearer in Feldman’s example of accused criminals and Lefty and
Righty, which he modifies to illustrate his point:
Consider again the example involving the two suspects in a criminal case, Lefty
and Righty. Suppose now that there are two detectives investigating the case, one
who has the evidence about Lefty and one who has the evidence incriminating
Righty. They each justifiably believe in their man’s guilt. And then each finds out
that the other detective has evidence incriminating the other suspect. If things are
on a par, then suspension of judgment is called for. If one detective has no reason
at all to think that the other’s evidence is inferior to hers, yet she continues to
believe that Lefty is guilty, she would be unjustified. She is giving special status
to her own evidence with no reason to do so, and this is an epistemic error, a
failure to treat like cases alike. She knows that there are two bodies of equally
good evidence for incompatible propositions, and she is favoring the one that
happens to have been hers originally.22
Note the inclusion of “If things are on a par…” This is a very large if. How could either
detective possibly know whether the other’s evidence is comparable until she knows what
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it is? But she cannot know that if it’s private.23 Granted, she may lack a reason for
thinking that it’s inferior to her own, but she also lacks any reason for thinking that it’s
superior or even equal to her own. All she has evidence for is that it’s sufficient to
motivate conviction in her peer. It may be, for all we have said so far, that this alone is
reason enough to lead her to lower her credence in her own view, but if so that is due to
the epistemic relevance of peerhood, not to private evidence per se. Given that peerhood
is the subject of Chapter Seven, I will reserve discussion of this point.
Note also that Feldman claims the detective “knows that there are two bodies of
equally good evidence for incompatible propositions…” But this isn’t right--she knows
only that there are two bodies of evidence sufficient to warrant belief in opposed
propositions. If the evidence is really private, she can discern nothing about its objective
value.
As we will see below, peerhood implies, among other things, that we are
generally equal with respect to whatever faculties contribute to assessing evidence well.
However, it does not imply anything in the present case, which concerns private
evidence. If I believe that you and I are epistemic peers, then I will accord your view
some evidential weight, even if I don’t know the specifics of your evidence, but I must
also weigh your view against my own seemings, and it is not yet clear that your view
should counterbalance mine. Indeed, given that most instances of peer disagreement are
unlikely to move far beyond the initial recognition of disagreement, we can already say
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This quote comes from the section where Feldman is considering private evidence. He is here using a
case which includes in-principle shareable evidence to help him make the point that knowing that someone
else has comparable evidence to your own implies that you should not prefer your own to theirs simply
because it is your own. This comparison (between shareable evidence and private evidence) is problematic
for the reasons I point out in the text.
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that one is usually justified in maintaining one’s view after recognition of peer
disagreement, owing to one’s possession of private evidential seemings which are not
overcome by the report of another’s contrary seemings. Nothing Feldman has said about
private evidence should lead us to reject this conclusion. Indeed, it will be strengthened
when we consider the relationship between evidential and perceptual seemings in the next
chapter. So Feldman, like van Inwagen, has not given us sufficient reason to regard the
possibility of private evidence as irrelevant or unreasonable.
2.3 – Christensen on the Symmetry of Private Evidence

David Christensen, another Conformist, has also argued against the relevance of
private evidence.24 Christensen argues that once I discover that a peer disagrees with me
about p, this gives me two sorts of evidence: evidence that the peer has made a mistake-because she has reached what I take to be a wrong conclusion--and evidence that I have
made a mistake, because an epistemic peer disagrees with me.25 This results in an
evidentially symmetrical situation, according to Christensen, and so the reasonable thing
to do is to lower one’s credence in p. He illustrates this with an example: I check my
wristwatch for the time, and my friend does the same. The watches are of comparable
quality and, so far as I know, equal reliability.26 But on this occasion they disagree by
about 10 minutes. Clearly, says Christensen, I should not prefer the time given by my
watch simply because it is on my wrist.

David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 116, no. 2
(2007): 199-205.
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Ibid., 196.
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time, etc.
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This analogy is crude: watches are external objects and can be neutrally
compared. I, on the other hand, cannot get out of my epistemic perspective to compare it
with a peer’s. But Christensen says the watch analogy is accurate in the following way: I
have no reason, outside of the disagreement itself, to prefer my view to my peer’s.
Indeed, explaining our disagreement by saying that my peer must be the mistaken one
because she disagrees with me, is question-begging. Further, Christensen argues,
stipulating that it seems to me that my peer is the incorrect one from within a first-person
perspective won’t change the epistemic situation. Though Christensen does not use the
phrase “private evidence” here, I take it that this is what he has in mind with the “firstperson perspective” language. As he says, “it seems to me that taking a first-person
perspective on the situation does not license me in thinking that disagreement with my
friend is better explained by her error than by mine.”27 So the challenge is to explain the
disagreement from my first-person perspective “in a way that does not just beg the
question in favor of the opinion I currently hold.”28
Christensen’s solution is to require that any explanation of the disagreement that
favors one party over the other must be based on reasoning that is independent of the
matter under dispute.29 The question is then whether private evidence is independent of
the disputed matter.30 Taking it to be so is anomalous, for private evidence is typically
thought of in terms of a seeming or intuition that such-and-such evidence really does
support p.
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Consider, in this regard, another of Christensen’s cases: two meteorologists study
the same weather data and come to slightly different conclusions about the chance of rain
tomorrow: meteorologist A puts it at 55%, and meteorologist B puts it at 45%.31 Assume
that prior to examining the weather data, both A and B take one another to be peers with
respect to discerning the likelihood of rain based on this kind of data. We can even
stipulate that if we asked them prior to examining the data who they thought would be
correct in the event of this kind of disagreement, they both would have said that they had
an equal chance of being correct. When A learns about B’s differing assessment of the
evidence, she should probably be a bit less confident in her own assessment than she had
been a moment before, given that she considers B a peer and had even predicted that in
just this sort of situation, B would be as likely as herself to be correct. So let’s say she
goes back through the weather data and examines it even more carefully than before, and
she still comes away with the view that there is a 55% chance of rain. Moreover, after
having spent this extra time with the data, she is now more aware than before just how
apparent this result is, and she has a hard time imagining how B could come away with a
lower result. In other words, she has a seeming or a felt sense of obviousness that 55% is
the chance that the data supports.
Is this seeming new evidence independent of the issue which is already in
dispute? It seems not. Granted, she noticed the seeming after becoming aware of the
disagreement, and we can even say that she would not have noticed it without the
disagreement, and we can grant that the seeming is strengthened by reviewing the data,
but it always seemed to her that the chance of rain was 55%. If she were asked why she
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thinks that is the right prediction, her answer would certainly involve the weather data
that she and B examined, the application of various meteorological models, her
calculation, and so on. It would certainly not involve her own seeming. If this is right--if
seemings are not independent evidence--then Christensen’s condition rules them out, and
thereby prohibits private evidence in the form of seemings. Indeed, Christensen later
implies that private evidence would not be independent: he references van Inwagen
mentioning “incommunicable insight” and concludes that since “van Inwagen does not
claim to be able to point to any reason, independent of the disagreement itself, for
thinking that those who disagree with him lack some special insight he has,” he therefore
ought to conciliate.32
Is Christensen’s independent evidence condition warranted? First, note some of
its counterintuitive consequences: the theist who has had what she takes to be obvious
and compelling mystical experiences must consider these private seemings to be
evidentially empty when she encounters an atheist peer who has had no such experiences.
Similarly, a savant who can “see” the answer to a calculation immediately and clearly-and who has never been wrong--must consider this seeming to be evidentially irrelevant
when confronted with a peer who gets a different answer.33 Van Inwagen, who can sense
when his wife is angry, must set that seeming aside when her sister (say) insists that she
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isn’t. And so on.34 This does not by itself show that the condition is unwarranted, but it
does cast some doubt on it.
There are, in addition, more serious problems with it. The condition is open to
counterexample in cases in which either: (i) there is no independent evidence but it is
clear whether one should conciliate or not, or (ii) there is independent evidence, and it is
clear whether, ceteris paribus, one should conciliate or not, but, all things considered, one
should not do what is ceteris paribus required because of the independent evidence, or
(iii) gathering independent evidence is unrealistic or practically costly.
Let us consider these cases in order:
(i) Consider Christensen’s case of the bill calculation. One person arrives at an
obviously false answer, say, a $450 share. In this case, it is apparent that one should not
move one’s belief in the direction of one’s peer at all, since the peer’s result is plainly
wrong. Christensen agrees but says that this is because there is independent evidence
here: the peer’s violation of a norm of common sense. After all, common sense dictates
that a share of a bill cannot be more than the total bill. So once one realizes that her peer
has violated this norm, she has evidence independent of the original dispute that justifies
her in maintaining her own view. But Christensen acknowledges, rightly, that this may
not be convincing because the person is still experiencing the violation of the norm as a
felt sense of obviousness. He, however, rejects this point. But he shouldn’t. Christensen
himself is simply redescribing the basis for the act of non-conciliation so that it sounds
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independent of the dispute at issue, when it in fact is not. One’s sense that her peer’s
answer is obviously wrong is part of the original evidence that constitutes the
disagreement.35
Christensen attempts to dodge this bullet by switching cases. He brings up a
different case in which it is clearer that there is no independent evidence. He does this in
order to show that in such cases, maintaining one’s view is arbitrary and therefore
unreasonable. The example he uses is the mathematical savant case. Imagined two peer
savants who both “see” the answer to a math problem and yet disagree. He thinks that the
savants should both conciliate, since neither can appeal to an outside piece of evidence to
support the view that it is his peer who is mistaken.
That is Christensen’s intuition. I have a different one. Mine is that if it seems to
one in the clear and vivid way that the “seeing” metaphor suggests that p is true, then that
is sufficient reason to maintain belief in p, even if a peer disagrees and also claims a clear
and vivid seeming. This is due largely to my view of peerhood and its significance, which
will be discussed in Chapter Seven. For now, it is enough to point out a problem with this
case. Christensen apparently intends it to mollify the objector in the previous case, about
which he acknowledges that one may not share his intuition that the evidence there is
truly independent. But this case is no improvement, since it does not in fact show that in
peer situations with no independent evidence, one should conciliate. Rather, it shows that
in cases of perceptual disagreement between peers (for that is what the savant case
amounts to), there is no good reason to break the stalemate. It is true, but unremarkable,
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that in such a situation one cannot be sure that one’s seeming is veridical. Nonetheless, it
may still be reasonable to stick to one’s vivid seeming, rather than to cast about for some
“independent evidence,” find none, and on that basis decide to lower one’s credence.
(ii) In the bill calculation case with an obviously false answer, a person is
reasonable to “stick to her guns” because she has a clear and vivid seeming that the peer
must have made a mistake. This is why in fact most people in such a situation would
refuse to alter their view, and this is the proximal explanation of the reasonability of
refusing to alter one’s view, even if there is, as Christensen argues, a possible distal
explanation having to do with violations of norms of common sense. If Christensen is
right about the independent evidence condition and about the norm violation being
independent evidence, this would entail that most people in such circumstances are not in
fact acting reasonably when they maintain their view, as he admits they should, since
they would be doing so for the wrong reason: a seeming. Even if we agree with
Christensen that in the bill calculation case one’s appeal to a violation of a norm of
common sense is in fact an appeal to independent evidence, if one is not conciliating
because of that independent evidence, then one is not in fact reasonable to conciliate. I
take it this consequence is sufficiently counterintuitive--counter to Christensen’s own
stated intuitions--to reject the independent evidence condition.
(iii) It is also possible that there would be practical costs to seeking independent
evidence that would outweigh the potential benefit of finding such evidence, even if there
is independent evidence to be found.36 Take, for example, the case of two epistemic peers

Marc Moffett considers something like this; see Marc Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational
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disagreeing over abortion.37 Neither has any particular expertise in the matter, but both
have a felt sense of obviousness about the morality of abortion. They’ve shared all of the
arguments and evidence in the form of data, statistics, moral principles, and so on, that
they can think of, and each remains convinced that the other is mistaken. As things stand,
on Christensen’s account, neither has any reason to prefer her own view, and so both
should conciliate, unless there is independent evidence to appeal to that would make it
reasonable to conclude that the other person is mistaken. Presumably, either party could,
if she chose, go out and begin interviewing people who have direct experience with
abortion, physicians, policy-makers, judges, ethicists, and the like. On the basis of these
interviews, one may find some additional support for or against one’s own view that was
not included in the previously shared evidence. But given the practical difficulty of
undertaking such an enterprise, can we really consider someone irrational for not
conciliating? Some commentators have allowed for a rational resistance to this sort of
effort under the label of “epistemic conservatism,” the view that one may be rational in
resisting belief revision if the practical cost is very high, or more modestly, that there is
an epistemic presumption in favor of one’s standing beliefs, even when one is aware of
the existence of equally justified conflicting beliefs.38 If some version of epistemic
conservatism is plausible, then one may be justified in avoiding gathering independent
evidence on practical grounds.
Thus, Christensen’s independent evidence condition is open to counterarguments.
It therefore cannot be used as a prohibition on private evidence.
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Chapter Three – The Perceptual Analogy
3.1 – Perceptual Seeming in the Disagreement Debate

What is a seeming? As we saw above, there is a tendency in the literature to
understand seeming to be the case that p--call this evidential seeming--as analogous to
perceptual seeming--seeming to see that p.1
Alvin Plantinga gives a nice characterization of what he calls “doxastic
experience,” based primarily on memorial and a priori sources of belief. It can, I think, be
applied to what I’m calling evidential seeming:2
…experience comes in several varieties. First, there is sensuous imagery, the kind
of experience you have most prominently in vision but in hearing, smelling,
tasting, and touching as well. To use Roderick Chisholm's terminology, in this
kind of experience one is appeared to in such and such a way. Sensuous imagery
plays an enormously significant role in perception; perceptual beliefs are formed
in response to sensuous imagery and on the basis of such imagery. Still, this isn’t
the only kind of experience that goes with belief formation…the formation of
memory beliefs is often unaccompanied by phenomenal experience, or else
accompanied only by fragmentary, fleeting, indistinct, hard‐to‐focus sensuous
imagery. You remember that you went to a party in Novosibirsk; there is a bit of
imagery, all right, although it is fleeting, partial, indistinct, and such that when
you try to focus your attention on it, it disappears. But there is another kind of
experience present: the belief that it was Novosibirsk (and not, say, Cleveland)
seems right, acceptable, natural; it forces itself upon you; it seems somehow
inevitable (the right words are hard to find). The belief feels right, acceptable, and
natural; it feels different from what you think is a false belief. The same goes for
1
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sense that they essentially have conceptual items, such as propositions, as objects. I intend my arguments
here to remain neutral between conceptual and nonconceptual understandings of evidential and perceptual
seemings. I want only to illustrate the widely assumed view in the disagreement literature that whatever can
be said about the justifying role of perceptual seemings should apply, mutatis mutandis, to the justifying
role of evidential seemings. For an account of the epistemological role of conceptual/nonconceptual and
perceptual/nonperceptual experiences, including an extended argument regarding how nonconceptual
perceptual contents play an evidential, justifying role, see Paul K. Moser, Knowledge and Evidence
(Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially Section 2.3.2 (esp. pp. 84-6), Section 3.4 (esp. pp. 156-8),
Section 4.1.1. (esp. pp. 181-3), and Section 4.2 (esp. p. 192). See also pp. 34-35 above.
2
One difference is that evidential seeming need not yield belief--it may yield a variety of other cognitive
attitudes such as acceptance, assumption, or deferral of judgment. In this sense it is not properly “doxastic”
according to Plantinga’s usage.

55
a priori belief. You believe that no dogs are sets. This belief, too, involves little
by way of sensuous imagery. When you consider that proposition, perhaps it is as
if you catch a momentary and fleeting glimpse of part of a sentence expressing the
proposition, or perhaps a fragmentary glimpse of a dog, or perhaps of a dog
enclosed within braces; this imagery seems unimportant, however, more like mere
decoration than something on the basis of which the belief in question is formed.
And here, too, there is also this other sort of experience: it’s just seeming true and
indeed necessarily true that no dogs are sets. Thinking about this proposition feels
different from thinking about the proposition that some dogs…are sets. Still a
third kind of example…: the knowledge that it is you (as opposed to someone
else) who is now perceiving the page in front of you. This too is not a matter of
sensuous imagery: it is not on the basis of sensuous imagery that you believe it is
you who are perceiving that page, rather than your cousin in Cleveland. Here too
there is that other sort of phenomenal experience, that feeling that the proposition
in question is the right one. Suppose we call this second kind of phenomenal
experience doxastic experience because it always goes with the formation of
belief….3
This sense that an epistemic state of affairs is “right, acceptable, natural” also applies, I
believe, to evidential situations. It seems to a person that her evidence supports p, that
concluding that p is the case on the basis of this evidence is the “right, acceptable,
natural” thing to do. As Plantinga says, there need be no imagery that accompanies this
felt sense, but it nonetheless feels different from the thought that the evidence does not
support p. That thought feels wrong, unacceptable, unnatural. Perhaps the closest we can
get to a fuller account of this feeling is by comparing it with the more imagistic
experience of sense perception. Note that Plantinga implies that the paradigmatic case of
experience or seeming is perceptual, and that what goes for it epistemically also typically
goes for other forms of experience.
This comparison is also common in the disagreement literature. For example, van
Inwagen, speaking of private evidence, writes:
Owing to some neural accident (I might say) I have a kind of insight into the, oh, I
don't know, entailment relations among various of the propositions that figure in
3
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the Ism/Nism debate that is denied to the Nismists. I see, perhaps, that p entails q
(although I am unable to formulate this insight verbally) and they are unable to
see that p entails q.4
Here the sense that some proposition follows from another is analogous to the sense that
perceptually something is the case. Similarly, Feldman’s dean-in-the-quad analogy
suggests that he takes perceptual and evidential seemings to be analogous, and so what
goes for one goes for the other. For example, he disallows the evidential relevance of
private evidence analogous to van Inwagen’s “insight” or “sense of obviousness” by
citing the case of perceptual disagreement:
…compare a more straightforward case of regular sight, rather than insight.
Suppose you and I are standing by the window looking out on the quad. We think
we have comparable vision and we know each other to be honest. I seem to see
what looks to me like the dean standing out in the middle of the quad.… I believe
that the dean is standing on the quad. Meanwhile, you seem to see nothing of the
kind there. You think that no one, and thus not the dean, is standing in the middle
of the quad. We disagree.… Either I am “seeing things,” or you are missing
something. I would not be reasonable in thinking that the problem is in your head,
nor would you be reasonable in thinking that the problem is in mine.5
This case would not be a sufficient response to the epistemic relevance of private
evidential seemings unless Feldman took such seemings to be analogous to perceptual
seemings.
Gideon Rosen has perhaps been most explicit in drawing this analogy, and it is
worth quoting him at length. In the context of discussing how the realization of the
contingency of one’s beliefs may affect one’s confidence in those beliefs, Rosen airs the

Peter van Inwagen, “We’re Right. They’re Wrong,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted
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possibility that perception-like seemings could play a justificatory role in non-perceptual
contexts:
It is a familiar thought that perceptual knowledge rests on a principle to the effect
that certain non-doxastic ‘perceptual seemings’ constitute grounds for belief. If it
seems to me that there is a cat on the mat, then I have reason to believe that there
is a cat on the mat. Its seeming to me that P is not a matter of my believing
anything. It is a sui generis propositional attitude that does not stand in need of
justification but which is capable of supporting a perceptual judgment that P. The
justificatory connection between seeming and believing is immediate. It does not
depend on the reliability of the transition.… Nor does it depend on the subject’s
believing that perceptual seemings are reliable.6
After providing this characterization, Rosen discusses three cases in which such
seemings--such “non-doxastic appearing-true” as he puts it--are justificatory in an
analogous way to perceptual seemings.7 The first is desire:
Mark Johnston has argued that a certain sort of desire is best understood as a
matter of being “struck by the appeal of things.” This “being struck by the appeal”
is a quasi-perceptual matter--it is phenomenologically vivid, for example; but
since it is typically directed at hypothetical states of affairs, it is not literally a
matter of perception.8
The second is moral evaluation:
Like perceptual seeming, evaluative seeming is not doxastic. It is a matter of an
object’s seeming to one to possess one or another highly determinate evaluative
property. There may be other routes to evaluative knowledge. But it is plausible
that insofar as perceptual judgment is canonically grounded in perceptual
appearances, evaluative judgment is canonically grounded in evaluative
appearances. That one finds a certain contemplated course of action appalling is a
reason for taking it to be appalling. And once again, it is plausible that this is a
basic epistemic norm, ungrounded in further facts (or thoughts) about the
reliability of evaluative seeming.9
The third is modal judgment:
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Ibid., 88.
8
Ibid., 87. Rosen here cites Mark Johnston, “The Authority of Affect,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 63, no. 1 (2001): 181–214.
9
Ibid.
6
7

58
Steve Yablo has argued that judgments of metaphysical possibility are typically
grounded in intuitions of conceivability. On Yablo’s view, to conceive that P in
the relevant sense is a compound act: One first imagines a P-world, and that world
then strikes one as possible. The model is as above. The non-doxastic modal
seeming provides a sufficient though defeasible ground for the modal judgment.
And in this case in particular there is no thought that the seeming need be a matter
of sensitivity to the facts in question.10
He concludes:
These cases suggest a pattern. It may be that as a general matter, one’s finding it
obvious upon reflection that P is the case--its striking one that P; it seeming
clearly to be the case that P--amounts to a ground for believing that P.11
Seemings are non-doxastic, pre-theoretical, sui generis, basic, and generative of prima
facie justification.12 This is the fullest description one gets in the disagreement literature
of this phenomenon. And it is noteworthy that this description is assumed by almost
everyone else in the literature, along with the perceptual analogy on which it is based.
For example, Adam Elga uses the perceptual analogy to highlight what he takes to
be the strengths of his “Equal Weight View,” which recommends according equal weight
to one’s own assessment of the evidence and to that of one’s epistemic peer. Considering
a case of perceptual disagreement in which two peers differently judge the outcome of a
horse race, he says:

Ibid. Rosen here cites Stephen Yablo, “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 53, no. 1 (1993): 1–42. Cf. Kripke on modal intuitions: “Of course, some
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think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don’t know, in a way, what more
conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking.” See Saul Kripke, Naming and
Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 42.
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Ibid.
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On the non-doxastic character of seemings, see footnote 2, this chapter. See also pp. 34-35 above.
Essentially, while all seemings may be “intellectual” in the sense of having propositional content, they do
not necessarily yield or justify beliefs--they may instead justify weaker cognitive states, like acceptance.
Going forward, I will gloss this distinction and speak of “belief” in a loose way to connote any of the class
of propositional attitudes which may be justified by a seeming.
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Here is the bottom line. When you find out that you and your friend have come to
opposite conclusions about a race, you should think that the two of you are
equally likely to be correct. The same goes for other sorts of disagreements.13
Elga then adapts an argument brought against reliabilism about perceptual knowledge,
and uses it against those who would argue that it is reasonable to maintain one’s view in
the context of peer disagreement, regardless of the type of disagreement.14 The details of
these arguments don’t matter in this context. The important point is that Elga takes for
granted that an objection to a view about perceptual disagreement can be applied to all
other sorts of disagreement.
Similarly, Thomas Kelly, in his critique of the Equal Weight View, does not deny
the perceptual analogy--he implicitly accepts it--and then takes pains to show that his
own “Total Evidence View” yields the same verdict as the Equal Weight View in
perceptual cases.15
Elsewhere, Michael Bergmann adopts the perceptual analogy in defending the
claim that disagreement with an epistemic peer after full disclosure of evidence need not
lead one to revise her view. To the conformist, Bergmann says:
I think that the rational response for S1 to E is to continue believing p. However, I
don’t have an argument for that conclusion, just as I don’t have an argument for
the conclusion that the rational response for us to a tactile experience like the one
we typically have when grabbing a billiard ball is to believe something like
“that’s a small hard spherical object”. I can see, in the case of the billiard ball, that
that belief is a rational response to the tactile experience in question. But I don’t
have an argument for why that is so. Likewise, I don’t have an argument for the
view that the rational response for S1 to E is to continue believing p.16
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Here the analogy with perception is especially clear, as is the assumption that like
perceptual seemings, evidential seemings are basic and prima facie justified (i.e., without
need of argument or further evidence). Bergmann goes on to give examples of other cases
in which one need not modify one’s view, despite knowing that a peer disagrees for
reasons similar to those one uses to reject the peer’s view. The examples need not detain
us here, but it is noteworthy that they are inspired by an epistemological issue in which
perceptual beliefs are typically implicated: skepticism about the external world. “We
realize,” Bergmann says, “that it’s possible for things to seem to us perceptually just as
they do now even though we are mistaken.”17 Nonetheless, it is rational to hold onto our
belief in an external world, even if we can’t prove it. The same applies, mutatis mutandis,
to cases of peer disagreement in realms as varied as morality, religion, and politics.
Other commentators also assume the perceptual analogy. Marc Moffett argues
that it may be reasonable to use disagreement as the basis for reassessing an interlocutor’s
status as a peer. To illustrate this, he uses the now-familiar perceptual case of looking out
the window and seeing someone in the quad. Interestingly, however, his conclusion about
the case differs from those of other commentators: Moffett argues that in such a case,
“my visual evidence is so strong, that it simply makes more sense to jettison my
antecedent belief that you are an epistemic peer than to accept that I am mistaken.”18 This
is because the changes to my “overall theory of the world” are less radical on the
supposition that you are not my peer than on the supposition that my senses are presently
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deceiving me.19 Moffett then takes this point to apply broadly to all types of peer
disagreement, including non-perceptual cases, implying that what holds for visual
evidence also holds for other sorts of evidence.
Lastly, Jennifer Lackey suggests that conclusions drawn on the basis of perceptual
cases can and should be applied more broadly. For example, while she rejects the
Nonconformist view, she admits that the Nonconformist position yields the correct
verdict in cases of perceptual disagreement, and that this helps to explain what is
attractive about the Nonconformist position in general.20 Moreover, she notes as much in
the course of observing that Nonconformists (and everyone else in the debate) hold to
“Uniformity,” the view that peer disagreement functions the same--and therefore has the
same type of solution--in all epistemic contexts.21 She eventually rejects Uniformity,
since some types of disagreement have apparently Nonconformist solutions, such as
perceptual disagreement, while other types have apparently Conformist solutions.
However, she does not question the basic idea that perceptual disagreement is analogous
to other sorts of disagreement. She merely attributes the connection between
disagreement-types to the fact that many cases of disagreement, perception among them,
involve highly justified underwriting beliefs.22 Insofar as a case of disagreement does not
involve highly justified underwriting beliefs--i.e., beliefs which resemble the justification
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structure of perceptual beliefs--it is more likely to be susceptible to a Conformist-style
solution. So on Lackey’s justificationist account, the perceptual analogy is preserved.
3.2 – Implications of the Analogy

I take it that this survey of the disagreement literature is adequate to establish that
the analogy between perceptual seemings and evidential seemings is widely assumed and,
indeed, apparently uncontroversial. This is a telling feature of the debate. For one thing, it
suggests broad agreement among commentators on the basic justificational structure of
evidential seemings, namely, that they are like perceptual seemings, and that this entails
that they are prima facie justified. It also has the interesting consequence that attempts to
argue for the epistemic legitimacy of one’s evidential seemings, as with one’s perceptual
seemings, will be inevitably circular (hence Bergmann’s comment above about the proper
epistemic response to his perception of the billiard ball). This is because any argument
for rational reliance on one’s perceptual seemings will necessarily involve premises
which appeal to one’s perceptual experience. As Rosen says:
…insofar as we are justified in believing that perceptual seemings are generally
veridical, it is because we are independently justified in accepting a detailed
account of the perceptual mechanisms which can only be grounded in particular
instances of the transition from ‘seems’ to ‘is’.23
Similarly, Ralph Wedgwood says, “…the only primitively rational way of coming
to know facts about the material world is by relying on the very experiences that are in
question.”24 Continuing, Wedgwood explains his justification for holding that there is an
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“egocentric epistemic bias” by claiming a dispositional capacity shared by all humans
capable of perceptual experiences. As he says:
I propose that the practice of forming beliefs by taking one’s sensory experiences
at face value has the following essential connection with the truth. It may be that
it is essential to sensory experiences that any subject who has such experiences at
all has some disposition to have experiences that veridically represent certain
aspects of her environment.25
Notice that this is equivalent to answering the question “How is sensory belief connected
with the truth?” by saying: “To have a sensory experience is to be disposed to have an
accurate sensory experience.” And this, in turn, is equivalent to answering: “Sensory
belief is connected to the truth by virtue of being a sensory belief.” Wedgwood continues:
“Whenever one’s experience does consist in the manifestation of this essential
disposition, then the content of the experience will be true.”26
This, however, is just unquestioning and absolute reliance on the assumed
accuracy of perceptual seemings, and is certainly too strong a claim, even if such
seemings are basic and therefore prima facie--not absolutely--justified and fundamental.
Wedgwood is essentially building truth into mechanisms that aim at truth, which is
question-begging.
The epistemic fundamentality, or “basicality,” of perceptual seemings, and the
epistemic circularity engendered by it, is widely acknowledged. For example, William
Alston has argued that owing to the social nature of our epistemic practices, justifying
our basic sources of information inferentially, or giving a non-circular argument for them,
is impossible. At the end of “Perceiving God,” Alston writes:
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Apart from reliance on doxastic tendencies with which we find ourselves, we
literally have nothing to go on. Indeed, what Descartes did, as Thomas Reid
trenchantly pointed out, was arbitrarily to pick one doxastic practice he found
himself engaged in--accepting propositions that seem self-evident--and set that as
a judge over all the others, with what results we are all too familiar. This is not to
say that we must acquiesce in our prereflective doxastic tendencies in every
respect. We can tidy things up, modify our established practices so as to make
each more internally consistent and more consistent with the others. But, on the
whole and for the most part, we have no choice but to continue to form beliefs in
accordance with these practices and to take these ways of forming beliefs as
paradigmatically conferring epistemic justification. And this is the way that
epistemology has in fact gone, except for some arbitrary partiality. Of course it
would be satisfying to economize our basic commitments by taking one or a few
of these practices as basic and using them to validate the others; but we have
made little progress in this enterprise over the centuries. It is not self-evident that
sense perception is reliable, nor can we establish its reliability if we restrict
ourselves to premises drawn from introspection; we cannot show that deductive
reasoning is valid without using deductive reasoning to do so; and so on. We are
endowed with strong tendencies to engage in a number of distinct doxastic
practices, none of which can be warranted on the basis of others. It is clearly the
better part of wisdom to recognize beliefs that emerge from these practices to be
rational and justified, at least once they are properly sifted and refined.27
Alvin Plantinga concurs with Alston, saying:
I believe he succeeds in establishing the important conclusion that it is not
possible to show in a noncircular fashion that SP [sense perception] is reliable--at
any rate he gets as close to establishing this conclusion as philosophers ever get to
establishing any important conclusion.28
Elsewhere, Plantinga himself argues for a similar point in connection with his
defense of the idea that belief in religious propositions can be justified, rational, and
“warranted” (i.e., can amount to knowledge) without any argument or evidence
whatsoever to support them. He draws upon the perceptual analogy we’ve noted in the
disagreement literature, and says:
We have perceptual beliefs: in general, there won’t be ‘appropriately cogent
evidence’ for these beliefs by way of beliefs that are themselves evidentially
independent of perceptual beliefs. The same goes for the beliefs about the past,
27
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inductive beliefs, beliefs about other minds, and the like. In each of these cases,
there is a source of warranted belief; and beliefs produced by the source in
question can’t in general be provided with that “appropriately cogent evidence”
from beliefs emanating from some other source. But of course that is nothing
against them.29
Similarly, Robert Audi has said that “To acquire justified beliefs about the
reliability of perception, moreover, we would need to use perception, say in looking at
objects again to see if our initial color perceptions were accurate.”30 To the response that
this justification may be a priori, Audi replies:
On the most plausible kind of reliability theory of justification… a belief is
justified by virtue of being grounded in reliable belief-producing processes such
as perceptual ones; and it is apparently not an a priori matter what processes are
reliable, that is, actually produce a suitably large proportion of true beliefs. This is
the sort of thing that must be determined largely by observation.31
So epistemic circularity, in the case of perceptual experience, is held by many
philosophers to be unproblematic.32 So if the perceptual analogy holds, and perceptual
seemings as justificatory cannot be non-circularly justified, then neither can evidential
seemings of the form “It seems to me that E supports p.” Demanding a further argument
for the justificatory force of this seeming, or expecting one for comparison and
assessment,33 is out of place. One cannot justify a seeming that E supports p without
relying on the same faculty of judgment that produced the initial seeming, just as one
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cannot justify perceptual seemings without relying on the same faculty of perception
which entails that perceptual seemings have evidential value.
It is clear that if the perceptual analogy we’ve been discussing holds, then if
perceptual seemings yield basic and prima facie justified beliefs, then so do evidential
seemings of the sort exemplified by van Inwagen’s intuition about his wife or the chicken
sexer. This has the apparent consequence that cases of peer disagreement involving
conflicting conclusions based on the same shared evidence base, where the evidence
seems to one to support p, and the evidence seems to the other to support not-p, ought to
be judged on the basis of analogous cases of perceptual disagreement. That is to say,
when I find myself in disagreement with a peer about what evidence supports, it should
be useful to ask myself what I would do in a case of disagreeing with a peer about what I
am currently seeing. If in such a case I would be justified in holding onto the perceptual
belief, then I would, ceteris paribus, be similarly justified in the evidential case (assuming
the seemings involved are similarly clear, vivid, stable, and so forth). But recall that
opinions on what one should do in the perceptual case are divided: some (e.g., Feldman)
think one ought to suspend judgment, while others (e.g., Moffett) think that one ought to
maintain one’s view. Thus, the perceptual analogy will unfortunately not satisfy all of the
commentators in the disagreement debate.
It does, however, help to constrain potential reasonable solutions to the problem.
For example, it suggests that one should not simply disregard one’s evidential intuitions
(e.g., that the preponderance of the evidence supports p), counting them as irrelevant in
the case of peer disagreement, unless it would be reasonable to do so in the case of
perceptual disagreement. I believe this is an important consequence, since this is
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precisely what is recommended by Conformists such as Christensen and Elga who insist
that only evidence independent of the disputed issue can be relevant to breaking the
stalemate created by peer disagreement. If this is correct, then such Conformists are
committed to the same policy in cases of perceptual disagreement, or else they must
admit inconsistency. Should they reject the analogy, they would bear the burden of
showing what is special about perceptual seemings that does not hold for evidential
seemings, such that the former are evidentially relevant under dispute, while the latter are
not.
But if they bite the bullet and maintain that disputed perceptual seemings are in
fact evidentially irrelevant to what one should believe, then their position becomes
implausible. For if perceptual seemings are evidentially irrelevant in the context of
perceptual disagreement, then any perceptual seeming anyone is having at any time could
be evidentially neutralized simply by someone else having a different seeming, or, at
least, by a peer having a different seeming. In the case of perception, peers are
remarkably easy to come by: I assume that almost any stranger I meet has perceptual
capacities which are roughly equal to my own. It therefore follows on the Conformist
“independent evidence only” view that I actually have no evidence that is relevant to the
truth of any proposition about the world that things are the way they seem to me to be.
But this is absurd: I of course do have perceptual evidence that things are some way or
other, and this evidence is highly relevant to my beliefs about the world, even if it can be
outweighed by enough competing evidence (e.g., finding out that I was given a
hallucinogen).
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So the Conformist independent evidence requirement cannot be sensibly applied
to cases of perceptual disagreement, and if not to those, then not to other cases of nonperceptual disagreement either, at least where one has a seeming that some evidence
supports a proposition. Thus, the perceptual analogy, apparently assumed by everyone in
the disagreement debate, has consequences that have been missed by those in the debate.
But as we said above, this will not convince everyone in the disagreement debate, since
there is dispute about what one should do in cases of perceptual disagreement between
peers. It should be clear that one should not accord one’s perceptual seemings no
evidential weight, but it does not follow that they should be trusted blindly either. And
there are cases in which it is apparent that even a clear, vivid, and stable perceptual
seeming can be overridden by considerations of the views of others. We must, then,
determine the evidential weight of seemings--of the perceptual or evidential type--within
the context of disagreement as such. This is the subject of the next two chapters.
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Chapter Four – The Evidential Value and Defeat of Seemings
4.1 – Rosen on the Contingency of Evidential Seemings

As we saw above, seemings of either the perceptual or evidential variety are
widely held to be basic, i.e., they are not justified by virtue of an inferential relationship
with other cognitive states. They are not based on anything further; rather, they are
themselves that on which other reasonably held cognitive states (beliefs primarily, but
also desires, volitions, and others) are based, if not themselves basic. We also saw that
owing to their basic nature, and perhaps to their tendency to produce true beliefs,
seemings are also typically taken to be productive of prima facie justification.1 We
concluded in the last chapter that evidential seemings--seemings of the form “It seems to
me that E supports p”--have evidential weight, and that this weight does not disappear on
the discovery of disagreement. However, it is in the nature of prima facie justified beliefs
that they may be overridden, or defeated, in the parlance common among
epistemologists. Classic examples of perceptual defeat include learning that one is not in
a sound state of mind, learning that one is in a simulation, learning that there are lots of
barn facades around, etc. Similar examples could be adduced for evidential seemings:
learning that one has missed some crucial evidence, learning that one has been slipped a
drug with the side effect of making 99% of people misjudge evidence sets, and so on.2

The “perhaps” here alludes to the ongoing disagreement between epistemologists about internalism and
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Our question in this and the next chapter is whether disagreement serves as a defeater for
evidential seemings, and if so, to what extent.3
Gideon Rosen has argued that disagreement can be a defeater. In his 2001 paper
“Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” Rosen takes as his point of departure
the experiences of nominalists versus anti-nominalists regarding the existence of abstract
objects. He uses this to prod the reader’s intuitions about cases of disagreement. He
begins by noting that belief in abstract objects is rationally permissible but not obligatory.
One may rationally believe in them, suspend judgment about them, or even reject them.
He lists some reasons to think that it’s permissible to believe in them (he calls these his
“dogmatic assumptions”):
1. We take them for granted in nearly everything we do.
As he says, “…if our considered worldview is roughly accurate, abstract entities exist.”4
2. By ordinary standards, we are justified in accepting this worldview--i.e., we
are not normally obliged to establish the existence of, say, numbers, before
using them.5
This shows “that any case for compulsory nominalism must be a skeptical case: a case for
revising a pervasive (and by ordinary standards, unproblematic) commitment of common
sense and established science.”6 The nominalist can make such a case in two ways: she
can argue either that abstract objects are inadmissible from the point of view of science,
or from that of philosophy. Unfortunately,
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3. No such arguments against abstract objects are compelling.
If the above assumptions are correct, Rosen claims, then belief in abstract objects
(antinominalism) is rationally permissible.
But can it also be rationally permissible to take a contrary view? Can it be
rationally permissible, for example, to suspend judgment on the existence of abstract
objects, especially considering that, per assumption 1, this entails the rejection of much of
our usual view of the world? If it can, then the person who suspends judgment--or the
nominalist who advocates suspension of judgment--must still be able to take “science
seriously as a source of information about concrete nature.” 7 That is, straightforward
skepticism about the deliverances of science is not rationally permissible. But it seems
that there is a way for the suspend-judgment-nominalist to do this--to take science
seriously and still not be committed to the existence of abstract objects.
There is, Rosen thinks, a “trick” for “nominalizing at a stroke any theory
whatsoever.”8 Rosen asks us to imagine a place called Bedrock, where instead of taking
Platonism for granted as we do (at least as Rosen assumes we do), people believe, and
can articulately support, that platonistic language is a useful fiction. When they “assert”
some mathematical truth, for instance, they are doing something different from what we
are doing. We presuppose that we’re aiming for truth, but they presuppose only that
they’re aiming for “nominalistic adequacy.” All they are presupposing is that the
aggregate of concrete objects in the world in which the assertion is made is identical to
the aggregate of concrete objects in a world in which the assertion would be true. That is,
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“things [in the actual world] are in all concrete respects as if [the assertion] were true.”9
And nominalistic adequacy has all the same practical effects as platonic realism: “To the
extent that practically relevant conclusions are all claims about the concrete array, it
follows that there is no practical difference between believing a theory to be true and
believing it to be nominalistically adequate.”10
Now we ask: “Are the Bedrockers rationally entitled to persist in their
fictionalism? And is it a rational option for us?”11 If the answer to either question is yes,
then rational people can disagree; if the answer to the second question is yes, then we can
be rational both in accepting p and in accepting ~p, even when we have no compelling
case against p (where p is the proposition that abstract objects exist).12 With respect to the
first question: if the Bedrockers are not rationally entitled to their fictionalism, then we
should be able to show them their error, but it’s hard to see how we could, especially
since they’re as lucid and well-informed about the relevant scientific evidence as we are.
Does this mean we should become fictionalists too, since we cannot show that it
would be unreasonable to do so? Or is it rational to hold onto our complacent platonism?
One thing to note is that our platonism is contingent--if things had gone differently
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historically, we might have been Bedrockers (indeed, there is some reason to suspect that
this is close to our natural attitude).13 Does this recognition of contingency mean we
should modify our belief? Not necessarily: this will depend on the case. It is true both
that it is “psychologically possible for us to maintain a belief in full awareness of its
strong contingency,” and that in “some cases there is absolutely nothing wrong with
doing so.”14 For example, if one were raised by Genghis Khan, one would likely believe
different things about cruelty than one in fact does; if one were raised by a certain kind of
empiricist, one would reject the existence of atoms. Moreover, these positions might
withstand reflection. Nonetheless, one need not now revise her view simply because it is
contingent in this way. On the other hand, in some cases--and Rosen thinks complacent
theism and complacent platonism are such cases--he does recommend that one revise
one’s view, though he thinks it is not obligatory to do so. As he says:
When I reflect on the fact that I might have found it natural to suspend judgment
on the existence of mathematical objects and that I have nothing to say to
someone who does find this natural, I find my complacency somewhat shaken,
and rightly so, in my opinion. I grant that I am entitled to persist on grounds of
conservatism, or on the ground that it takes effort and ingenuity to sustain the
fictionalist epoché. But belief on such a basis strikes me as hollow: as a
lamentable concession to necessity or to laziness. It may be permissible, but it is
hard to see the virtue in it.15
So what is the epistemic difference between the cases in which one should revise
a belief upon recognizing its contingency and those cases in which one should not? Rosen
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does not say--or rather, he says that different cases just seem, phenomenally, different to
him. Revising in the cases of the alternate morality or science feels or seems unnecessary,
whereas revising in the case of theism feels or seems right.16 But why should we care
about individual psychology? The question, after all, is whether we should revise our
beliefs upon recognition of coherent, apparently equally motivated alternatives, not
whether we are inclined to do so.
Rosen responds by drawing the analogy discussed in the last chapter between
perceptual seemings and evidential seemings. For perception, seemings serve as the
justifying basis of beliefs, and the beliefs need no other ground. Similarly, there are nonperceptual seemings (e.g., evaluative seemings) that can ground their analogous beliefs.
And so, if an encounter with an alternate view removes this natural tendency to ascribe
prima facie justificatory force, then it may be recommended--or even “virtuous”--to
revise one’s belief, though still not obligatory, owing to the potential costs involved to do
so. “But if one does have the time, and one can see one’s way through to a more coherent
overall view, then, as I say, there would seem to be virtue in rethinking.”17 Rosen classes
platonism along with theism as topics that he personally finds to be affected by the
realization of contingency, i.e., the force of the initial seemings are altered for him. This
results in a form of relativism based on one’s non-doxastic seemings. Rosen concludes by
reiterating that if one can avoid agnosticism on some issue only by appealing to the
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practical difficulty of belief revision (he calls this “conservatism”), then one may still be
“rational,” but is nonetheless epistemically defective.18
So, to recapitulate: Rosen understands the potential for disagreement to defeat
one’s evidential seemings to be a matter of the recognition of the contingency of one’s
belief. But he also admits that not all contingent beliefs are defeated upon the recognition
of their contingency. This happens only when this recognition is able to overcome the
seeming that one has--and thus the prima facie justification--that the belief is true. When
does this happen? His answer seems to be that there is no way to tell, except by
experiencing it, hence his conclusion of epistemic relativism. That is, whether or not
one’s evidential seemings are defeated is relative to the felt sensibility of the force of
recognizing their contingency. As such, Rosen’s is a very strong relativism, for it makes
the justification of one’s belief entirely a matter of the felt sensibility of the individual.19
Is this strong relativist conclusion correct? I think not. Indeed, I do not think that
contingency is the right place to focus in order to locate the evidential significance of
seemings, or how they might be defeated. To see this, consider more closely the
examples of belief contingency that Rosen himself discusses.
His first and most prominent example is “complacent theism”:
When the complacent theist first asks himself whether or not there is a God, and
then notices that there is nothing intrinsically unreasonable in agnosticism, it

One may legitimately wonder here what use the word “rational” has if it does not imply lack of epistemic
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would be bizarre to insist that he is nonetheless obliged to remain a theist simply
because that is where he started out, and he has been given no ‘positive grounds’
for thinking that he is mistaken. In a case of this sort, retrenchment is obviously
an option. The case of nominalism is no different in principle in my opinion.20
It is certainly true that the complacent theist is not obliged to remain a theist, but I think
that it is at best misleading to say that “retrenchment” is simply an “option.” Surely it is
in some sense unreasonable for him to become an agnostic just on the basis of coming to
believe that agnosticism is not “intrinsically unreasonable” (whatever that may mean).
The complacent theist may have some reason to think he’s wrong, but so has the
agnostic--or atheist--who meets a reasonable theist. It would be at best misleading to say
that theism is not obviously an option because of such meetings. The complacent theist
merely sees that it is possible to be a reasonable agnostic--but these do not become his
reasons just because he now recognizes that they exist.21
Rosen continues:
It can be disconcerting to realize that one’s views are strongly contingent in this
way. When it first dawns upon the complacent theist that his belief in God is not
forced upon him by compelling reasons, but is rather a matter of what he has been
raised to take for granted, one response is to say, “There but for the grace of God
go I. It’s a matter of luck that I wound up believing. But thank goodness for it. If I
had been raised differently, I would have been mistaken.”22 But another possible
response is to wonder, “With what right do I suppose that I am one of the lucky
ones?” The structure of this familiar predicament is as follows. You have always
believed that P for no reason in particular. P is part of the worldview you take for
granted: neither inculcated by argument nor supported by argument after the
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fact.23 You then encounter someone else who finds it natural to doubt it. Neither
of you can offer arguments to sway the other. Nor is it plausible to suppose that
you have special access to the truth in the relevant domain (e.g., a special sense
for detecting the truths in question). In such circumstances the only thing to think
is that the differences between you and them [sic] are due to historical
contingencies which in themselves favor neither option.… How should one
respond to this sort of predicament?24
Let’s leave aside for the moment the unmotivated claim that the “historical
contingencies… favor neither option,” a claim which neither party is likely to be in a
position to know. Why should the recognition of historical contingency be disconcerting
in the first place? Presumably, it is because one may think of “contingent” in the sense of
“arbitrary,” or “lacking supporting reasons.” But this is a confusion to be avoided. It is a
matter of contingent history that we now take general relativity for granted. Things may
have gone differently if, say, Eddington and his team had failed to detect the bending of
light around the sun during the 1919 solar eclipse.25 Nonetheless, belief in general
relativity is not arbitrary, even if one holds it only because it is an assumption of one’s
culture. This distinction helps explain why Rosen thinks that two of his cases--the
Genghis Khan case and the atomist case--are different from his complacent theist and
complacent platonist cases. In the former, one’s views--that Khan was morally bad and
that atomism is true--are not arbitrary even though they are historically contingent. In the

Of course, it does not follow that a belief’s being unsupported by argument means that there is no reason
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latter cases, Rosen thinks, one’s beliefs are both historically contingent and arbitrary.26
So when Rosen says, “I can acknowledge the fact that my commitments are contingent
without finding myself with anything like a compelling ground for retreating from them,”
this is because in these cases he is admitting contingency, but denying arbitrariness.27
Call cases like this cases of mere contingency. In such cases--Khan and atomism--one has
reasons to prefer one’s view to others. For example, one has the strong sense that Khan’s
lifestyle was morally repugnant, and some reason to think that such a view is not
culturally relative.28 Also, one knows that scientists from various cultures were
apparently motivated by the discovery of truth, and have converged on the idea that some
version of atomism is true. One is also not likely to be complacent about these issues--in
the sense that one would be unbothered by the suggestion that one’s beliefs about them
are false--which would constitute a relevant difference from the complacent theist and
platonist cases. But even if one were complacent about them, one’s view would not be
arbitrary. It would be undergirded by lots of reasons, reasons that would presumably be
persuasive even to people of different eras if they could be brought to understand them.
The only way I see to make the Khan case comparable to the complacent platonist case is
if in fact one thinks that one has no better reasons for one’s moral views that a reflective
Genghis Khan--in other words, that there could be a community of Khanians analogous
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to the community of Bedrockers who recognize all the same data about concrete actions
but draw wildly different moral conclusions. Presumably Rosen doesn’t think this. If he
did, then based on what he says about the complacent platonist, it would be a virtue to
reconsider his view in light of the reflective Khan community.
Rosen’s notion of contingency is made clearer in what he says immediately
following the quotation above. There, he references al-Ghazali’s use of taqlid, a concept
in Islamic thought that signifies “‘derivative’ or ‘second-hand’ belief.”29 Rosen
apparently takes this to mean belief that is held “for no reason in particular”; it is simply
the belief of one’s culture or tradition.30 He then notes that al-Ghazali thinks that
abandoning taqlid when one becomes aware of it is both the epistemically appropriate
and psychologically necessary course of action. Rosen then disagrees with al-Ghazali,
and introduces the Khan and atomism cases as examples where it is both psychologically
possible and epistemically permissible to maintain one’s taqlid belief. But if I am right
that Rosen is confusing contingency with arbitrariness, then perhaps there is room to
interpret al-Ghazali more charitably here. This is because abandoning one’s belief when
one discovers that it is arbitrary does seem to be the appropriate response. On the other

29

Ibid., 84.
Note, however, that taqlid also has the connotation of “authoritative,” in the sense of deference to past
interpreters of religious texts whose views are held to be unsurpassed. This would not be an arbitrary belief.
Notably for our discussion of disagreement, taqlid also had a classical sense in which one was unjustifiably
conforming one’s view to another. This happened when one who was an authority (a mujtahid) conformed
his view to one who was not, or to the view of another mujtahid, who was considered a peer. This is
somewhat ironic considering Rosen’s position that there is virtue in rethinking a view when one is
presented with evidence of the view’s contingency in the form of a peer’s disagreement. Here the classical
Islamic view just referenced would seem to suggest that the opinion of a peer should have no bearing on
one’s own. See Bernard G. Weiss, “Taqlid,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World (Oxford
University Press, 2009),
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195305135.001.0001/acref-9780195305135-e0785.
30

80
hand, abandoning it when it is contingent but not arbitrary--as with many moral and
scientific beliefs--is obviously not appropriate.
The next question to ask is whether disagreement provides one with evidence that
one’s belief is arbitrary, rather than simply contingent. And the answer, of course, is no.
This is the case whether one is an expert about the disputed issue, an informed nonexpert, or someone who has no reasons for the belief other than that it is the received
view of his tradition. In any of these cases, disagreement highlights the contingency of
the belief, but in no way suggests that it is arbitrary in the strong sense of lacking any
reasons. Granted, disagreement may serve as an occasion for the discovery of
arbitrariness, but it is not itself evidence of it. Hence, disagreement is not a defeater of
evidential seemings, insofar as it is not an indicator of arbitrariness. But it may still be a
defeater in other ways, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Another thing to note about Rosen’s case is that there is an element of tautology
in his view, in the sense that the thing that actually motivates his relativism is trivially
true for all views of belief. As we’ve seen, he thinks that one should reconsider a view
when one recognizes that his seeming is contingent. As he says,
When the encounter with an alien sensibility destroys this felt obviousness--or
when it makes it plain that it was never there to begin with--it knocks the ground
out from under what one has previously taken for granted.31
The language of “never there to begin with” is telling: it suggests that the virtue of
reconsideration accompanies beliefs that are held on the basis of nothing. In other words,
if one’s seeming is removed (“destroyed”)--if one has nothing to go on--then it is
recommended to revise one’s view. But surely this holds for all of the cases Rosen cites.
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Who wouldn’t say that one should revise his belief when he discovers that he has nothing
to support it? Notice also that belief revision here is not due to anything peculiar to
disagreement, or even to contingency. It is based solely on the loss of one’s seeming.
This effectively trivializes Rosen’s position.
So far, then, we have no reason to think that disagreement provides a defeater for
one’s evidential seemings, except insofar as it provides evidence of arbitrariness, which it
usually does not.

4.2 - The Epistemic Parity of Seemings

Some have construed seemings in such a way to make it very unlikely that they
could be defeated by disagreement. For example, Thomas Kelly has argued that if one
“recognizes” that some evidence supports a proposition, then one knows that it does, or at
any rate, one is justified in thinking that it does, and is also justified in believing the
higher-order proposition that one is reasonable to hold that belief.32 If he is right, then
disagreement is unlikely to defeat one’s recognition in cases where one is in fact
correct,33 and guaranteed not to defeat it if recognition entails knowledge.
The problem here is that “recognize” is ambiguous. It can mean see, where one
perceives that p, and is thereby prima facie justified in p in the normal way that
perceptual beliefs are prima facie justified. This would be the sense of the word in usages
such as “I recognize that bird as a cardinal.” But it can also mean “know,” as in “I
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recognized my friend in the lineup,” but in that case Kelly’s argument would be clearly
question-begging. If recognition entails knowing, then the word “recognize” is simply
inappropriate for what happens in many cases of determining what a body of evidence
supports, which is much more akin to the “seeing” sense of recognition. Kelly is surely
right to say that “in some cases, one’s recognition that one’s evidence supports a given
belief is based on an unmediated appreciation of that evidence itself.”34 But this is just
what we’ve been calling a seeming. It would be more precise to think of the relevant
sense of “recognition” in the following way: the claim “My evidence supports p” is prima
facie justified when based on the experience of E supporting p, but can be defeated by,
for example, further higher-order evidence that one’s initial evidence really did not
support p. The question, again, is whether disagreement provides such higher-order
defeating evidence.
Kelly raises an interesting point here: it seems that if one person has done a better
job assessing the evidence than another, then the conclusion of the former should not be
defeasible in the same way as the conclusion of the latter. For example, if you and I
disagree about, say, Davidson’s theory of indirect discourse, and you have assessed his
argument correctly, and I have not--assume that we’ve shared all the reasons we can
think to share and remain deadlocked, each finding the other’s assessment weak--it seems
wrong that your view should be overcome just as easily as mine. The problem is that
neither of us are in a position to know which of us has made the incorrect assessment. If
each of us has a seeming (or “recognition”) that the evidence supports his view, then each
of us is prima facie justified in believing that the evidence supports his view. Now, for all
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we’ve said about the Uniqueness Thesis, it may be possible that the evidence supports
both our views, but let’s say in this case it does not. How is either of us to decide which
of our beliefs ought to be defeated by the evidence presented by the other’s
disagreement? “From the inside,” as Kelly says, “a case in which you fail to appreciate
the genuine merits of what I say on behalf of my view because of dogmatic commitment
on your part might seem just like a case in which my defense is indeed without merit.”35
I’ll call this the Parity Problem:
Parity: From the perspective of either party in a peer disagreement, the epistemic
situation is indistinguishable from one in which the strength of the peers’
evidence assessments are inverted. Things would appear just as they do to the
correct party if she were incorrect, and vice versa.
For his part, Kelly says that “the fact that it might be difficult to tell which of these is the
case does not mean that it makes no difference.”36 But it may mean that it can make no
difference to me, even if it is true that it ought to make a difference in some all-thingsconsidered, epistemically idealized way.
Another philosopher who holds that seemings are unlikely to be defeated by
disagreement is Michael Bergmann. In essence, he concludes that there simply is no way
to solve the Parity Problem--the best one can do is to maintain one’s view based on one’s
own seemings, no matter how dialectically unsatisfying this may be. It will be helpful to
consider his view here.
In “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure,” Bergmann defends a form of
Nonconformism, according to which reasonable disagreement with an epistemic peer is
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possible.37 Bergmann understands peerhood to be a matter of two (or more, presumably)
peers who are, and take themselves to be, equally “intellectually virtuous,” where
intellectual virtue implies “intelligent, thoughtful, and sincerely seeking the truth.”38
“Full disclosure” means that each party has taken the time to lay out all the evidence for
his position that he can think of. Suppose that disagreement persists after such disclosure,
and that both parties are still convinced of their equal intellectual virtue. Are they rational
to be convinced of this?
Bergmann distinguishes between “internal” and “external” rationality. Consider a
person who comes to believe p (where p is a noninferential belief) on the basis of
experience e, and suppose it is the case that the reasonable thing to do when confronted
with experiences of “the same phenomenal type as e” is to believe p. Suppose further that
this person believes p as a result of brain damage which caused the experience. Is this
belief rational? Bergmann here borrows Alvin Plantinga’s distinction between internal
and external rationality.39 For Bergmann, “a belief is internally rational if and only if it is
an epistemically appropriate response to the subject’s mental states,” and it is “externally
rational if and only if the believer’s cognitive processing mechanisms are working as
they epistemically should be in producing the belief (including where their working well
is not in response to the subject’s mental states).”40 So external rationality rules out
rational beliefs formed due to cognitive malfunction, while internal rationality does not.
With this distinction in mind, Bergmann provides some answers to the question of
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whether the parties to the disagreement are rational to hold each other to be equally
intellectually virtuous.
With respect to internal rationality: imagine a case of peer disagreement in which
peers S1 and S2 are such that S1 believes p and S2 believes ~p.41 Further, each has a
broader outlook, O1 and O2, of which their beliefs about p are a part. Part of S1’s outlook
O1 is an error theory about why O2 seems true but isn’t, and vice versa for S2’s outlook.
Further, these beliefs of S1 and S2 in p and ~p, and in the error theories of O1 and O2,
respectively, are based partially on “apparent insight” into the truth of these propositions,
where an “insight” is a special case of “seeing that” a proposition is true, in other words,
evidential seemings.42 As Bergmann says, “If there are no defeaters, the rational response
to a strong apparent insight that p--like the rational response to a strong apparent memory
that p--is to believe p.”43 Now, note that S1 and S2 do not have the same evidence, even
after full disclosure. After all, having an insight (even an apparent one) and hearing about
someone else’s insight are not the same thing. Note also that S2’s apparent insight that ~p
does not count as a defeater for S1’s belief that p because S1 has an error theory that
anticipates that belief (even from someone as intellectually virtuous as oneself) and
explains why it’s wrong. The same thing is of course also true for S2. So, it seems that
when internal rationality is intended, it is possible for both parties to rationally hold
themselves to be equally intellectually virtuous after full disclosure of evidence.
With respect to external rationality, Bergmann argues as follows. If it is possible
for two disagreeing parties to be internally rational while taking themselves to be equally
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intellectually virtuous, then this suggests that they may be externally rational while doing
so as well. This is because all that is required in order to be wrong and yet still externally
rational is a little epistemic bad luck.44 One of the parties is generally reliable but in this
case (against the odds) wrong. Nonetheless, both parties remain externally rational.
Bergmann says it is also possible that “both parties are externally rational in continuing to
disagree and in thinking that the other may well be externally rational in continuing to
disagree.”45 This is because “may well be” implies that, from the vantage point of one of
the parties, the other party may be--for all one knows--a victim of said epistemic bad
luck, even though everything else is working as it should. Nonetheless, Bergmann holds
that in such cases--in which one thinks that another is internally rational but mistaken-one will likely conclude that the other is in fact externally irrational, especially if the
disagreement is a persistent one (more on this below).
So it turns out that “recognized disagreement about p with someone you view as
roughly equal to you in intellectual virtue” need not provide a defeater for your belief that
p. But Bergmann also thinks that it may, in the following kind of case:
If in response to recognizing that S disagrees with you about p (which you
believe), you either do or epistemically should disbelieve or seriously question or
doubt the claim that you are, on this occasion, more trustworthy than S with
respect to p, then your belief that p is defeated by this recognition; otherwise,
not.46
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So when is it the case that one “epistemically should” question whether one is
more trustworthy on this occasion than a peer? Unfortunately, says Bergmann, there is no
uncontroversial answer to this question, even if we look at specific cases:
It’s unfortunate that, even after full disclosure of evidence among people
seemingly equal in intellectual virtue, disagreement persists about precisely when
disagreement provides a defeater. But I think that’s what we’ll find.47
A Conformist like Elga or Christensen might here raise the following objection:
what reason does either party have to assume that she is the one who has avoided error on
this occasion? Bergmann’s response to this is already quoted above in another context:
I think that the rational response… is to continue believing p. However, I don’t
have an argument for that conclusion, just as I don’t have an argument for the
conclusion that the rational response for us to a tactile experience like the one we
typically have when grabbing a billiard ball is to believe something like ‘that’s a
small hard spherical object’.48
Bergmann is here appealing to the basic nature of evidential seemings in order to
reject the demand for an argument supporting a bias in one’s own favor. He provides two
cases to help make his point:
Case 1: We may not be able to satisfactorily answer the radical skeptic, but this
does not thereby provide a defeater for our perceptual beliefs.
Likewise, the fact that we think someone is mistaken (in a moral or religious or
political disagreement with us) despite her being confident in ways similar to the
ways in which we are confident doesn’t automatically mean that we should
seriously question or doubt the reliability of our beliefs in which we’re so
confident.49
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Case 2: Imagine an instance of obviously morally wrong behavior,50 and imagine
further that two other parties disagree with you about its wrongness--one because he is an
ethical egoist, and the other because he is a moral nihilist. Assume that you’re peers with
respect to intellectual virtue and other relevant factors, and that you discuss it and reach
full disclosure. Should you “have significant doubts about the reliability of your own
apparent insight that [the] behavior is morally wrong? Is this what internal rationality
requires?”51 Of course Bergmann thinks not. Your own apparent insights are based on
seemings which provide great confidence in your belief and which you have no reason to
give up just because someone else apparently lacks those seemings or has different ones.
Unfortunately, Bergmann underestimates the force of the seeming that one should
modify her view in light of the disagreement of an informed peer about issues regarding
which one’s seemings are not as clear and vivid as those in the cases of current perceptual
experiences or grossly immoral behavior. When informed peers disagree about, say, the
causes of the gender pay gap, and they reach full disclosure, it is much less clear that
either of them is entitled to say, “Well, my insight supports p, and even though I have no
argument for preferring my insight to yours, I am reasonable to believe p.” If asked what
makes one reasonable to do so in this case, one will simply not be able to say. And as
Rosen says, if one has nothing to say, then one should be less confident in one’s view.52
Since we are imagining a situation of parity, neither party to the disagreement will be
able to determine that her own assessment is the correct one, outside of her own
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evidential seemings, and both parties will know this about their own and their peer’s
situation.
So even if Bergmann has successfully shown that it is possible for peer
disagreements to be rational,53 as in the case of epistemic bad luck, he has not established
that one is reasonable to think that one’s own peer disagreement is rational, especially if,
as he admits, it is a persistent disagreement. In his own words:
I think the most natural outcome of a case where both parties to a disagreement
sensibly believe the other is internally rational but mistaken is that both parties
will also sensibly think the other’s belief is probably externally irrational--i.e., the
other probably has some cognitive processing problem that has resulted in her
having misleading experiential evidence for a false proposition. … But at most
one of the parties to the dispute will be basing her belief in the disputed
proposition (and in the probable external irrationality of the other) on
nonmisleading evidence.54
But of course neither party can know if she is the one with the nonmisleading evidence,
so we’re back to the Parity Problem.
Bergmann avoids this problem only by defining “intellectual virtue,” which is his
stand-in for “peerhood,” in an idiosyncratic and unmotivated way, saying that “in
thinking that one’s friend is roughly on a par with oneself in terms of intellectual virtue,
one needn’t think that the apparent insights of one’s friend are produced in a cognitively
healthy and fitting way.” But this is precisely what most commentators on peerhood have
thought, and what strict peerhood would seem to require. If I do not think that your
seemings are produced in a cognitively healthy way, then there is no interesting epistemic
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problem with respect to our disagreement. So Bergmann avoids the primary issue by
instead answering a more trivial problem.
Another possible avenue for dealing with the Parity Problem is to claim that there
is a presumption in favor of one’s own view just by virtue of it being one’s own. This has
been called an “egocentric epistemic bias,” most notably defended by Ralph
Wedgwood.55 According to Wedgwood, it is reasonable to assume that the other party in
a disagreement is mistaken, and not oneself. This is a rational stance because it is rational
to have a primitive trust in one’s own intuitions--i.e., to regard them as reliable, take them
at face value, even if one has no independent or antecedent reason to do so. But,
Wedgwood argues, it is more rational to have this sort of primitive trust only in one’s
own intuitions, rather than in someone else’s, because this minimizes risk of error, which
is already quite high. He explains:
In general, it seems to be a general requirement of rationality that one must in
some non‐arbitrary way minimize the number of sources of information that one
has this sort of primitive trust in. (The non‐arbitrariness condition is crucial here:
it would, for example, be arbitrary to have a primitive trust in one’s vision but not
in one’s hearing or one’s sense of touch.) If I have a primitive trust only in my
own intuitions, then clearly there is a smaller number of sources of information
that I have such a primitive trust in than there would be if I had such a primitive
trust in everyone’s intuitions. Moreover, it seems to me that it would not be
arbitrary for me to have this sort of primitive disposition to trust only my own
intuitions: after all, my own intuitions by their very nature involve my having an
inclination to believe the corresponding proposition, whereas other people’s
intuitions do not involve my having any such inclination.56
In other words, there is an asymmetry between the epistemic advisability of relying on
one’s own intuitions and relying on those of other people. Hence, owing to this rational
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egocentric bias, one may reasonably conclude in the face of peer disagreement (even if
one is forced to lower one’s confidence in one’s view) that it is the other party who is
wrong.
Is the egocentric epistemic bias a solution to the Parity Problem? I think not,
though I do think it gets at something important that is worth taking into account. It is
true that there is an initial asymmetry between the trust one should place in one’s own
seemings and the trust one should place in the reported seemings of a peer. And it may be
true that this asymmetry is justified in much the way that Wedgwood describes. This is
not an insignificant point. It entails that there is a prima facie presumption in favor of
one’s standing view (assuming it is accompanied by the right sorts of evidential
seemings) in any dispute. This puts the burden of proof squarely on the disagreeing party
to overcome this presumption. Given that many disputes never move past the initial stage
of recognition of disagreement, this entails that people are often within their epistemic
rights to go on believing as they have after becoming aware of disagreement with those
they take to be peers. I am, after all, epistemically responsible for me, not for my peer,
and all I have to go on are my own seemings.
Nonetheless, the egocentric bias cannot solve the Parity Problem because there
the relevant comparison is not between one’s own seeming and the report of someone
else’s--it is between the subject’s own conflicting seemings. In a sustained disagreement
with an epistemic peer and shared evidence, the Parity Problem stipulates that I will
eventually reach a point where I cannot tell, phenomenally, whether I am in the right or
not, because I recognize that things would seem just the same to me in either situation. So
I have two seemings:
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(1)

the evidential seeming that suggests (and produces justified belief that) E
supports p, and

(2)

the higher-order seeming that I have reason to believe that (1) is not
accurate.

An egocentric epistemic bias, even if true, will not help here.
Now, it is of course true that I always have some reason to think that I might be
mistaken. But this worry only becomes salient if I am confronted in some way with the
need to worry about it. The peer disagreement problem is akin in this way to the broader
epistemological problem of skepticism, and it has been recognized as such by prominent
commentators.57 Bryan Frances calls this “disagreement skepticism,” and defines it as
follows:
The disagreement skeptic focuses on beliefs that satisfy the following recognitionof-controversy conditions. You know that the belief B in question has been
investigated and debated (i) for a very long time by (ii) a great many (iii) very
smart people who (iv) are your epistemic peers and superiors on the matter and
(v) have worked very hard (vi) under optimal circumstances to figure out if B is
true. But you also know that (vii) these experts have not come to any significant
agreement on B and (viii) those who agree with you are not, as a group, in an
appreciably better position to judge B than those who disagree with you.58
Thus, disagreement skepticism is significantly different from traditional global
skepticism, as its effects are limited to beliefs that satisfy conditions (i)-(viii). As Frances
says, this form of skepticism is limited in three ways:
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(1)

It is contained: “Only beliefs that meet something like the recognition-ofcontroversy conditions are subject to this skeptical threat.”59

(2)

It is contingent: “The nature and extent of disagreements are both
contingent matters, so since disagreement skepticism relies on these
factors, the skeptical consequences of disagreement are also contingent.”60

(3)

It is exclusively epistemic: it does not imply anything about “what moral,
prudential, or even religious reasons you may have for holding a
controversial belief. The skeptical threat from disagreement only concerns
our epistemic reasons.”61

The effects of the Parity Problem would also be similarly limited, since there are various
conditions one must meet to be in it, analogous to Frances’s recognition-of-controversy
conditions. Nonetheless, these effects are serious: they include the fact that many
controversial beliefs, in areas as important as morality, religion, politics, and philosophy,
can be defeated--even when they start out as justified--by prolonged peer disagreement.
This includes beliefs for which one has clear, vivid, and stable evidential seemings. Thus,
there is something to the Conformist stance: via the Parity Problem, there are many cases
in which a person is seemingly epistemically obligated to alter her view because of peer
disagreement. Potential solutions to the Parity Problem will be discussed in Chapters
Eight and Nine.
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Are there other ways that peer disagreement may lead to the defeat of one’s
evidential seemings? To answer this, we need to understand what evidential value
agreement or disagreement with another carries on its own. This is the subject of the next
chapter.
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Chapter Five – The Evidential Value of Disagreement Itself

5.1 - Idealization, Independence, and Bootstrapping

The clearest explanation in the disagreement literature of the epistemic
significance of disagreement--and the clearest justification for the discussion of
peerhood--is due to Jennifer Lackey. She notes that many disagreements are due to
differences in access to evidence, cognitive inequalities between the parties, or other
epistemic defects such as bias. Such cases would not easily yield what is epistemically
interesting about disagreement per se. This is because, as she says,
…adjusting our doxastic states in all of these sorts of cases does not reveal
anything significant about disagreement itself, since the fact that you and I
disagree drops out of the explanation of this adjustment; it is, for instance, the
difference in our familiarity with the relevant evidence or the asymmetry in our
cognitive capacities that does the explanatory work.1
To examine the effect of disagreement itself, we must control for these sorts of
inequality, which means we must assume some notion of peerhood. No other method
captures the intrinsic significance of disagreement as well as this, since it allows us to
isolate disagreement as an epistemic issue.2
Defining peerhood is not my aim here--that is the subject of Chapter Seven--I
want merely to note that the idealization of peer disagreement cases in the literature is
primarily motivated by the reason Lackey explains.3 Idealizing cases somewhat (e.g., by

Jennifer Lackey, “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Social
Epistemology, ed. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University Press, 2010),
298-299. Note that Lackey’s point here follows only if factors other than the disagreement account
completely for the belief adjustment.
2
Ibid.
3
For her part, Lackey finds this idealization a bit overwrought. She says, “…it is very common for
philosophers writing on this topic to motivate interest in it by citing debates in history, philosophy, politics,
religion, and other areas where disagreement is widespread and impassioned. But these debates bear very
1

96
considering cases of epistemic peers) helps to focus on the epistemic nature of
disagreement itself. Our question here is what contribution the disagreement with another
makes to one’s total evidence base. One way of approaching this question is to begin with
the related question: What evidential difference does agreement make?
Thomas Kelly approaches this question via a consideration of the Common
Consent Argument (CCA) for the existence of God. He first notes that when a large
number of peers independently converge on some opinion, that affords that opinion
significant evidential weight.4 He then notes that:
As arguments go, the Common Consent Argument for the Existence of God is not
exactly an overwhelming one, possessing as it does the twin defects of transparent
invalidity and the having of an obviously false claim as its sole premise.
Nevertheless, even though God exists does not follow from Everyone believes that
God exists, we can ask: if it were true that everyone, or almost everyone, believed
that God exists, how much support would that lend (if any) to the proposition that
God exists?5
The answer, he says, depends on whether those people came to their belief independently
or not. If I believe p merely because you believe p, then the fact that two people now
believe p is no more epistemically significant (i.e., it affords no greater evidence for p)

little resemblance to the hyper‐idealized scenarios under consideration here.” (Ibid., 311) I sympathize with
Lackey’s view here, even while disagreeing with other statements she makes. For example, she continues:
“It would rarely, if ever, happen that two people continue to disagree with one another about, say, gay
marriage where there is evidential and cognitive equality with known epistemic symmetry in situations of
full disclosure.” I disagree. Even idealized symmetry seems plausible in cases where the parties have
known each other for a long time, and/or have had sufficient interaction to become acquainted with the
personal characteristics of the other. Lackey claims that “…conclusions drawn from hyper‐idealized
situations involving disagreement ultimately tend to have very little connection to the disagreements we
face every day.… I think that, at least for the most part, ordinary disagreement ought to be the focus of this
debate.” (Ibid.) I certainly agree that the philosophical debate ought to be sensitive to--even constrained by-what disagreement is like in real life. However, I deny that the cases Lackey describes are all unrealistic.
The seminal examples in the disagreement debate (e.g., the disagreement we discussed above between van
Inwagen & Lewis on free will, or the older debates in religious pluralism) are very real and yet exhibit a
high degree of what Lackey calls idealism.
4
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than the fact that you believed p all by yourself before convincing me. “In principle,” he
says, “the fact that a small handful of people arrive at the same belief independently of
one another might be better evidence that that belief is true than if many millions of
people arrive at the same belief non-independently.”6 This entails that if one is in
disagreement with a whole group of people about some issue, the scales are not obviously
shifted in favor of the group, if the members of the group have not arrived at their view
independently of one another.7 Kelly borrows an example here from G.A. Cohen, who
recounts a division among philosophers from his days as a student at Oxford:
Now people of my generation who studied philosophy at Harvard rather than at
Oxford for the most part reject the analytic/synthetic distinction. And I can’t
believe that this is an accident. That is, I can’t believe that Harvard just happened
to be a place where both its leading thinker rejected that distinction and its
graduate students, for independent reasons--merely, for example, in the
independent light of reason itself--also came to reject it. And vice versa, of
course, for Oxford. I believe, rather, that in each case students were especially
impressed by the reasons respectively for and against believing in the distinction,
because in each case the reasons came with all the added persuasiveness of
personal presentation, personal relationship, and so forth.8
So, as someone trying to decide what to think about the analytic/synthetic distinction, one
need not be overwhelmed by the number of people who reject (or accept) it, since in
actuality, there is only one independent argument, or set of arguments, represented by
that group.9
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A danger lurks here with respect to testimony. Kelly’s view could be read as Lockean to the extent that
beliefs rooted in testimony are seen as non-independent, and therefore epistemically less valuable, than
beliefs rooted in some other knowledge source, such as direct perception. If in fact this is an entailment of
Kelly’s view, I take that to be a further weakness of his account, in addition to the one I here discuss. I
discuss the relationship between testimony and disagreement below.
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Now, this is true to an extent, but there is a danger here: we do not want to go so
far as to say that a substantial number of people who believe p, and who trace that belief
to a common source, carries no epistemic weight. That would ignore the fact that it’s
well-nigh impossible for every individual to do all of her own investigating, given how
many propositions most individuals need to believe or disbelieve. It is perfectly rational
to accept the well-reasoned views of one’s community, with or without investigating
them for oneself, and if the views are sufficiently detailed and accurate to have survived
in a large population for a long time (a population in which it is the job of some members
to investigate, refine, and if necessary, alter these views), then there is no reason the
average person shouldn’t take the commonality of a view as evidence of its truth.10
Kelly clarifies his view as follows: “… insofar as one believes as one does
because this is what one’s teacher believes, the fact that one believes as one does is not an
additional piece of psychological evidence, over and above the psychological evidence

relationship, and so forth” is a mark against the epistemic value of a belief, then it is a mark against nearly
all beliefs.
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J.L. Austin says something similar, not regarding ordinary belief but ordinary language. Still, what
Austin says seems to apply, mutatis mutandis, to ordinary belief:
Certainly ordinary language has no claim to be the last word, if there is such a thing. It embodies,
indeed, something better than the metaphysics of the Stone Age, namely, as was said, the inherited
experience and acumen of many generations of men. But then, that acumen has been concentrated
primarily upon the practical business of life. If a distinction works well for practical purposes in
ordinary life (no mean feat, for even ordinary life is full of hard cases), then there is sure to be
something in it, it will not mark nothing: yet this is likely enough to be not the best way of
arranging things if our interests are more extensive or intellectual than the ordinary. And again,
that experience has been derived only from the sources available to ordinary men throughout most
of civilised history: it has not been fed from the resources of the microscope and its successors.
And it must be added too, that superstition and error and fantasy of all kinds do become
incorporated in ordinary language and even sometimes stand up to the survival test (only, when
they do, why should we not detect it?). Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last word: in
principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember,
it is the first word.
See J.L. Austin, “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
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afforded by the teacher’s belief.”11 This seems correct: one person believing p merely
because someone else believes p does not provide additional evidence for p. But Kelly
continues this line of thought in a footnote:
… the need to discount the numbers is not limited to
cases in which there is causal dependence present, as in the examples considered
above. If I know that two individuals will respond to given evidence in the same
manner, then I should treat their having arrived at some particular answer as one
piece of evidence, and not two pieces of evidence, in favor of that answer (even if
their both having arrived at that answer is in no way underwritten by some causal
link).12
This is surely mistaken. I think here of William P. Alston, who reportedly
defended his dissertation in front of Charles Hartshorne, Rudolf Carnap, and W.V.O.
Quine, the first two of whom were on his committee.13 Let’s say Alston agreed with
something his committee members also believed, and for the same reasons--surely it is
possible that the assent of that prodigious mind could have contributed additional support
for the view besides what it already enjoyed. Similarly, imagine two mathematicians
examine the same proof and decide that it is successful. If I believe that it is successful on
the basis of both of their testimony, then my belief is better justified than if it were based
on the testimony of only one of them, even though I know that they responded to the
evidence “in the same manner.”14 I am inclined to think that the perspective of certain
thinkers, who exhibit certain characteristics like incisiveness, care, thoroughness,
creativity, etc., count for something, even when they agree with the perspective of others,

Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” 148.
Ibid., 149, footnote 28.
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and for the very same reasons. One might argue that this is still a matter of independence,
with the difference that here the independence is a trait of personality, rather than of
reasons. Nonetheless, this serves as a counterexample to Kelly’s claim that two
individuals responding to the evidence in the same way is only ever one piece of
evidence. I believe that it can be additional evidence, and whether or not it is depends on
the epistemic characteristics of the individuals, and not merely on how similar the
contents of the arguments are between them.
So we can discern two senses in which agreement has epistemic weight over and
above what a testimonial report would typically carry on its own: when the view of others
is either (i) supported by multiple independent lines of evidence (represented by
individuals arriving at the view independently of one another), or (ii) supported by the
assent of individuals who are independent and especially careful reasoners.
Another way to approach this question is via a disagreement over the so-called
Equal Weight View, championed by Adam Elga. This view is a species of the Conformist
view, which holds that peer disagreement provides one with reason to adjust one’s own
view, and adds that it is most rational to accord equal weight to the view of one’s peer
and to one’s own view.15 Elga contends that views which reject this conclusion--i.e.,
views which hold that it is reasonable to accord more weight to one’s own view than to
one’s peer’s--incur a bootstrapping problem. As he says:
…suppose that it was legitimate to give your own evaluations more weight than
those of a friend who you initially count as a peer. Then it could be legitimate for
you to “bootstrap”--to come to be confident that you are a better evaluator than
the friend merely by noting cases of disagreement, and taking it that the friend
made most of the errors. But that is absurd. So it is not legitimate to give your
own evaluations more weight than those who you count as peers. A similar
15

Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Noûs 41, no. 3 (2007): 478-479.

101
argument shows that it is not legitimate to give your own evaluations less weight
than those who you count as peers. So the equal weight view is correct.16
If this is correct--if Nonconformist views have a bootstrapping problem--then it follows
that disagreement itself is evidentially significant. This is because if it is illegitimate to
give one’s own view more weight than a peer’s based on the same evidence, this can only
be because the fact of disagreement itself acts as a counterweight against the first-order
evidence one had prior to the disagreement. It is not that one assumes the peer has
evidence one lacks--this is ruled out by stipulating shared evidence. And it is not that one
assumes that the peer’s reasoning abilities indicate evidence one has missed--Elga
explicitly disallows this by insisting on the “independent evidence only” view discussed
above.17 What makes the Equal Weight View the correct view, Elga thinks, is that it
recognizes that disagreement itself carries epistemic weight sufficient to defeat the
evidential seemings one possesses for her view that p. The bootstrapping objection is
intended to bring this out by showing that denying disagreement’s epistemic significance
commits one to inventing justification out of thin air by saying, in effect, “We disagree;
you’re wrong; therefore, we’re not peers on this issue.” If disagreement provides its own
counterbalancing evidence, one would not be able to dismiss the view of an assumed
peer.

16

Ibid., 488. Because Elga, like most commentators in the disagreement debate, limits peerhood to local
disagreements over specific propositions, it would not follow immediately that non-Equal Weight views
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However, the bootstrapping objection does not work. Or, to put it differently, it
works too well, since it cuts against the Equal Weight View itself. Elga contends that
when someone considers her own view to be superior to her opponent’s, she is
bootstrapping--even if she is correct--since she has no evidence that she has in fact
evaluated the evidence correctly. This much is true. However, for Elga, the person also
has no evidence that she is mistaken. This counterintuitive result is a consequence of
Elga’s independent evidence only requirement. Notice: intuitively, the way that peer
disagreement justifies counterbalancing one’s confidence in a standing belief with that of
a peer is by providing higher-order evidence that one has misjudged the first-order
evidence for p. Why does peer disagreement provide this meta-evidence? Because a peer
is as capable as oneself to correctly judge the evidence for p. How do we know if
someone is a peer with respect to p? According to Elga, it is by observing how that
person judges the evidence pertaining to allied issues related to p. Considering a
disagreement about abortion, for example, Elga says: “setting aside [another’s] reasoning
about abortion does not set aside her reasoning about allied issues.… the accuracy of an
advisor’s views on these allied issues indicates how accurate the advisor is likely to be,
when it comes to abortion.”18 Since in “messy real-world cases, the disputed issues are
tangled in clusters of controversy,” one cannot help but determine the peerhood of an
interlocutor based on issues related to the one under dispute.19
The upshot of this, says Elga, is that one will only count as peers those who “have
views that are similar to one’s own.”20 Hence, in cases like the abortion case, I cannot
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appeal to independent evidence to break a stalemate with a peer because a peer is simply
someone who probably already agrees with me in general, so there shouldn’t be a peer
disagreement in the first place. But let’s say that, against the odds, there is. Given Elga’s
view of how judgments of peerhood work, one would not be justified in lowering her
confidence in p in response to peer disagreement, because there is no independent
evidence to appeal to that would justify this change. Any such evidence has already been
accounted for in deciding that one is a peer with respect to p, which in Elga’s view means
that one is equally likely to be correct about p as oneself.21 But if one has no evidence
independent of the dispute to appeal to in order to justify thinking that one is more likely
to be correct about p, then for the same reasons one has no evidence independent of the
dispute which justifies thinking that one is less likely to be correct about p. Elga thinks
this implies that one should “split the difference” and assign equal weight to both views.
But if I am right, any change in confidence, up or down, would be unjustified on Elga’s
account. This is based on the intuitively plausible principle that a change in credence for
p (in either direction) requires justification, and owing to the independent evidence only
restriction on judgments about peerhood, no such justification exists in these cases. So
decreasing one’s confidence in p (say, by according it “equal weight” as the opponent’s
view) as a result of disagreement is a kind of “reverse” bootstrapping.22

5.2 - David Christensen on Symmetry between Apparent Peers
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David Christensen has also taken peer disagreement to constitute defeating
evidence which counterbalances one’s evidential seeming. Consider his restaurant bill
case: two friends at a moderately priced restaurant mentally calculate their split bill and
come to slightly different totals for their share, say, $43 and $45. Christensen describes
his initial intuition about this case as follows:
If we set up the case in this way, it seems quite clear that I should lower my
confidence that my share is $43 and raise my confidence that it’s $45. In fact, I
think (though this is perhaps less obvious) that I should now accord these two
hypotheses roughly equal credence.23
What could motivate the idea that the hypotheses should be accorded equal credence?
Christensen admits that this is not obvious, and I suspect it is not obvious because
Christensen’s view assumes that disagreement itself provides equal evidence rather than
merely being an indicator that there is evidence against one’s view. My own intuition
about the bill calculation case is that one should lower one’s credence about the amount
pending recalculation, and form no beliefs at all about the peer’s answer. Assigning the
answers equal credence is unwarranted because I lack sufficient evidence to overrule my
seeming until I know more about why the peer takes a different view.
Alternatively, consider Christensen’s discussion of a case he borrows from Kelly,
in which two meteorologist peers interpret a set of weather data differently. Kelly says
that in a case like this--in which each takes the other to be a peer initially and then
discovers their disagreement--from the perspective of one of them, the disagreement
provides evidence that they’re not peers after all. About this, Christensen says:
It seems to me that there is clearly something right about this line. As applied to
the weather case, my discovering that my friend has reached what seems to me to
David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 116, no. 2
(2007): 193.
23
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be the wrong conclusion does constitute evidence that she has made a mistake,
and thus does give me reason to trust her opinion less than I ordinarily would.
However, another point needs equal emphasis: the fact that she disagrees with my
prediction also constitutes evidence that I have made a mistake. So it’s not clear
so far that any asymmetry has developed.24
So Christensen thinks the evidential situation here is a wash, because the fact that she
disagrees constitutes evidence that I have made a mistake, and that evidence counts the
same as the evidence I have that she made a mistake.
But is this right? It seems to me that Christensen (and Kelly) are correct that
learning of peer disagreement in a case like this does provide some evidence that one’s
peer is mistaken, and therefore (Kelly, contra Christensen) contributes to breaking the
symmetry between the peers, i.e., making them not peers in that case. However, the
symmetry is not broken because of the discovery that the other party interprets the
evidence differently from me, in the sense that because one disagrees with me, therefore
she must be mistaken. After all, it’s not as though being mine makes a belief more likely
to be justified. Rather, the symmetry is broken because of what the disagreement is based
on--namely, my own seeming that the evidence points my way.25 But I do not have my
peer’s seeming--that the evidence points her way--and so it does not follow that her
disagreement gives me evidence that counterbalances my own seemings. I can
simultaneously acknowledge that she is usually my peer about this sort of evidence, but
that she is apparently making a mistake in this case, and also acknowledge that her view
counts somewhat against mine (owing to her peer status), but not enough to outweigh my
first-order evidential seemings.
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peers in this case.” It is not: “We disagree; I am usually right; therefore, we are not peers in this case.”
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Further, in some cases the discovery of disagreement will not make any difference
with respect to the total evidence one has for or against p. For example, if you predict a
30% chance of rain on the basis of evidence which, to me, clearly supports a much higher
percentage (say, 70%), then this is evidence to me that you may not be my peer after all
with respect to predicting rain in circumstances like this. It is not clear that my evidence
for the proposition “There is a high chance of rain” has changed at all because of our
disagreement, even if I thought you my peer prior to disagreeing.26 Compare disagreeing
with a child: intuitively, the disagreement alone typically provides no evidence against p.
In the case of disagreeing with a presumed peer, on the other hand, the effect of the
disagreement on one’s total evidence for p depends on the strength of one’s judgment that
the other is in fact a peer in this case. But we’ve just said that the discovery of
disagreement provides some evidence against peerhood. So, because I have only my
evidential seeming to go on, not my peer’s, the fact of disagreement will often only count
against her view, not mine, unless of course my seeming is that the evidence could go
either way. The exception to this will be cases where I am very confident that she is my
peer on issues like this one and I cannot bring myself to think that she is suffering some
kind of unusual defect in this case, such as in a situation of Parity. Thus, a typical (nonParity) disagreement does produce an asymmetry between us, assuming that I take the
evidence to support my view.
Now, the same will of course be true from my friend’s perspective: she will also
think (rightly) that an asymmetry has been created by the disagreement, and that I am no
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longer her peer with respect to this question. Perhaps this is what Christensen is getting
at. But he is wrong to conclude that “it’s not clear so far that any asymmetry has
developed.” It is more accurate to say that an asymmetry has developed from both
perspectives, but in opposite directions. This suggests that both parties are within their
epistemic rights to regard the other as temporarily less than a peer, and that therefore
rational disagreement between apparent peers (viewed from a third party perspective) is
possible. The case also suggests that from the perspective of either party, one is justified
in maintaining her view, and there is nothing here to suggest that it would be somehow
more epistemically virtuous to conciliate (contra Rosen).
Christensen also takes his wristwatch analogy, mentioned above, to indicate
symmetry between peers:
To focus in on the symmetry question, let me begin with an admittedly crude
analogy: I look at my watch, a one-year-old Acme that has worked fine so far, and
see that it says 4:10. Simultaneously, however, my friend consults her watch--also
a one-year-old Acme with a fine track record--and it reads 4:20. When she tells
me this, it clearly gives me new evidence that her watch is fast: I should not trust
her watch as much as I would have before finding out that it disagreed with mine.
But just as clearly, I’ve just gotten new evidence that my watch is slow, and this
should diminish my trust in it. In this case, it’s obvious that the fact that one of the
watches is on my wrist does not introduce an epistemically relevant asymmetry.27
But here, as above, the symmetry is confused. It is true that the watch’s being on my wrist
is not a relevant asymmetry. However, whatever reasons I have for trusting my watch are
relevant, and if they are no more than as stated, I should pretty clearly suspend judgment.
This is not simply because the other person disagrees with me, but because I have two
objective, conflicting pieces of evidence (the two watches), and no way to tell which is
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more reliable. Christensen himself comes close to acknowledging something like my
points here when he says:
… it is certainly true that when I consider how to regard my friend’s
disagreement, I must do so from within the first-person perspective--that is, using
my own beliefs. Might this give my beliefs--which include my belief about the
matter on which my friend and I disagree--a kind of privileged position that the
watch on my wrist doesn’t share?28
Of course Christensen goes on to argue that it does not, for reasons we saw above in
Chapter Two. But again, one’s beliefs should be privileged only if things really do appear
to be a certain way after investigation (checking for defeaters, etc.), not merely because
they are one’s own beliefs.
So Christensen has not provided a compelling argument for the view that peer
disagreement necessarily produces epistemic symmetry between the peers which entails
according the views of a peer equal weight as one’s own. While peer disagreement may
certainly (in fact, typically does) provide some evidence against one’s view--though I
will argue below that it does not do so necessarily--it does not follow that it provides
counterbalancing or defeating evidence. However, Christensen is right about one thing: it
can happen in a case of peer disagreement that I am justified in counting the present
disagreement against you, and therefore considering you temporarily not my peer, and I
am also aware that you are justified in doing the same with me, and I cannot say for sure
which of us is right. And as we saw above, the longer the disagreement lasts and the
better we know one another’s reasons--i.e., the more confident we are that we are peers-the more pernicious this problem becomes. Hence the Parity Problem returns.
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Chapter Six – Higher-Order Evidence and Testimony
6.1 – The Meta-Evidence Principle

As we saw in Chapter One, Richard Feldman understands the epistemic
significance of disagreement to be a matter of higher-order evidence that there is
evidence against one’s view. This provides another way in which disagreement may
defeat one’s private evidential seemings, namely by providing evidence that one’s initial
evidence assessment was mistaken. This differs from David Christensen’s proposed
symmetry between peers, discussed in the previous chapter. With symmetry, there are
two equally good evidence assessors, neither of which has any reason (allegedly) to
prefer her view over the other. From a first-person perspective, Christensen thinks, one
should weigh the peer’s contrary testimony (disagreement) the same as one’s own
evidential seemings. In other words, peer disagreement defeats one’s evidential seemings
by providing counterbalancing evidence. On the other hand, with higher-order evidence,
one obtains evidence about one’s own evidence via disagreement which suggests that
one’s first-order evidential assessment was sub-par. The difference between these two
justifications for conciliating in a case of peer disagreement roughly tracks the distinction
between “undercutting” and “rebutting” defeaters. As Thomas Kelly says:
Following Pollock (1986), we can distinguish
between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. Intuitively, where E is evidence
for H, an undercutting defeater is evidence which undermines the evidential
connection between E and H.… In contrast, a rebutting defeater is evidence which
prevents E from justifying belief in H by supporting not-H in a more direct
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way.… It is something of an open question how deeply the distinction between
‘undermining’ and ‘rebutting’ defeaters cuts.1
Alternatively, it may be better to think of Christensen’s argument for epistemic
symmetry between peers not as a matter of gaining a rebutting defeater, but rather as a
simple case of gaining new first-order evidence which renders one’s total evidence set
inconclusive. Christensen describes the difference between first-order and higher-order
evidence as follows:
Any new evidence… that rationalizes a change of belief state… is, in a trivial
way, evidence against one’s previous belief state.… But while this sort of
evidence does indicate that my previous beliefs are, in a certain sense, suboptimal,
it does not indicate that I’ve been anything less than a perfectly rational believer.
The evidence that there’s something suboptimal about my pre-change beliefs is
merely a byproduct of the evidence bearing directly on the subject matter of the
beliefs. Sometimes, however, evidence rationalizes a change of belief precisely
because it indicates that my former beliefs were rationally sub-par. This is
evidence of my own rational failure.… in this case, the indication that my former
beliefs are suboptimal is no mere byproduct of my reasoning…2
The focus of this chapter is on the evidential effect of disagreement considered as higherorder evidence, which provides, as Christensen says, “evidence of my own rational
failure.”
One of the most prominent commentators about the role of higher-order evidence
in peer disagreement is Richard Feldman. He describes the views of a peer as providing
“evidence that there is evidence for p,” which in a case of disagreement can sometimes
defeat my own first-order evidence about p. Discussing private evidence, Feldman says:
Each may have his or her own special insight or sense of obviousness. But each
knows about the other’s insight. Each knows that this insight has evidential force.
And now I see no basis for either of them justifying his own belief simply because
Thomas Kelly, “Evidence,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence/, Section 1. Kelly is here citing John Pollock, Contemporary
Theories of Knowledge, 1st ed. (Towota, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1986).
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the one insight happens to occur inside of him. A point about evidence that plays
a role here is this: evidence of evidence is evidence. More carefully, evidence that
there is evidence for P is evidence for P. Knowing that the other has an insight
provides each of them with evidence.3
This section will explore the claim that “evidence of evidence is evidence,” which we
earlier labeled the Meta-Evidence Principle (MEP). In two later papers, Feldman clarifies
his intent in advancing this principle and responds to some objections.4 The idea, he says,
is not that one peer acquires the other’s experiential evidence--“When you tell me that
you have a headache, I don’t thereby get your headache,” he says.5 Rather, it is that your
believing that p gives me reason to believe that there is some reason for p, which in turn
gives me reason for p.
The function of MEP in the context of peer disagreement is to explain why one is
not justified in maintaining one’s prior belief after discovering the disagreement. The
idea is that encountering a disagreeing peer gives one higher-order evidence that there is
first-order evidence against one’s view that one has either missed, misinterpreted, or
weighed incorrectly. Further, this holds even if one does not know what the peer’s firstorder evidence is. It is enough that a peer disagrees to undercut one’s first-order evidence
assessment. Or so Feldman claims. But is MEP defensible?
Several other commentators in the disagreement debate have had some (mostly
negative) things to say about this principle. Much of this discussion centers on the
relationship between evidence and justification. Plausibly, evidence typically produces
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justification for believing a proposition. If one is an evidentialist, like Feldman, then in
fact evidence is the only thing that can produce justification. So on first glance, the
principle seems to imply that evidence that someone else has evidence for p gives one
justification for the belief that p. But several commentators have wondered about this
implication.
For example, Earl Conee notes that the principle does not entail justification
because justification is a “summary evaluation” of a belief.6 Meta-evidence could easily
be defeated by other considerations. For example, if I learn that you, normally my
epistemic peer about such things, believe that it will snow today (despite having been
quite warm yesterday), then by the principle, I thereby gain some evidence that it will
snow today. However, say I also find out that the weather app you’ve been using has a
known malfunction that results in false predictions of snow. Then the evidence I gained
from your evidence is canceled out, and so I am not justified in believing that it will
snow.
Nonetheless, both Conee and Feldman suggest that evidence of evidence provides
some defeasible evidence for a person--even if that evidence is always defeated. Conee
considers a case where someone has some evidence that there is evidence for some
proposition, but that person also knows that her belief in the proposition is a guess, with
no better than a 50/50 chance of being true. This knowledge that it is a guess plausibly

Earl Conee, “Rational Disagreement Defended,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A
Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 76-78, and Appendix 1, 84-89. Conee is specifically discussing
the principle:
EE: Evidence for Evidence. If S has evidence for the proposition that evidence exists in support of
X, then S has evidence for X. (76)
6

114
defeats the meta-evidence, but it--the meta-evidence--nonetheless counts as evidence.7
Similarly, Conee considers another case in which one gains evidence that someone else
has evidence for a proposition, in the context of being told about a hoax being perpetrated
on that person. So Smith tells you that he made it seem to Jones as though Black was in
the room today, when in fact Black was not. By the Meta-Evidence Principle, you now
have evidence that Black was in the room--Jones’s evidence--but that evidence is
immediately defeated by the fact that the source of your evidence--Smith’s testimony--is
also defeating evidence for the proposition that Black was in the room. Feldman has a
similar case: you read a retraction in the newspaper of a story from yesterday that you
had not read. You now, says Feldman, get simultaneous evidence for and against what
was reported yesterday, because the retraction gives you meta-evidence (and therefore
evidence) for the content of yesterday’s report. But the retraction also gives you defeating
evidence. As he says, “if you were asked whether you had any evidence at all in support
of P, it is clear that the answer is ‘Yes’--you have evidence about yesterday’s newspaper
report. To ignore this would be wrong.”8 In other words, “defeated evidence is
evidence.”9
Another commentator, Alvin Goldman, interprets Feldman’s principle to mean
that if one person “truthfully reports evidence Q concerning P, this evidence is also
acquired by the hearer.”10 Now, this is not what Feldman means--and Goldman admits
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Feldman and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 211.
8

115
that it isn’t--but nonetheless Goldman makes a point that is relevant to Feldman’s
intended usage:
Hearing such testimony may give the hearer default justification for believing Q,
but such default justification can be defeated by other information in the hearer’s
possession. In that case, Q does not qualify as an item of evidence for the
hearer.”11
Goldman seems to imply here that evidence that is defeated--i.e., evidence that cannot
justify a belief--is not really evidence.12
A related objection to the Meta-Evidence Principle comes from Hud Hudson:
Suppose that at some APA conference we’re having our yearly beer together and I
say, “Hey Rich, something kind of cool...it’s my birthday today!” And I do it in
that winning and trustworthy way you’ve come to trust over the years. But I’m
lying and I know I’m lying. I now have evidence for the proposition that evidence
exists in support of the claim that it’s my birthday today, but I don’t have
evidence (not even a little bit) for the claim that it’s my birthday today.13
Hudson’s point here is that if MEP is correct, then Hudson would have evidence that it’s
his own birthday, when he knows that it isn’t, which seems absurd.
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It seems to me that the way to respond to this objection is as follows: MEP is not
a norm governing one’s abilities to create evidence by lying. It is a principle about what
the opinions of others give one reason to believe. This is due to the obvious fact (at least
it seems obvious to me), which Hudson is here exploiting, that my own claims cannot
create evidence for me for the content of those claims.14
But this is not how Feldman responds to Hudson’s objection, and indeed it seems
that he cannot. For if he were to acknowledge that the evidence possessed by one person
may not be evidence for another, then the principle would fail to do the work he initially
set for it, which is to show that evidence that a peer has evidence for p is evidence for me
that has defeating power for my own first-order evidence about p. Goldman makes a
similar point:
… even if [a report of there being some evidence is not defeated]…, the hearer
does not necessarily acquire the same evidence possessed by Smith. Smith's
saying that he had a certain visual experience, for example, does not reproduce in
the hearer the same visual experience, with its full evidential load. So the hearer
does not acquire the same evidence for P as Smith has.15
Clearly if evidence for one person cannot be assumed to be evidence for another person,
then it does not follow that Feldman’s evidence that it is Hudson’s birthday is also
evidence for Hudson that it is his birthday.
Instead of making this (I think) sensible reply, Feldman replies by biting the
bullet: “I think that in his example Hud does get some evidence for the proposition that it
is his birthday today. But this is not problematic.”16 It isn’t problematic, supposedly,
because the evidence that Hudson receives through his lie is minimal and is easily
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swamped by the other evidence that he has that it is not his birthday. Feldman reminds
the reader, rightly, that to have some evidence for p is not to be justified in believing p,
since justification has to do with the balance of one’s total evidence. So, since Hudson
does not obtain justification through his lie, there is no problem.
This seems to me to miss the force of the objection. The objection is not that
Hudson obtains a justified belief that it is his birthday by lying about it being his birthday,
but rather that he obtains evidence for the proposition that it is his birthday by lying about
it being his birthday.17 Shifting attention away from this odd result and toward an even
stranger result (justification) does not remove the original oddity. Surely evidence cannot
be manufactured so easily. If it can, then all I need to do to obtain evidence for some
view is to make a convincing show of evidence to someone else. But evidence,
intuitively, has to do with having a reason to believe that something is true. As Kelly
says:
… the concept of evidence is closely related to other fundamental normative
concepts such as the concept of a reason. Indeed, it is natural to think that ‘reason
to believe’ and ‘evidence’ are more or less synonymous, being distinguished
chiefly by the fact that the former functions grammatically as a count noun while
the latter functions as a mass term.18
And surely the person who lies to another doesn’t thereby gain a reason to believe
anything about the content of the lie. If, after Feldman forms the justified belief that it is
Hudson’s birthday, we ask Hudson, “Do you have any more reason to believe that it is
your birthday than you did a moment ago?” the intuitive answer is no. But if evidence
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gives one a reason to believe something, then MEP entails that the answer is yes. I find
this highly counterintuitive, even if such reasons are always defeated by other competing
reasons. But as I say, Feldman cannot respond differently, for if he concedes that
Hudson’s claim creates evidence, but not evidence for Hudson, then he must admit that
evidence of evidence is not always evidence for just anyone. And this would undercut the
usefulness of the principle for his position, which is to establish that in a case of peer
disagreement with private evidence, a peer’s reported disagreement can defeat one’s own
private seemings.
It is also important to be clear about what peer disagreement is actually evidence
of. Consider Christensen’s mention of Feldman’s principle:
Suppose I have good reason to believe that my friend’s evidence, though different
from mine, is just as good (for example, suppose my friend and I have done
similar polls of distinct but comparable sample populations and have reached
conflicting conclusions). Here, the reasons for our disagreement need not be
cognitive--it could just be that one of the samples was not representative. But
absent some special reason for treating her evidence or reasoning differently from
mine, it seems clear that in evaluating explanations for our disagreement, I should
regard our opinions as equally likely to be accurate, and thus I should alter my
opinion toward hers.19
Assuming that one has not seen the peer’s evidence directly, why should it follow that the
peer’s opinion is “equally likely to be accurate”?20 To see the point a bit more clearly,
consider another case. Returning to the courtroom scenario discussed above, imagine that
you are a defense attorney. Your client has claimed his innocence, and given the evidence
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you’ve seen, you’re inclined to believe him. However, the prosecution is not behaving as
if the defendant is innocent. In fact, it is behaving in a way that suggests it believes
something you do not. You infer this because you know how you would behave as a
prosecutor, given the evidence you have, and the prosecution is going well beyond that.
So here you have some evidence in the form of the prosecution’s behavior. But what
exactly is this evidence of? The proposition in question here--the proposition in dispute
between you and the prosecution--is: “The defendant is guilty.” Call that p. You deny p,
while the prosecution affirms it (or at any rate, they’re tasked with defending it, whether
or not they actually believe it). You each have evidence relevant to p, some shared and
some, presumably, not (such as your own interviews with your client). Does the
prosecution’s behavior give you any evidence for or against p itself? As things stand,
without knowing more about the prosecution’s evidence, I think that it does not. It gives
you, rather, evidence for another proposition: “The prosecution has information I lack.”
Call this q. Note that even your evidence for q is weak, because many other things
besides extra information could explain the behavior, and some alternative explanations
are plausible. For example, the prosecution could be posturing, behaving this way to get
you to think they have more information so that you’ll be more likely to make a plea deal.
Owing to these alternative explanations, q does not entail that p is either more or less
likely than you took it to be before observing the prosecution’s behavior. For all you
know, the prosecution has indeed obtained damning evidence against your client. On the
other hand, they may just as easily be working with evidence that would be compelling if
not for a strong defeater that you possess and they lack. Or they could be posturing.
Whether q turns out to be evidence for p cannot be predicted before you know the content
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of the prosecution’s information. So it seems that here evidence that there is evidence for
p (for someone else) turns out not to be evidence for p (for you). In this case, evidence of
evidence is evidence, but not necessarily evidence of the disputed proposition, and not
necessarily for both parties to the dispute.
But there is, it seems to me, something right about MEP. I think what this is
comes through in a comment van Inwagen makes about David Lewis:
Consider… the body of public evidence that I can appeal to in support of
incompatibilism (arguments and other philosophical considerations that can be
expressed in sentences or diagrams on a blackboard or other objects of
intersubjective awareness). David Lewis “had” the same evidence (he had seen
and he remembered and understood these objects) and was, nevertheless, a
compatibilist. If I know, as I do, that David had these features (and this feature,
too: he was a brilliant philosopher), that he had these features is itself evidence
that is (or so it would seem to me) relevant to the truth of incompatibilism.21
Notice that what is relevant to what van Inwagen should believe about p (in this case,
incompatibilism) is that Lewis had these features--namely, he had seen, remembered, and
understood the evidence, and was brilliant.22 And those features are themselves evidence
pertinent to p. If none of these obtained, the question of the evidential value of Lewis’s
opinions would be moot. So Feldman’s principle is right in one sense: insofar as one is
dealing with a perspective that is constituted by certain features of epistemic excellence,
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then the views of a person with that perspective may count as evidence for a disputed
proposition which challenges one’s own evidential seemings.23
Kelly makes a similar point when he says:
Let us set aside, for the moment, the special case of disagreement among peers,
and reflect on a much more general question: in what circumstances does it make
sense for me to treat the fact that someone else believes as she does as evidence
for the truth of that which she believes? A true (although perhaps not especially
informative) answer: exactly when I take her belief to be a reliable indication of
how things stand in the relevant part of reality. Thus, suppose that I know, on the
basis of extensive past experience, that, when my weather forecaster judges that it
will rain the next day, it tends to rain 80 percent of the time. In that case, I will
treat her judgments to the effect that it will rain as evidence that it will rain,
inasmuch as I take there to be a positive correlation between the two. Notice that,
in this respect, there is absolutely nothing special about the way in which the
judgments of another person come to count as evidence.24
This implies that it is the reliability of a person that makes her opinion evidentially
valuable, which in turn depends on the person’s reasoning habits. This is not to say that
testimony from someone with poor reasoning habits has no evidential weight--such
people can still effectively transmit information, and perhaps even knowledge.25 It is just
to say that I am not likely to consider the testimony of another person capable of
undercutting my own evidential assessment unless I take her to be an especially careful

Note the implications here for Hudson’s counterexample to MEP: if Feldman takes Hudson to have these
features of epistemic excellence, then Hudson’s testimony that it is his birthday does give Feldman
evidence that it is Hudson’s birthday. However, it does not give Hudson any evidence that it is his own
birthday, because he knows himself to be lying, and therefore to be contravening the conditions for his own
epistemic excellence, one of which is accurately representing the available evidence.
24
Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman
and Ted Warfield (Oxford University Press, 2010), 132. Note that Kelly seems to imply here a reductionist
view of testimony, since the forecaster’s report acquires evidential weight only via an observed correlation
between the report and the world. Notice also his emphasis on “taking there to be a positive correlation”
between a peer’s judgment and some “part of reality.” It is this, he says, that grounds the evidential value of
the judgment. It follows that judgments of epistemic excellence--and consequently, judgments that one is a
peer--are based on observations of this sort of correlation. This strikes me as a Humean point about the
empirical basis of judgments regarding the beliefs and reasoning habits of others. How to understand such
judgments along Humean (and Kantian) lines will be the theme of Chapters Eight and Nine.
25
See the discussion of testimony in the next section.
23

122
reasoner. In other words, I must take her testimony regarding p to be trustworthy if it is to
be capable of defeating or compelling me to alter my first-order belief. So we can modify
Feldman’s principle to yield a more plausible version as follows:
MEP*: For peers S1 and S2, evidence of S2’s trustworthy judgment that p is
evidence for S1 that p.
This takes into account the perspectival nature of evidence (that it’s for S1, though not for
S2); it specifies the object of the evidence (the proposition p); and it emphasizes that
evidence rooted in a trustworthy judgment, which implies various features of epistemic
excellence, is evidence that is pertinent to p for S1.26 It thus avoids the objections to
Feldman’s original principle that we’ve mentioned.
As stated, MEP* leaves open the question of whether the reported judgment of
another that is not marked by such features may count as evidence for S1 that p. In fact, it
is pretty clear that it can: most of us would accept directions in an unfamiliar city from a
perfect stranger, and accept that we thereby obtain evidence for propositions about where
things are located. But the focus of this section has been on when the disagreement of
another provides evidence which can defeat (undercut) one’s first-order evidential
seemings. MEP* allows for that to happen via higher-order evidence obtained through
disagreement, and it specifies what is required for that meta-evidence to be capable of
defeating one’s own prior evidence: namely, a contrary judgment from someone one
takes to be trustworthy in the relevant domain.

6.2 - Disagreement and Testimony
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It is worth noting a connection here between peer disagreement and testimony.
The epistemological problem of peer disagreement may be thought of as a special version
of the problem of testimony--i.e., the problem of whether the reports of others can be a
basic source of knowledge or justified belief.27 This is because the evidence that one has
in a case of peer disagreement is testimonial evidence: the report of a peer about the truth
of some proposition. Thus, one is weighing testimonial evidence against the evidence of
one’s own seemings (including one’s reasoning, perceptions, memory, etc.). Thinking of
the problem in this way does not necessarily get us closer to a solution, since the issue of
testimonial justification itself is still controversial. But there is at least widespread
agreement that testimony is a source of evidence (the debate is mostly about whether it is
a fundamental or autonomous source of evidence), so if peer disagreement is merely a
problem of weighing testimony, then the subject of this chapter can be clarified: insofar
as testimonial reports provide potentially defeating evidence, so do the disagreements of
a peer.
Note, however, that in idealized cases of peer disagreement (especially those that
give rise to the Parity Problem), we are assuming that the peers have done their best to
share their evidence. The means of sharing is testimonial, but once shared, it is thought
that the evidence can become one’s own, so to speak. If you write your argument down
for me, and I read it, whatever inferential justification went into your testimonial report is
now part of my own inferential evidence base (barring, of course, private evidence). As
Kelly says, “In cases of peer disagreement, one gets to go underneath the hood, as it
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were.”28 So while the epistemic problem of belief adjustment arises because of testimony,
whether or not there is additional reason to adjust one’s belief beyond the content of the
shared evidence depends on the nature of the peer’s reasoning habits, and not merely on
the instance of testimony that gave rise to the disagreement.
In other words, recognizing peer disagreement as a problem about testimony
leaves open the question of when the testimony of others should provide defeating
(undercutting or rebutting) evidence for or against some proposition. I suggested in the
last section that in order to defeat one’s first-order evidence for p, such testimony needs
to be rooted in a trustworthy judgment, which is to say that I take your reasoning to be
marked by certain features of epistemic excellence, features which I take into account.
One way of understanding how this works, which I want to raise here as a
suggestion, without pursuing it in depth, is to think of the disagreement problem in the
context of a virtue ethical theory of testimony.29 Such a theory has been proposed by Paul
Faulkner, who discusses the epistemic role of the virtue of trust, utilizing Miranda
Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice.30 He considers his own version of a “problem of
disagreement,” which arises from the possibility of conflicting sets of ethical concepts,
which make it impossible, he argues, to give a purely epistemological account of the
virtue of trust. This is because it is not reasonable, for various reasons, to presume that a
speaker is trustworthy in the absence of a relationship that makes ethical demands.31 His
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solution to this problem involves an explanation of the way that trust as an ethical virtue
creates the epistemic tools needed to justify trusting the testimony of others.
Faulkner notes that testimony does not occur in a vacuum--the partners in a
conversation always have some interest in the outcome of the conversation, and thus
“there are a multitude of potential explanations of any given bit of testimony, where each
explanation starts from the interest the speaker has in the conversation.”32 Note that while
“an audience’s basic reason for entering into a testimonial exchange is to find things out,”
it is not necessarily the case that a speaker’s interest is to help the audience accomplish
this goal.33 As Faulkner says:
… from the multitude of potential explanations of any given bit of testimony,
there is no reason to single out ‘satisfying the audience’s epistemic interest’ as the
default explanation. And this is to say that a presumption of trustworthiness
cannot be established as the epistemic default, because testimony does not have
the proper function of servicing an audience’s epistemic interests.34
It follows from this that
… what an audience needs, in every case, in order to epistemically rationalize
testimonial uptake is some judgement that this explanation applies, that the
speaker’s purpose in communicating is indeed informative, and that the speaker is
thereby trustworthy. More generally, what is thereby needed is some particular
reason for thinking that a given bit of testimony is true.35
Now, we must be careful here in interpreting Faulkner’s claim that “a
presumption of trustworthiness cannot be established as the epistemic default.” It is
plausible, and widely acknowledged, that under the usual conditions in which one
receives and depends on testimony, one is reasonable to assume a norm of truthfulness.
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For example, Jonathan Adler describes a class of “core cases” of testimonial transmission
which meet certain conditions, including that the purpose of the speaker is primarily to
inform. Regarding the core cases, he observes:
These are ordinary contexts where the norm of truthfulness holds, the purpose is
primarily to inform, the hearer’s information about the speaker is minimal and
there is little or no motivation to deceive e.g., the time, the weather, driving
directions, the location of notable places, prominent historical facts, sports scores,
the whereabouts of acquaintances, explaining why you are going to the shopping
mall. In these core cases, hearers generally have no special reason to doubt the
speaker’s word, as they would if the speaker’s assertion is controversial or selfserving.36
Further, some epistemologists have offered arguments for the a priori justification
of such a norm of truthfulness. For example, Tyler Burge says:
We are a priori entitled to accept something that is prima facie intelligible and
presented as true.… Intelligible affirmation is the face of reason; reason is a guide
to truth. We are a priori prima facie entitled to take intelligible affirmation at face
value.37
Burge here represents a version of the anti-reductionist view of testimony, according to
which testimony is an autonomous source of epistemic authority, not reducible to other
sources such as perception and memory, even if it depends on them causally. On the
other hand, reductionists hold that testimony derives its epistemic authority from these
other sources. For example, Elizabeth Fricker says that the assumption of a norm of
truthfulness is “an epistemic charter for the gullible and undiscriminating,” and that “a
hearer should always engage in some assessment of the speaker for trustworthiness. To
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believe what is asserted without doing so is to believe blindly, uncritically. This is
gullibility.”38
Faulkner defends a theory that is midway between these views, though it is more
accurately described as anti-reductionist than reductionist. His is a version of the
Assurance View of Testimony, which holds that “The hearer’s entitlement to belief [on the
basis of testimony] resides in the speaker’s standing behind his word, giving his
assurance.”39 Proponents of the Assurance View are suspicious of interpreting the
epistemic significance of testimony in an evidential sense, because the epistemic import
of evidence is independent of the presenter of the evidence, which is not typically the
case in testimonial exchanges. Compare the difference between being told and
overhearing: the one who is told has a claim against the speaker if the testimony turns out
to be false, whereas the overhearer has no such claim because she is not entitled to expect
an intention to inform from what is, to her, mere third-person evidence for the truth of
what is said. As Adler says, “The overhearer has no… social-ethical duty to the speaker,
and the speaker feels no ethical obligation of veracity toward the overhearer. Yet the
overhearer has, it would seem, the same evidence as the hearer.”40
On Faulkner’s version of the Assurance View, a hearer is not entitled to assume
without reason that a speaker’s intention in the testimonial exchange is to inform.
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Nonetheless, this view is anti-reductionist in the sense that one may be justified in relying
on the speaker’s testimony without further investigating it for oneself, insofar as the
speaker presented the testimony to the hearer as true. The hearer is trusting the speaker,
and this is sufficient for forming a justified belief via testimony. On the other hand,
confirming the content of a speaker’s testimony with some other faculty, like perception,
implies that the speaker’s word is insufficient on its own to justify belief.41 Assurance
views treat testimony as an autonomous source of knowledge. They also hold, however,
that trust in the truthfulness of a speaker is required for the justification of one’s
testimony-based beliefs. But this does not entail that one’s testimonial beliefs are
typically unjustified, because one generally does have such a basis for trust in the sorts of
core cases Adler notes. For example, if I get the time from someone on the street, I can
trust that person’s testimony because there are implicit social norms governing trusting
one another in such circumstances. I know that people don't normally lie about that,
they’re not normally mistaken about that, they don’t normally have a rational reason to
be deceptive about that, and so on. Such interactions are still ultimately trust-based, even
though the relational connection between speaker and hearer is weak. This explains why I
would feel like I had been wronged if a stranger asserted to me some directions which
turned out to be misleading.
So when Faulkner says that “a presumption of trustworthiness cannot be
established as the epistemic default,” the keyword is epistemic. Treating testimony as
evidence, disconnected from the assurance to the truth of the testimony by the speaker,
does not yield a presumption of truthfulness. However, one may presume trustworthiness
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as an ethical default, which in turn can yield an epistemic norm. The moral reason to
believe a peer can become an epistemic reason because, as Faulkner says, “the
presumption of trustworthiness in effect articulates a truth-based explanation of utterance:
the speaker tells one that p because one visibly needs to know whether p.”42 He
continues:
… in the good case, there is an explanatory connection between one’s trusting and
a speaker’s being trustworthy that runs via the existence of… social norms of
trust. This connection ensures that it is no accident that the truth-based
explanation of utterance holds, given one’s presumption that it does.43
This way of thinking about the epistemic significance of testimony helps to clarify
the problem with Feldman’s assumption, discussed in the previous section, that testimony
that p is automatically always evidence for p. Feldman would likely reply that testimony
always provides some (defeasible) evidence because of the presumption that it is intended
to be informative, and that this evidence is outweighed when one finds out that it wasn't
so intended. But it is, I think, both less epistemologically loaded and closer to real-world
experience to say that testimony provides a reason to believe something--a reason which
could play a defeating role for one’s prior beliefs--only if one is justified in thinking that
the speaker’s interest is to “satisfy the audience's epistemic interest.” This is less
epistemologically loaded in the sense that it does not presume that the proper function of
testimony is to be informative, nor does it require an evidentialist interpretation of
testimony’s epistemic significance. It is closer to real-world experience because we are
all well-acquainted with the experience of discovering that being informative was in fact
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not a speaker’s intention in delivering some testimony, and feeling as though the speaker
violated an obligation toward us as a result.
This view also implies a solution to Hudson’s case: I do not gain evidence by
giving false testimony, because--even though the other person testifies with the intention
to inform--that testimony relies on other testimony (mine) that lacks this intention, and I
am in a position to know that. The whole testimonial chain must preserve the intention to
inform.
When is it reasonable, then, to believe that a speaker intends to be informative,
and so is trustworthy? Faulkner’s answer is that “trust, morally understood, is central to
the epistemology of testimony in that it can be our ‘reason’ for testimonial uptake.”44 In
other words, we need a virtue theory of testimony. The details of such a theory need not
concern us here; I want merely to suggest that one plausible way of understanding when
the testimony of a peer should count as evidence for oneself that could defeat one’s own
evidential seemings is that this depends in part on whether it is morally appropriate to
trust that peer.
6.3 – The Problem of Possible Rational Disagreement

In this section I consider the argument that possible peer disagreement presents a
similar epistemic problem to actual peer disagreement, and that therefore real-life peer
disagreements are unnecessary to give rise to the epistemological issues at play in the
debate.
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This issue is raised by Kelly and considered by Christensen, who responds to a
thought experiment of Kelly’s.45 Kelly considers whether possible disagreement should
be “intellectually threatening.” He thinks that the answer turns on how rational such
disagreement would be. That in turn depends on how strong one takes the evidence and
arguments for a possible contrary view to be. As he says, “the extent to which merely
possible dissent should be seen as intellectually threatening effectively reduces to
questions about the strength of the reasons that might be put forward on behalf of such
dissent.”46
Kelly offers a thought experiment involving Newcomb’s Problem to support his
case.47 Imagine a student, call her S, who is considering Newcomb’s problem, weighing
all of the arguments for both One-Boxing and Two-Boxing, and attempting to make up
her mind about which strategy is best. Imagine two possible worlds that differ only with
respect to opinions on this problem. In World A, opinion is divided evenly: about half the
people who consider the matter are One-Boxers, and about half are Two-Boxers.48 In
World B, as a matter of contingent fact, everyone is convinced by the arguments for OneBoxing. Assume that the arguments and evidence pertinent to Newcomb’s problem are

See Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology,
Volume 1, ed. John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), Section 5,
181-185; and Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Section 5, 505-10. The issue
is also present in Rosen’s discussion of the nominalist “Bedrockers” discussed above.
46
Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 181-2.
47
This problem was made famous by Robert Nozick in his “Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of
Choice,” in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing
Company, 1969), 114-146. The problem is as follows: A player must choose either one opaque box or two
boxes--the same opaque one and a transparent one. The transparent box contains $1,000. The opaque box
contains either $1,000,000 (if a predictor has predicted that the player will choose only that box), or
nothing (if the predictor has predicted that the player will choose both boxes).
48
This was, apparently, the state of things in the actual world according to Nozick’s first reporting. See
Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 19-23, esp. footnote 17.
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identical in both worlds. Should S differ with respect to her view of the problem
depending on which world she is in? Specifically, assuming S has considered all of the
arguments and evidence pertinent to the problem, and is leaning toward One-Boxing,
should she be less confident in this opinion in World A than she would be in World B?
Kelly thinks not, since the arguments in the two worlds are identical, and since, even in
World B, she should realize that she has epistemic peers who are Two-Boxers in World
A. In other words, the existence of these possible peers who are convinced by the same
arguments that S already possesses should count the same epistemically as the existence
of actual peers who were convinced by those arguments.49 As Christensen says, “The
lesson, if I understand Kelly correctly, is that it’s the arguments that determine what’s
rational to believe about Newcomb’s problem, not contingent sociological facts about
what other people think.”50
Note that given what we said about Kelly in the last chapter, this interpretation is
probably not quite fair: arguments are only as good as the evidence supporting them, and
part of the evidence here is purportedly what other people think, which can matter. I take
it this is why Kelly apparently accepts that multiple independent lines of evidence are
weightier than a single independent line or multiple non-independent lines, even when
the arguments in each are the same. So the views of others do seem to have evidential
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Kelly goes on to argue that the case of radical skepticism in epistemology is a real-life example of his
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weight for Kelly--he just does not think that this is a special kind of evidence that
automatically has overriding power when the other people in question are peers.
Nonetheless, Kelly does suggest with the Newcomb case that possible peers are
epistemically equivalent to actual peers. This is important for Kelly because he wants to
maintain that since the arguments in Worlds A and B are the same, if it is the case that S
shouldn’t lose confidence in World B when no one disagrees with her, then she also
shouldn’t lose confidence in World A, just because her peers there are actual. What really
matters in both worlds is what the arguments support.
Christensen responds by returning to his restaurant bill case, though modifying it
slightly. Imagine that instead of one peer, there are seventeen superiors, all expert
calculators, say, and they all independently arrive at the same answer that differs from
mine. It would obviously be irrational for me to continue to insist on my answer in this
case, and Christensen says this remains true “even if, in this particular case, [my] answer
was actually the correct one.”51 So perhaps what the arguments support is not all that
matters. He applies his conclusion to Kelly’s case, saying that if S:
…reasonably sees herself as being among others who… are her epistemic peers,
then the denizen of the divided World A should be less confident of the truth of
One-Boxing than the denizen of World B, where all the other smart and
knowledgeable people take the evidence and arguments to support One-Boxing.
The One-Boxing denizen of World A has real evidence that she may have made
some mistake in evaluating the arguments.52
Note the phrase “real evidence” in the last sentence. Christensen is implying that the
evidence provided by the consideration of merely possible peers is not real, or more
charitably, that it is considerably less weighty than that provided by actual peers.
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For what it’s worth, I am not sure that Christensen is right about the bill
calculation case with seventeen superiors. I grant that my own intuitions are that I should
weaken my confidence in my belief. Nevertheless, there are some cases in which being
the “lone ranger” is rational. Consider, for example, Plantinga’s case of the person on
trial for a crime she knows she did not commit--surely here one should not revise her
belief.53 Or consider Einstein’s claiming, before wide acceptance, that space is curved.
Surely such a stance--even resilience about such a stance--can be rational. What is the
difference between these cases and the restaurant bill case?
It is tempting to think that the difference is making the seventeen people in the
restaurant case expert calculators, so that we are no longer peers. One might argue that,
were we all peers, then perhaps there being seventeen of them would not make it less
likely that I am the one that is right, because it could be that adding peers is like flipping
coins--their probabilities are not additive. But this is incorrect. After all, the testimonial
reports of eyewitnesses presumably are additive: seventeen of them gives us better reason
to believe what they report than one of them. And if what I argued against Kelly above is
correct--if the views of a particularly excellent reasoner can provide evidence in addition
to the views of that reasoner’s teacher, even when they agree and have the same
evidence--then the reports of several such excellent peers would count for more than the
report of only one. In that case, seventeen peers would have a similar effect on my
evidence for p as seventeen superiors. So Christensen is probably correct that what the
arguments support is not all that matters with respect to the justification of my own view:
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it also matters what other excellent reasoners think the arguments support. This, too, is
evidence.54
Where does this leave us with respect to the question of merely possible
disagreement? Christensen has one more thing to say about this. As we saw above, he
thinks that disagreement is a special version of the problem of possible error, and this is
why it’s epistemically significant. But this implies, he thinks, that actual disagreement
and possible disagreement are different in the same way that actual error and possible
error are different:
Actual disagreement with peers is informative because it provides evidence that a
certain possibility--the possibility of our having made an epistemic error--has
been actualized. It makes what we already know possible more probable. Could
we get this same sort of evidence simply
by asking ourselves whether merely possible peers might disagree with us
rationally? It seems not--for in those cases where we have made a mistake in
assessing the evidence about P, we are overwhelmingly likely to make the same
mistake in assessing how a rational peer would assess the same evidence about
the same proposition.55
So the reason we could not get the same kind of evidence from possible disagreement
that we get from actual disagreement is that when considering possible disagreement, we
are likely to make the same mistakes in imagining possible disagreeing peers as we make
in assessing the evidence for ourselves. In other words, our epistemic frailty extends as

Christensen has another case: a doctor who finds out she’s been given a drug that causes 99 percent of
the people who take it to make mistakes on tasks like dosage determination. The doctor, says Christensen,
is morally obligated to have her dosage determinations checked in these circumstances, even if it turns out
that she isn’t affected by the drug. But in this case one is not rational to insist on her view because to do so
she must assume that she got lucky. So the new information about having been drugged serves as a defeater
for her belief that she prescribed the correct dosage, because she has no defeater-defeaters, such as
evidence that she is immune to that kind of drug. So this case is sufficiently unlike the cases of peer
disagreement we’ve been considering as to be unhelpful. See Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement:
The Good News,” 207-208.
55
Ibid., 208-209. Note here that in the case of possible disagreement as imagined, one need not assess how
a rational peer would assess the evidence for p; one need only realize that a contrary assessment by a
rational peer is possible.
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much to our ability to conceive of the reasons of rational disagreeing peers as it does to
our assessment of the evidence for p.
The problem here is that Christensen misses the force of the possible
disagreement problem. For the defeater provided by disagreement to kick in, we do not
need to accurately predict (or predict at all) how a possible peer might assess the
evidence differently. We need only see that in fact a different assessment is possible. We
can even build in the assumption, to avoid the sort of worry Christensen has, that
whatever possible assessment a possible peer would have would be as coherent, detailed,
fruitful, and so on as our own. The problem Christensen mentions is avoidable if care is
taken about what views are really possible, consistent with the evidence. And of course,
ideally, a plurality of people will help us to figure this out, but this is not necessary. It
may be that the cogency of our ideas of what alternate views are possible is likely to vary
with our experience of actual peer disagreement. This may not be the case, however, for a
few excellent reasoners, but it’s sufficient to note that any alternative view consistent
with the evidence raises the possible disagreement problem. One need not be a
philosopher to think of an alternate, consistent conclusion drawn from most evidence
sets, especially given the underdetermination of theory by evidence.56
Christensen here cites Alston, who argues that possible competing epistemic
practices “would pose as great a threat to our practice as would actual competing
practices.”57 Alston takes the upshot of this to be that if we don’t think possible
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competing epistemic practices are worrisome, then we shouldn’t think actual competing
epistemic practices are worrisome either.
For what it’s worth, Alston seems right here: if it’s really possible to have
fundamentally different “sense perceptual doxastic practices” (see note 46) that all give
rise to similar practical results, then that should cause just as much concern as if those
forms were actualized. We may not be able to foresee the details of how a rational peer
would assess the same evidence about the same proposition from one of these
fundamentally different perspectives (though we can surely try), but nonetheless the
possibility that they might be able to do so rationally should give us just as much pause as
if we actually encountered such a person. This is because, in both cases, “we have no
reason to suppose [our perspective] to be more reliable than these other possibilities.”58
But Alston thinks that in both cases, we need not be worried about this situation. The
reason he gives is telling:
Yet it is difficult to work ourselves up into worrying about these possibilities, and
even difficult to convince ourselves that it is our intellectual duty to do so. Insofar
as this has a respectable basis, it is that it is not really clear that the alleged
possibilities are indeed possible. At least they may not be real possibilities for us,
“Cartesian” practice of seeing what is visually perceived as an indefinitely extended medium that
is more or less concentrated at various points, rather than, as in our “Aristotelian” practice, as
made up of more or less discrete objects scattered about in space. In other cultures we find a
“Whiteheadian” SP to be equally socially established; here the visual field is seen as made up of
momentary events growing out of each other in a continuous process. Let's further suppose that
each of these practices serves its practitioners equally well in their dealings with the environment.
We may even suppose that each group has developed physical science, in its own terms, to about
as high a pitch as the others. But suppose further that, in this imagined situation, we are as firmly
wedded to our “Aristotelian” form of [sense perception] as we are in fact. The Cartesian and
Whiteheadian ausländer seem utterly outlandish to us, and we find it difficult to take seriously the
idea that they may be telling it like it is. Nevertheless, we can find no neutral grounds on which to
argue effectively for the greater accuracy of our way of doing it. In such a situation would it be
clear that it is irrational or us to continue to form perceptual beliefs in our “Aristotelian” way,
given that the practice is proving itself by its fruits? It seems to me that quite the opposite is clear.
In the absence of any external reason for supposing that one of the competing practices is more
accurate than my own, the only rational course for me is to sit tight with the practice of which I am
a master and which serves me so well in guiding my activity in the world. (273-274)
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given our actual constitution and the lawful structure of the world. It may be that
we are innately programmed to perceive the environment in Aristotelian terms,
and that this program does not allow for social reprogramming into a “Cartesian”
or a “Whiteheadian” mode. Nevertheless, it seems clear to me that if these
alternatives really are possible, then they give rise to difficulties for the rationality
of engaging in SP that are quite parallel to those arising from the actual diversity
of religions for the rationality of engaging in CP. And so, in that case, if it is
rational to engage in SP despite these difficulties, the same conclusion follows for
CP.59
Alston’s point is that it’s not clear that these alternate viewpoints really are
possible, and it’s hard to care about something that you’re not sure is possible. This gives
us a way to respond to Kelly’s Newcomb argument more fully than Christensen does.
Possible disagreements should not be treated the same as actual disagreements, but this is
not because--contra Christensen--we’re likely to make mistakes in imagining them.
Rather, it is because until the possibility is actualized in our experience, we don’t have
good reason to think that the alternative viewpoints really are nomologically possible for
us--possible, as Alston says, “given our actual constitution and the lawful structure of the
world.” So S should be less sure of her One-Boxing in World A, where opinion is
divided, than in World B, where everyone agrees with her, because in World A the
possibility of an alternative consistent view is actualized, thereby confirming that it is a
real possibility for people like S.
This response allows us to avoid an objection that Christensen apparently does not
appreciate but that people like Wedgwood, with his “moral evil demon,” do:60 if
disagreement itself provides defeating evidence (as Christensen maintains), and if
possible disagreement is as evidential as actual disagreement (which Christensen denies,

Ibid. Here “SP” is sense perceptual practice, and “CP” is Christian mystical practice.
See Ralph Wedgwood, “Disagreement and the A Priori,” in The Nature of Normativity (Oxford
University Press, 2007): 259.
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but Kelly affirms), then a general skepticism ensues. This is because it is nearly always
possible to think of an alternative, consistent belief for any issue, and for any actually
controversial issue, it is possible to think of one that seems rational. It is fortunate, then,
that we need not grant merely possible disagreement equal evidential weight as actual
disagreement.61
So the problem of merely possible rational disagreement, since it cannot motivate
genuine epistemic concern, need not detain us any further. It is best to keep the peer
disagreement issue rooted firmly in everyday experiences of actual disagreement. Such
experiences motivate interest in the abstract version of the problem, and the
epistemological discussion of that problem has value only insofar as it helps us to frame
and clarify our epistemic obligations when we disagree.

Note what seems like an agreement between Christensen and Alston: Christensen admits that “an ideally
rational intellect that knew for certain that it was ideally rational would have no reason to defer to the
opinions of others who were equally informed, no matter how numerous.” Christensen, “Epistemology of
Disagreement: The Good News,” 208. Of course, Christensen does not think this amounts to much because
we are not in fact ideal intellects and so “we would be irrational simply to dismiss the possibility of error.”
Ibid., 210. But we must also weigh this possibility against the other evidence that we have, and often it just
will not be enough to tip the scales. In addition, Christensen’s admission regarding the ideal intellect
suggests that if one could approximate ideally rational conditions, then one should to that extent trust the
judgments formed under those conditions, irrespective of the views of others. Given what was said about
the perceptual analogy in Chapter Three, it seems that we have such approximately ideal conditions when
we have clear, vivid, and stable evidential seemings.
61
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Chapter Seven – Peerhood, Conformism, and Nonconformism
7.1 – Defining Peerhood

This chapter has three aims: (1) to define more clearly the notion of peerhood, (2)
to critique an alternative conception, and (3) to demonstrate that both Conformist and
Nonconformist solutions to the problem of rational disagreement are incorrect.
In Disagreement, Bryan Frances distinguishes three notions of peerhood:
1. Equality on “Disagreement Factors”
2. Equal likelihood to be correct
3. The conditional likelihood that if you turn out to disagree with me, then you’re as
likely to be correct as I am (i.e., we are “C-peers”).1
Option 1 is the common sense notion of peerhood: two people are peers if they are
equivalent with respect to the things that make one a good assessor of the evidence for
the truth of some proposition. Call these things “Disagreement Factors” and the view of
peerhood which depends on them the “Factor Definition of Peerhood” (FP). Frances
provides a list of such factors:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

1

cognitive ability had while answering the question
evidence brought to bear in answering the question
relevant background knowledge
time devoted to answering the question
distractions encountered in answering the question
relevant biases
attentiveness when answering the question
intellectual virtues possessed2

Bryan Frances, Disagreement (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 188-190.
Bryan Frances and Jonathan Matheson, “Disagreement,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/disagreement/, Section 4.
2
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He does not specify the intellectual virtues required, but they would include things like
conscientiousness, carefulness, creativity, thoroughness, fairness, honesty, etc. This is not
intended to be an exhaustive list, and it should be apparent that one will rarely if ever be
in a position to know with great precision how similar one is to someone else with respect
to such factors. That is, the factors can provide only a rough approximation of the
similarity between the epistemic positions of two or more people. But they do give one
some idea of how seriously to take the views of others, especially in situations where one
has had the time and the reason to measure oneself against someone else with respect to
these factors.
Options 2 and 3 are advanced by Adam Elga, and have subsequently been
influential in the disagreement debate. Option 3 is a development of option 2, so we can
consider them together, as, in effect, a single view of peerhood. Call it the “Likelihood
Definition of Peerhood” (LP). Elga begins by noting that taking someone to be an
epistemic peer means thinking that that person is “as good as you at evaluating” the sort
of claim you’re disagreeing about, adding the qualification that what matters “is that you
count your friend as your epistemic peer,” not that your friend really is your epistemic
peer.3 So far, a proponent of FP might very well agree: given the difficulty of knowing
for sure when someone else is equivalent with respect to the various factors, what really
matters for determining what to do in a case of disagreement is whether one takes another
to be a peer in that sense. But then Elga elaborates: “In other words, you think that,
conditional on a disagreement arising, the two of you are equally likely to be mistaken.”4
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This is a departure from FP. Recognizing that this will not be obvious to everyone, Elga
then explains in a footnote:
My use of the term “epistemic peer” is nonstandard. On my usage, you count your
friend as an epistemic peer with respect to an about-to-be-judged claim if and
only if you think that, conditional the two of you disagreeing about the claim, the
two of you are equally likely to be mistaken. On more standard usages, an
epistemic peer is defined to be an equal with respect to such factors as
“intelligence, perspicacity, honesty, thoroughness, and other relevant epistemic
virtues” (Gutting 1982, 83), “familiarity with the evidence and arguments which
bear on [the relevant] question”, and “general epistemic virtues such as
intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias” (Kelly 2005). In defense of
my use, suppose that you think that conditional on the two of you disagreeing
about a claim, your friend is more likely than you to be mistaken. Then however
intelligent, perspicacious, honest, thorough, well-informed, and unbiased you may
think your friend is, it would seem odd to count her as an epistemic peer with
respect to that claim, at least on that occasion. You think that on the supposition
that there is disagreement, she is more likely to get things wrong.5
So Elga thinks that “likelihood to be correct/mistaken” is the right concept to invoke, not
various cognitive virtues, and therefore that LP is preferable to FP.
This, however, is a mistake. First, note that in a case like the one Elga describes,
he apparently assumes that one must think either that one’s friend is more likely to be
correct, equally likely to be correct/mistaken, or else more likely to be mistaken. But this
is false. It is possible, and I suspect more common than not in real peer disagreement
cases, that one simply has no view at all about who is more likely to be mistaken.6 What
one does have are various past observations relevant to how good one’s friend is at
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assessing this sort of evidence. In other words, one has some information about how
similar both parties are with respect to the disagreement factors. For example, if we are
meteorologists familiar with one another’s predictive track records, and we are
encountering a weather problem that is unfamiliar to both of us, I can have good reason
to think you’re my peer with respect to this question, while having no view of who is
more likely to be correct. So one can think someone else is a peer in the FP sense while
having no views about whether that person is a peer in the LP sense, which implies at the
very least that LP will not suffice for all cases of peer disagreement.
Second, even if one does think that one’s friend is more likely to be mistaken than
oneself, it must be because of some dissimilarity in one or more of the disagreement
factors (assuming the friend is rational). I must think that you are not as familiar with this
kind of evidence as I am, or that you’re distracted, or tired, or what have you. Judgments
of peerhood depend on judgments about the disagreement factors, and therefore the
intuitive strength of LP depends on FP.
Marc Moffett accepts Elga’s notion of peerhood and offers further support for it:
Intuitively, we take an individual x to be an epistemic peer with respect to a given
domain (if and) only if we regard x’s judgments concerning that domain to be as
likely as our own to be correct given the same evidence. Something like this is a
very plausible account of the notion of an epistemic peer. For suppose we use a
different criterion which does not imply this one. For instance, we might try to
define the concept of an epistemic peer in terms of general intelligence or general
level of expertise or both, but nevertheless maintain that this criterion does not
imply an equal likelihood of being correct given the same evidence. Then there
must be some further truth-conducive factor F which we believe is relevant to
judgments in this domain and we must believe that we are superior to x with
respect to F. But this is counterintuitive. If we genuinely believe that F is a truthconducive factor in judgment in a given domain and we genuinely believe that we
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are superior to x with respect to F, then we do not regard x as an epistemic peer in
the relevant domain.7
But Moffett is here making the same flawed assumption that Elga makes: that one party
must take the other to be either more, less, or equally likely to be mistaken as oneself, and
that if one does not, then one cannot consider the other to be an epistemic peer. But again,
this misses the fact that I can be justified in believing someone is my epistemic peer even
if I have no idea how likely either of us is to be right.8 For example: I and a friend each
consider a case that is brand new to both of us, so that neither of us has any idea how
likely either of us is to be right about it. Intuitively, I can still justifiedly believe that the
other is my peer because I take her to be more or less the same as me with respect to the
various cognitive and evidential factors. It is odd to insist, as Elga must, that I cannot
hold someone to be a peer unless I have a belief about our comparative likelihood to be
correct.
Moreover, I can also be unjustified in believing someone to be my epistemic peer
even if I have good grounds for thinking that we are about equally likely to be right. If I
have a friend who comes up with the correct answer to math problems exactly as
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Michael Bergmann makes the same point:
It’s in part because I think that many interesting cases of disagreement… don’t involve viewing
the other as equally reliable with respect to the disputed proposition that I won’t be focusing on
cases of disagreement between those who view each other as epistemic peers. Instead… I’ll be
focusing on cases of disagreement between people who view each other as roughly equal in
intellectual virtue and who have tried to share all the relevant evidence they can think of with each
other. (To be clear, I should note that it doesn’t follow from the fact that the parties to the dispute
don’t view each other as being equally reliable on the topic in question that each views the other as
being more reliable or as less reliable. It may be that each person holds no views at all about how
reliable the other is on the issue.)
I take Bergmann’s use of “reliable” to imply “likelihood to be correct.” His mistake is to give over the
notion of peerhood to Elga, and then set it aside altogether, rather than to insist on the common-sense FP
understanding of it (which is what he does in practice; he merely rejects the label of “peer”). See Michael
Bergmann, “Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure,” Episteme 6, no. 3 (2009): 351, fn. 10.
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frequently as I do, but he uses a calculator and I do the problems in my head, then we are
obviously not epistemic peers with respect to math, even though we are equally likely to
be correct about it. Equally obviously, it is our presumed cognitive and evidential
inequalities that make us not peers.
Or consider a case in which an apparent peer draws an absurd conclusion from
some shared evidence. For example: I and a friend have the same kind of disagreement
about what actor starred in a film that we’ve had a hundred times before. Based on past
experience, we both believe that the other is about as likely to be right as ourselves
conditional on a future disagreement about this topic (we can even stipulate that we’ve
counted the times that each of us has been right). We then have a disagreement about
who starred in a particular American Western--I think it was John Wayne, and you think
it was Jane Seymour. Our answers are so drastically different that it seems insane to me
that you could honestly think it was Jane Seymour. It seems that in this case our
disagreement gives me evidence that you are in fact not my peer with respect to this
question, even though prior to our disagreement I would have held us to be equally likely
to be correct about this sort of question. Now, Elga does consider a case like this--in
which I believe your answer to be obviously incorrect--and he says that “in order to apply
the equal weight view, we must determine your prior probability that you would be right,
conditional on these circumstances arising.”9 In other words, I must ask myself what is
the likelihood that I would be correct, given that when we disagree I find your answer to
be utterly preposterous. If I think that in a case like that, I am more likely to be correct
than you, then I should not consider you my peer.

9
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One problem with this is that I can always imagine, prior to a disagreement
occurring, that someone else might give an answer that I find absurd. I am then left in a
situation where I must either disqualify that person from being a peer in Elga’s sense
because she might give an answer I find absurd--hence, no one would ever qualify as a
peer--or else I must convince myself that if she gives an absurd answer, we are still
equally likely to be correct. Again, this condition would seem to rule out the possibility
of epistemic peers in almost all cases. The problem here is that Elga is smuggling in a
truth-based notion of peerhood, so that peers are those who are really equally likely to be
correct, when he himself admits, as we saw, that what matters for peerhood is that we
count each other as peers. But, to the contrary, peerhood as an epistemic issue is about
what one is justified in believing, not about whether one is correct or incorrect.10
Another problem is that it is possible that we both consider the other’s answer to
be ridiculous. Let’s say you find my answer of “John Wayne” to be just as preposterous
as I find your answer of “Jane Seymour” to be. In that case, Elga says, his view states that
if, prior to our disagreement, we both agree that, conditional on a disagreement arising
where we both consider the other’s view to be utterly preposterous, we think we would be
equally likely to be correct in that situation, then we are peers, and therefore (he thinks)
when the disagreement does arise, we should accord equal weight to one another’s view.
Elga says that “that verdict is independently plausible.”11 I disagree. It is not reasonable
to conclude that your friend is your peer with respect to the identity of the actor when she
thinks it was Jane Seymour (and you clearly remember it being a man) and finds your
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answer of John Wayne to be absurd, even if, per improbable, your prior self would have
concluded that in the instance where you both find the other’s answer absurd, that you’re
equally likely to be correct. In this case, she’s just obviously mistaken, despite what you
might have predicted beforehand.
Jennifer Lackey offers her own critique of Elga’s conception of peerhood.12 Her
own definition of peerhood includes evidential equality, cognitive equality, and full
disclosure of evidence, making it a somewhat stronger notion than others in the
disagreement debate.13 She defines cognitive equality as parties who are “equally
competent, intelligent, and fair‐minded in their assessment of the evidence and arguments
that bear on the question whether p,” and then notes how Elga’s definition of peerhood
deviates from this.14
There are… reasons to question Elga’s non‐standard use of this term. For on his
account, two people could radically differ in both their evidential backgrounds
and their cognitive abilities with respect to the question whether p, yet
nonetheless turn out to be epistemic peers regarding this question. For instance, I
may be a complete novice with respect to identifying birds of prey, and you may
be an expert ornithologist. When I am sober and you are highly intoxicated,
however, we may be equally likely to be mistaken about whether the bird flying
overhead is an osprey. On Elga’s account, then, you and I would be epistemic
peers with respect to this question, but this strikes me as quite a counter‐intuitive
result.
I do not share Lackey’s reaction to this case. I think that, given the sensible restriction of
peerhood to the question whether p, it isn’t hard to believe that we could be peers in
circumstances in which I am sober and you, the ornithologist, are not. This is because, in

Jennifer Lackey, “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Social
Epistemology, ed. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University Press, 2010),
302 (see fn. 17).
13
Note that this makes her notion of peerhood highly idealized, despite her concerns about such
idealization discussed earlier.
14
Ibid.
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those circumstances, the cognitive features relevant to identifying ospreys might be equal
between us. So I do not think this is a successful counterexample to Elga’s LP as stated.
The problem with his view of peerhood, rather, runs deeper. As we’ve seen, equal
likelihood to be correct depends on equality of peer factors, not vice versa.15 This can be
seen by asking why two people who disagree about something are not typically peers: it
is nearly always because they differ on some peer factor or other. If we answer that they
are not peers because they are not equally likely to be correct, while this may be true, it is
not a satisfactory explanation of why they are not peers. In fact, it may not even be true:
as Lackey hints here without adequately defending (owing to the weakness of her
example), people who are not peers can be equally likely to be correct/mistaken. For
example, let’s say that you’re an expert on the Crumple-Horned Snorkack, and I am a
novice.16 You’re convinced they don’t exist, but I’m pretty sure I just saw one. We are
not peers with respect to whether they exist (i.e., you are vastly superior to me on that
question), and yet we may be equally likely to be mistaken about whether they exist.17 Or
suppose that you’re my defense attorney, but you’re convinced I’m guilty. You know
more about the evidence than I do, so we’re not peers with respect to my guilt, and yet I
clearly remember not committing the crime. I’d say that, in cases like these, we may be
equally likely to be mistaken, even though we are not peers with respect to the factors
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I do not mean to claim here that equal likelihood to be correct is conceptually parasitic on cognitive and
evidential equality, in the sense that if one has no view about relative cognitive/evidential equality, then
one can have no view about equal likelihood to be correct. That seems wrong. Consider again the case of a
math “peer” in the equal likelihood sense who uses a calculator, or is fed the answers by someone else.
Cases like this suggest that the two views of peerhood are conceptually distinct. What I am claiming in the
main text is that if one believes that someone else is or isn’t equally likely to be correct about p, that is
typically because one has a prior belief about the other’s cognitive/evidential equality with oneself.
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See J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix (Scholastic, 2004), ch. 13.
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149
involved in assessing the evidence for the relevant propositions. I say “may be” because
it’s difficult to know how to weigh one type of evidence (experiential) against another
type (theoretical). A similar point could be made about other sorts of claims, such as
those involving religious experience, or claims that a miracle has occurred. To avoid this
complication, consider a case in which one party has reasons the other lacks, but the
second party is under some circumstantial fluke whereby they are as likely to be correct
as the first party. Say, the second party is likely to be right about propositions of the ptype when they have recently encountered nice weather. If the first party has reasons
pertaining to p which make him likely to be correct about p, but also knows that the
weather has been nice recently, then on Elga’s definition of peerhood, the two parties are
peers. This is highly counterintuitive.
So equal likelihood to be correct is neither necessary nor sufficient for peerhood,
and its plausibility as a criterion of peerhood derives entirely from the primary criteria of
equality in disagreement factors. Therefore, FP is preferable to LP. This is important
because one’s definition of peerhood affects one’s view of what it is reasonable to do in a
case of peer disagreement.
7.2 – Responding to Parity: Conformism and Nonconformism

Elga uses his notion of peerhood to support his Equal Weight View, which he
defines as follows:
Upon finding out that an advisor disagrees, your probability that you are right
should equal your prior conditional probability that you would be right. Prior to
what? Prior to your thinking through the disputed issue, and finding out what the
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advisor thinks of it. Conditional on what? On whatever you have learned about
the circumstances of the disagreement.18
This view suffers from a host of problems, some of which have been canvassed in earlier
chapters and so need not detain us here.19 For our purposes it is sufficient to note two
things:
1. If we reject Elga’s notion of conditional peerhood (LP), then the Equal Weight
View is unmotivated. This is because if peerhood is not a matter of likelihood to
be correct, then there is no reason to “split the difference”--i.e., assign the
competing views equal credence probabilities--with an epistemic peer. Further, if
evidence pertinent to the issue under dispute can count for or against assigning
peer status to an interlocutor--which Elga’s independent evidence condition
discussed previously rules out--then whether someone counts as a peer does not
depend on the conditional likelihood to be correct that one would have assigned
prior to the disagreement occurring.20
2. The Equal Weight View, even if correct, could not help with the Parity Problem.
This is both because (a) the Equal Weight View would recommend considering a

Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 490.
Thomas Kelly provides what is to my mind a satisfactory refutation of the Equal Weight View in “Peer
Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield
(Oxford University Press, 2010), 111-74.
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person may rationally assign peer status based on how much agreement she thinks there is between herself
and a potential peer. As he says, the Equal Weight View states what you should “defer to an advisor in
proportion to your prior probability that the advisor would be correct in case of disagreement. In practice,
this means deferring most to advisors whose views (on matters closely linked to the issue in question) are
similar to one’s own.” Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 495. Of course, if only those who already
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leads to widespread skepticism on controversial issues--but at the significant cost of recommending as a
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peer’s view as equally good as one’s own, and therefore would offer a
straightforward “No” to the question whether reasonable disagreement in a
situation of parity is possible; and because (b) the Parity Problem represents a
conflict in one’s own evidential seemings, and not merely between one’s firstorder seemings and the testimonial report of another. The Equal Weight View
does not recognize such a possibility.
So, insofar as we are attempting to find a solution to the Parity Problem that allows for
the possibility of rational peer disagreement, the Equal Weight View must be set aside.
Likewise, Christensen’s version of Conformism cannot help with the Parity
Problem, since it too helps to create the problem, and does not consider the need to
suspend judgment in all cases of legitimate peer disagreement to be a significant cost.
Christensen, Elga, and even Kelly all mention that most people--philosophers not
excepted--tend to hold controversial views too confidently, and that therefore the
Conformist principle of belief revision up to and including suspension of judgment or
even outright disbelief in one’s prior view, is not so drastic as it might at first appear.21
Nonetheless, the intuition that began this debate remains strong: people of equal
epistemic virtue can have long and careful disagreements and remain rational, including
rationally believing that the disagreeing party is also rational. We want to know if this
can be a justified view, given a situation of parity.
If Conformist views cannot assist us in this task, can Nonconformism do any
better? Kelly’s Nonconformist view cannot help. This is because Kelly’s “Total Evidence

See Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” 497; David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The
Good News,” Philosophical Review 116, no. 2 (2007): 214-216; Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and HigherOrder Evidence,” 128.
21

152
View” stipulates that the preferable view is the one that actually accords best—
objectively--with the total evidence, which includes both first-order evidence for p, and
higher-order evidence about one’s first-order evidence provided by peer disagreement.
The problem is that in a situation of parity, one is not in a position to know what the total
evidence objectively supports. As Elga says, “Even if in fact you have done a much better
job than your friend at evaluating the claims, simply comparing your verdicts to those of
your friend gives you no evidence that this is so.”22
Kelly considers this sort of objection, and he admits that there is something right
about it, namely that “what it is reasonable to believe about the world on the basis of
one’s evidence is constrained by what it is reasonable for one to believe about one’s
evidence.”23 This insight, he says, can naturally lead to the phenomenon of “downward
epistemic push”:
even in a case in which [evidence set] E genuinely supports [hypothesis] H, one’s
justification for believing H on the basis of E will tend to be undermined by
evidence against the epistemic proposition that E is good evidence for H. And
one’s justification for believing this epistemic proposition would seem to be
hostage to what one’s peers think.24
However, Kelly is quick to point out that there is also the complementary phenomenon of
“upward epistemic push.” This happens if one’s correct assessment of first-order
evidence provides justification for one’s second-order epistemic beliefs about one’s
evidence.25 In other words,
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It is not only that one’s higher-order evidence typically makes a difference to
what one is justified in believing about the world; it is also the case that one’s
first-order evidence makes a difference to what one is justified in believing about
higher-level epistemic matters.26
For this reason, he thinks, the Total Evidence View is preferable to the Equal Weight
View, which does not allow for the phenomenon of upward epistemic push.
However, he admits that there is a difficulty with the Total Evidence View’s
insistence that reasonableness in disagreement situations depends largely on who has
more accurately evaluated the first-order evidence. As he says:
Of course, there is no magic red light that illuminates when one responds to the
evidence correctly, no warning bell that sounds when one does not. Indeed, as a
phenomenological matter, there might be no introspectible difference between
how things seem when one is responding correctly and how things seem when
one is not.27
I have argued that it is just this possibility--that there may be no introspectible difference
between being right and being wrong--that gives rise to the Parity Problem, and that
becomes epistemically problematic when one is in the circumstances of prolonged
disagreement with a peer. Kelly does not consider such circumstances; instead, he ends
the article by arguing that evidence should not be judged according to what it is
dialectically appropriate to cite as evidence.28 But the issue in contention between the
Conformist and the Nonconformist is just this: what should I do when I find myself
disagreeing with a peer? While Kelly is surely correct that one may be justified in her
view without knowing that she is, this is hollow succor when the person one is in a
prolonged disagreement with is obviously an epistemic peer.29 While I may be
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reasonable, in Kelly’s objective sense, to continue believing that my evidence is adequate
to justify p, when my admitted peer is convinced--with conviction, after thorough
consideration--that it justifies not-p, such an attitude does not seem commendable. Or, as
Rosen says, “it is hard to see the virtue in it.”30 So again we see that prolonged
disagreement with someone marked by the features of epistemic excellence that we have
labeled “disagreement factors” gives rise to a situation of epistemic parity, in which it is
difficult to see how the maintenance of one’s view could be commendable or
epistemically virtuous.
Before leaving the topic of what to do in a situation of peer disagreement, it will
be useful to consider in some detail the view of one more author. Richard Feldman’s
Conformist stance has already been discussed in earlier chapters. However, after the
article discussed above, he expressed a somewhat different view of the disagreement
debate which, to my mind, is much more compelling.31 There, he turns his sights onto the
various general principles that epistemologists have defended as responses to the problem
of disagreement, and finds them all wanting, including those in defense of his own
Conformist view.32 He then adopts and defends evidentialism, the view that (1) one is
justified in believing a proposition if and only if one’s evidence on balance supports that

See Gideon Rosen, “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” Noûs 35, no. 15 (2001): 85-86;
quoted above in Chapter Four, p. 73.
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See Richard Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” Episteme 6, no. 3
(2009): 294–312.
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Jennifer Lackey argues for a similar view in her “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic
Significance.” Instead of evidentialism, Lackey focuses on justification. For her, instead of affecting one’s
overall evidence, as for Feldman, peer disagreement affects one’s degree of justified confidence in a
proposition. Thus, Lackey rejects, as does Feldman, both general Conformist and Nonconformist
principles, and maintains that her justificationist account can explain the insights of both of those views.
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proposition, and that (2) one’s degree of justification is determined by how strongly one’s
evidence supports the proposition.33 Feldman’s thesis is that
there are no true special principles about justified responses to disagreement. That
is, there are no general and widely applicable principles specifying what attitudes
are justified for someone who encounters a disagreeing peer.34
All we need, Feldman thinks, is evidentialism. Nonetheless, disagreement does often
have an evidential impact, often in the form of higher-order evidence: evidence about the
significance of one’s first-order evidence.
Note that principles about conciliating or conforming in the face of disagreement-principles that Feldman himself came close to endorsing--do not count against
evidentialism. Rather, they can be seen as applications of the general evidentialist
principle in cases of peer disagreement. Nonetheless, Feldman now rejects such
principles, because they entail that the evidence one obtains from the fact of disagreement
must overwhelm whatever other evidence one had for the disputed proposition, and this is
often not the case. For example, consider the case of disagreeing with a peer who is a
lone dissenter among a larger group of agreeing peers, or the case of disagreeing with a
wishy-washy or unsure peer when one is well-justified oneself, or the case of a peer who
is known to be performing below par in this particular instance. In such cases, one’s firstorder evidence for p may outweigh the higher-order evidence provided by the peer
disagreement. In other words, what’s justified depends on one’s overall or total
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evidence,35 and there is no guarantee that the higher-order evidence of the disagreement
will offset the rest of one’s relevant evidence.36
Feldman notes that there are several ways of modifying conciliatory principles
(i.e., those that recommend suspending judgment in light of peer disagreement), none of
which are successful or helpful for understanding what is behind the conciliatory
intuition. That intuition can be stated simply without mentioning one’s own belief state:
“The proposition that S’s peer who shares S’s evidence concerning P disbelieves P is
evidence against P.”37 In Feldman’s view, nothing more than this needs to be said about
disagreement generally, and trying to say more gets one into trouble.
For example, conciliationists might try to strengthen their principle by building in
more descriptive features of the disagreement scenario that rule out Feldman’s
counterexamples. That is, one disagrees with a peer, and it is not the case that there is a
preponderance of agreeing peers, and the peer is not unsure, and the peer is performing
normally, etc. But Feldman claims that this list of and’s will run to infinity: “There will
always be the possibility of some other factor being present that provides the subject with
evidence that she ought not defer to the peer this time.”38 If one tries to counteract this by
adding to the principle that no additional counteracting evidence is acquired, then one is
still left with the possibility of one’s initial evidence outweighing one’s new evidence
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gained from the disagreement. If one tries to allow for this in one’s principle, then one
will be left with something like this:
If S justifiably believes P immediately prior to t, and S learns at t that an
epistemic peer with respect to P who has evidence comparable to S’s concerning
P disbelieves P, and S does not learn anything that counteracts the evidence
provided by this, then S becomes less justified in believing P at t.39
This principle or one like it may well be true, says Feldman, but it is no more than the
general evidentialist principle combined with the insight that peer disagreement is
evidence against one’s view.
Another strategy to salvage conciliationist principles is to modify the definition of
“peer.” But here again, the only options are to build in requirements on peerhood that rule
out potential flaws--and this will never be accomplished adequately--or to simply define
peerhood so that it is true by definition that disagreement with such a person renders
one’s belief unjustified.40 But of course this latter option is simply defining oneself into
victory, and leaves the original issue untouched. We can either eliminate the vagueness of
peerhood by making its requirements so strict that no one will ever actually be peers, or
we can allow for looser “similarity” criteria of peerhood, in which case we must consider
each case individually. In the latter case, we are back to our basic evidentialist principles
again. The same can be said about the vagueness inherent in the concept of “sharing
evidence.” At the end of the day, Feldman thinks that “there are no simple facts about the
epistemological significance of evidence of peer disagreement except for the fact (and its
implications)…that evidence that a peer disagrees has evidential impact.”41
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Feldman next turns to some reflections on higher-order evidence, which is
evidence “about the existence, merits, or significance of a body of evidence.”42 There are
at least three different sorts of disagreements involving higher-order evidence: (1)
Disagreements in which peers disagree about the significance or impact or weight of a
body of evidence, (2) Disagreements in which one learns that a peer has some
unspecified evidence supporting the opposing view, (3) Disagreements in which one
learns that a peer has some specific evidence that competes with one’s own view, but one
does not acquire that evidence oneself (as in the case of differing perceptions). Feldman
argues that (2) and (3) are simply cases of how to weigh competing evidence, and nothing
more than the general evidentialist principles are needed. The first case, however, is more
difficult. In a case like that--in which a peer and I agree about what the first-order
evidence is, but disagree about its evidential weight--there are three possible positions: (i)
I am justified in maintaining my view, and justified in believing that the first-order
evidence supports P (contra my peer); (ii) I am justified either in maintaining my view, or
(inclusive) justified in suspending judgment, or (inclusive) justified in disbelieving that
the first-order evidence supports P (in agreement with my peer); (iii) I am not justified in
maintaining my view, and I am justified in either suspending judgment or disbelieving
that the first-order evidence supports P (in agreement with my peer). Feldman argues that
(i) is unreasonable because its defense would involve arguing that one’s view of the
evidential support relation in question cannot be mistaken. He argues that (ii) is also
unreasonable because it implies the odd view that evidential support relations have no
impact on the justification of one’s first-order beliefs. That leaves only (iii), which
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Feldman believes is very often the reasonable response, hence his conciliationist stance-though he admits that suspense of judgment or disbelief may not always be recommended
owing to the possibility of the overriding evidential weight of one’s first-order views, or
even competing second-order views. In this way, higher-order evidence may serve as a
defeater for first-order evidence. As he says, “It is, in some ways, like what happens to
the belief that an object is red when one learns that a red light is shining [on] it.”43
But again, there is no universal principle to be had here. Feldman concludes:
“…the main thing to say is that [the evidence from one’s disagreeing peers] should be
added to the mix. This may seem disappointing--you want some crisper principles that
you can object to. But, as I said, we shouldn’t expect them.”44
I agree with Feldman that there are probably no general epistemological
principles to be had concerning what it is reasonable to do in a case of peer
disagreement.45 For me, this implies that there is no absolutist, exceptionless solution to
the Parity Problem, nor any guarantee of a solution that everyone would agree to in any
specific case of disagreement. Fortunately, finding such a principle is not my aim. In
Chapters Eight and Nine, I will sketch three possible solutions to the Parity Problem that
may allow one to reasonably maintain one’s view in the face of prolonged disagreement
with a recognized epistemic peer. However, I do not expect these solutions to convince
everyone, nor do I believe that they will settle every case of peer disagreement.
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Nonetheless, I do think that they can help with many cases, especially the cases that
motivated the disagreement debate to begin with: prolonged philosophical and religious
disagreement.
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Chapter Eight – Proposed Solutions I: Hume’s Contribution

In this chapter and the next, I propose two solutions to the Parity Problem, one
inspired by David Hume, the other by Immanuel Kant. I will not be defending either a
Humean or a Kantian doctrine per se, but rather taking inspiration from (1) the
argumentative moves they make, (2) their respective insights into the nature of
rationality, and (3) the nature of certain sorts of judgments, particularly judgments of
taste.
I have chosen to focus on Hume and Kant for several reasons:
First, with respect to nearly any significant epistemological issue, consulting these
figures is almost an a priori necessity. Kant is the most important contributor to questions
about human knowledge at least since Descartes, and his contributions cannot be
adequately appreciated apart from their relationship to Hume, who famously aroused
Kant from his “dogmatic slumber.” More specifically, there is a prevalent sense in the
disagreement literature, noted by both Feldman and Lackey in the last chapter, that peer
disagreement is a puzzle with a demonstrable solution. Hume and Kant help us to see that
this is unlikely. Note, however, that that does not mean that reasonable disagreement is
never possible.
Second, the interaction between the two figures provides a relevant historical
backdrop for, and in some ways anticipates, the current divisions in the disagreement
debate. Put another way: the disagreement between Hume and Kant about judgments of
taste prefigures current disagreement about disagreement. Hume, who seems to think that
one should adjust one’s beliefs in accordance with the judgment of recognized experts,
can be seen as anticipating the “Conformist,” “Conciliationist,” “Equal Weight,” or
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“suspend judgment” views, which hold that the realization of disagreement with a peer
gives one a strong reason to alter one’s attitude toward the disputed proposition.1 On the
other hand, Kant, who thinks that it is sometimes appropriate to form judgments which
are truth-directed, even when one recognizes that one lacks the ability to demonstrate
their truth, may be seen as representing the “Nonconformist,” “Steadfast,” or “Anticonciliationist” views, which hold that it is rational to maintain one’s prior attitude
toward a disputed proposition in the face of peer disagreement.
Third, the current debate, though still fairly young, has already produced
something of a stalemate of positions. The Conformist and Nonconformist views all have
able defenders, and, with a flourish of irony lost on no one, have generated seemingly
intractable disagreement among philosophers. The debate is in need of penetrating
insight. I think that Hume and Kant provide options for such a resolution.
8.1 – A Humean Approach to Disagreement

While Hume did not discuss peer disagreement in the contemporary sense, he was
self-avowedly motivated by a desire to settle the “endless disputes” of philosophy. He set
out to base our understanding of human nature and to determine the extent of human
knowledge on strictly empirical foundations.2 In addition, his concern with weighing
testimonial evidence against one’s experience of the world can be seen in his well-known

See, e.g., the conclusion of Hume’s Natural History of Religion, where he says of religious disagreement:
“The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspence of judgment
appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject.” David Hume, A Dissertation
on the Passions & The Natural History of Religion: A Critical Edition, ed. Tom Beauchamp (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 87.
2
See David Hume, The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T Greig, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932),
13.
1
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argument against the rationality of belief in miracles. In that argument he takes
competing claims from different religions that a miracle has occurred to count against the
rationality of belief in miracles.3 If such competition occurs, “there is,” he says, “a mutual
destruction of arguments.”4 In addition, Hume famously noted the inability of human
reason to non-circularly demonstrate the reliability of its own sources of belief about the
world. As he says, once we have “arriv’d at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit
down contented,” because we “perceive that we can give no reason for our most general
and most refin’d principles, beside our experience of their reality.”5
My discussion here is “Humean” in several ways:
(1) It is inspired by the idea that a theory of disagreement is empirically
constrained. As Hume says, respecting our knowledge of principles in general:
…tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by
tracing up our experiments to the utmost’ and explaining all effects from the
simplest and fewest causes, ‘tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and
any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human
nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.6
As Lackey and others have noted, disagreement as an epistemological issue arose
because of prolonged philosophical and religious disagreement, and it should remain
focused on real people in real situations of peer disagreement. This is what motivates the
Parity Problem, and what tells against Nonconformist views which take the objective
accuracy of one’s evidential judgments to justify the decision to maintain one’s beliefs.

See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Millican (Oxford World’s
Classics, 2007), Section X, esp. Part 2, paragraph 24, pp. 87-88.
4
Ibid., Section X, Part 1, paragraph 6, p. 81.
5
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J Norton (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2007), 5.
6
Ibid.
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Such views are not sufficiently sensitive to the impoverished evidential situation people
are typically in when encountering disagreement, nor to their inability to verify the
objective veracity of their assessments.
(2) My discussion in this section is “naturalistic” in that knowledge of the
limitations of disagreement is based on empirical observation of actual disagreement
(including the experience of having a disagreement).7
(3) As it was for Hume, this naturalism is motivated by a desire to settle the
“endless disputes” of philosophy by distinguishing those disputes that are legitimate from
those that stem from mere idle speculation about things beyond the limits of human
reason.
(4) My discussion here is methodologically similar to Hume’s discussion of
definition as far as its purpose is concerned: to obtain clarity about an obscure idea. In
Hume’s case, the obscure idea is “necessary connection”; in mine, it is “peerhood.” One
should begin, Hume says, by tracing the idea back to its initial “impressions” (seemings)
in order “to fix… the precise meaning of [the] term… and thereby remove some part of
that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy.”8
Consider, for example, Hume’s account of the source of moral sentiment:
sympathy. For Hume, morality is based on (1) feelings of approval and disapproval, and
(2) the ability to sympathize with others.9 Through sympathy, we move from an idea of

Cf. Hume’s claim that “as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the
only solid foundation we can give to this science [of human nature] itself must be laid on experience and
observation.” Ibid., 4.
8
Hume, Enquiry, 45.
9
See Hume, Treatise, Part 3, Section 1, 367-378.
7
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what someone else is feeling to feeling it ourselves. William Morris and Charlotte Brown
explain:
There are four steps to this process. I first arrive at the idea of what someone is
feeling in any of the usual ways. I next become aware of the resemblances
between us, so we are linked by that principle of association. While we resemble
every human being to some extent, we also resemble some individuals more than
others--for instance, those who share our language or culture or are the same age
and sex as we are. The associative principles of contiguity and causality also
relate individuals who are located closely to us in time or space or who are family
members or teachers. According to Hume, we are able to sympathize more easily
and strongly with individuals with whom we have strong associative ties. The
stronger the associative relations, the stronger our sympathetic responses. Hume
then claims--controversially--that we always have a vivid awareness of ourselves.
Finally, he reminds us that the principles of association not only relate two
perceptions, but they also transmit force and vivacity from one perception to
another.10
This is analogous to peerhood in important respects. When we judge that someone is a
peer, there is a similar stepwise, “sympathetic” process: I first find out how someone sees
things in the usual way (conversation, body language, etc.). I then notice that that person
resembles me in how I see things. For Hume, this step can invite bias--I am inclined to
privilege the perspective of those similar to myself, and so to consider them my equals
more readily than those not as similar to me.11 Only through noting this resemblance do I
attribute peerhood to another, for it is only then that I have any reason to take his/her
opinions seriously. Prior to recognizing the resemblance, I have only evidence about p
(first-order), and evidence about the other person’s view of p, which is also first-order,
but about the person, not the proposition. But peerhood is not directly about the
proposition or the person. It is about the proposition-as-held-by-the-person (Elga phrases

William Edward Morris and Charlotte R. Brown, “David Hume,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Spring 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/hume/, Section 7.2.
11
Cf. Elga’s view of forming peers. See footnote 20 in the previous chapter.
10
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this as having an “equal likelihood to be mistaken” about p). Since I am most familiar
with my own view of p and my own reasoning process about p (we need not follow
Hume here in the stronger claim that I always have a “vivid awareness” of my own
thoughts), I will always be more confident of my own conclusion about p than I am about
another’s conclusion about p, at least initially. But through observation of another’s
reasoning about p, I may come to see a greater resemblance to me, and then my
confidence in my own reasoning may be transferred to him/her, so that I begin to see
him/her as an epistemic peer. Crucially, my judgment of peerhood is based on
resemblance to me (this is true even if I come to view the other as an epistemic superior
or inferior).
For Hume, a belief is an idea that borrows its vivacity from impressions
themselves. By doing so, the idea becomes like an impression, for example, by sharing its
behavioral effects. I hear thunder, for instance, and react as though there is lightning: I
leave the playing field, say, even though I did not see lightning. Similarly, judging
another as my epistemic peer confers some of the vivacity of my own evidential seemings
onto his/her putative evidential seemings. On this view, to believe that someone is my
peer is to view his/her reported evidential experiences about p similarly to how I would if
they were my experiences. I did not see the lightning, so to speak, but I’m inclined to act
as if I had.
(5) My discussion is also methodologically similar to Hume’s discussion of
analogical argument. In criticizing the teleological argument in the Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion, Hume argues that disputes regarding “the degrees of any
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quality or circumstance” are incurably indefinite.12 This is because, as Morris and Brown
put it,
Analogies are always matters of degree, and the degrees of the qualities involved
in the design argument aren’t capable of exact measurement. The controversy thus
“admits not of any precise meaning, nor consequently of any determination.”13
The result is that with such analogies (i.e., those that resist precise measurement),
everything is analogous to everything else in some respect, and if the similarity cannot be
specified, then the analogy itself is meaningless. For Hume, this renders all natural
theology suspect by virtue of being predicated on such an analogy between the universe
and artifacts. Such analogies, Hume thinks, are unintelligible. Similarly, in the case of
peer disagreement, if the degree of similarity between one’s own reasoning ability and
another’s cannot be reasonably compared, then it too would be subject to the
unintelligibility objection, since it would be no more meaningful than comparing any two
phenomena.14
Part of our task, then, is to determine if the “peer-analogy”--“My interlocutor’s
reasons respecting p are similar to mine”--can be made precise enough to support a
Conformist or Nonconformist stance.15 Given the argument in the preceding chapter for
the priority of the “peer factor” approach (FP) to defining peerhood, assigning precise
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David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Dorothy Coleman (Cambridge University
Press, 2007), 92.
13
Morris and Brown, “David Hume,” Section 8.4, citing Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,
93.
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We need not follow Hume here in insisting that the analogues must be susceptible to “exact
measurement.” After all, we can and do reasonably compare things which cannot be quantified, such as the
beauty of various works of art. For our purposes, it is enough to note that the imprecise nature of such
analogies means that they will not yield a single most rational decision principle which can justify either a
Conformist or Nonconformist stance on the disagreement problem.
15
Note that the Conformists and Equal Weight theorists usually assume that the peer comparison can be
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probabilities to one’s peer status will be difficult but not impossible. I may not be able to
say, as the Equal Weight theorist would like, that my peer and I are each 85% successful
at evaluating evidential support for propositions like p. But I can say that we are roughly
equal in intelligence (measured either objectively or by our ability to marshal and
respond to powerful objections), conscientiousness (measured by our track record of
sticking to our own stated norms for evidence assessment), carefulness (measured by how
much time and attention we commit to each piece of evidence and each objection),
thoroughness (measured by how many objections we consider, and how many sources we
consult to find them), and so forth. Collectively, such rough measures will plausibly yield
a tolerably clear comparison between interlocutors, and thus a reasonable means of
claiming peerhood. But the inherently inexact nature of these measures, especially in
real-world contexts, means that one’s peerhood-judgments will always be somewhat
indefinite. Or put differently, they will be underdetermined, an idea which will become
important below. Because I cannot precisely measure the extent to which my peer and I
compare with respect to the various peerhood factors, in any particular disagreement it
could be the case either that in this instance, I am slightly more conscientious, careful,
thorough, etc., or that my peer is. And of course the same will be the case from my peer’s
perspective. It is thus up to each of us to decide whether to weigh our own evidence
assessment more heavily, and so maintain our first-order view of p, or to weigh our
assessment and our peer’s assessment as equal, and so, perhaps, suspend judgment about
p.
The crucial Humean insight here is that there is no numerical means of
comparison that can ensure that we make the unquestionably most rational decision,
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because the claim that there is an unquestionably most rational decision about this is itself
suspect. In order for there to be a quantifiably “correct” way to proceed, we would need
to be able to measure ourselves and our peer with respect to the various peer factors much
more precisely than we in fact can. But since all we have to go on in any actual
disagreement is an imprecise sense of similarity between ourselves, which decision we
make (conciliate or not) must be made on some basis other than what is demonstrably
most rational. This levels at one stroke both the Conformist and Nonconformist
(including the Equal Weight and Total Evidence) responses to peer disagreement, insofar
as they are interpreted as providing a demonstrable, quantifiable assessment of the most
rational response to peer disagreement. Hume helps us to see that such a response is not
to be had.
One Conformist, David Christensen, has recognized this issue and hinted at a
partial reply. In the course of considering a case in which two doctors disagree about the
proper treatment for a patient, Christensen says:
… do I think that [the other doctor’s evidence] weighting leads in general to
equally accurate beliefs? If so, then why think my belief is likely to be more
accurate now? … On the other hand, if I think her weighting does not lead in
general to equally accurate beliefs, why should I grant that it’s just as rational to
form beliefs using that weighting?16
The implication is of course that if I think her evidence-weighting policy is as accurate as
mine, then I have no reason to prefer mine, and I should conciliate. While if I think that
hers is less accurate than mine, then I should not grant that hers is as rational as mine.
Christensen adds in a footnote:

David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 116, no. 2
(2007): 191.
16
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… to say that I believe my weighting policy is more rational than hers need not
commit me to being able to give an ultimately non-question-begging defense of
my policy. Hume, I think, showed us that this cannot be the standard for rational
belief-forming policies. But to the extent that I regard it as my duty to prescribe…
treatment, I must regard my colleague in somewhat the way I regard the
counterinductivist: she’s not completely rational even if I can’t demonstrate that.
We should not take the impossibility of non-question-beggingly demonstrating
that one method of forming beliefs is uniquely rational to show that more than one
method of forming beliefs is rationally acceptable.17
Christensen’s point here seems to be that even if Hume is right that we can’t nonquestion beggingly demonstrate the superiority of one method of rational belief
formation, it does not follow that just any method is equal to any other, or even that there
is more than one rational method. Now, this is true so far as it goes, but it misses the
force of the problem in Christensen’s own case. Take the second horn of Christensen’s
dilemma: I think my colleague’s evidence-weighting policy “does not lead in general to
equally accurate beliefs” as mine (after sharing evidence, discussing it, and so on), but I
cannot demonstrate this. Should I still think of my peer as being as rational as me? This
will depend, not on what merits I think that policy has independently of who is
implementing it, but on whether I take my colleague to be my peer with respect to
assessing this kind of evidence. I must assess her, not merely her evidence-weighting
method. Now, the evidence-weighting policies she chooses will surely factor into my
judgment here, but it will not be the whole of it--I will also need to assess her with
respect to the various peer factors discussed above. It could be that her similarity to
myself along those factors is such that I come to believe that she is indeed rational in
implementing an evidence-weighting policy that I would reject.
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So while Christensen is correct that a permissive view of rational evidenceweighting policies does not follow from the failure to demonstrate the superiority of a
single one, it may yet follow from the features of epistemic excellence which factor into
peer-judgments. Now consider the first horn of the dilemma: I think my colleague’s
evidence-weighting policy does lead to equally accurate beliefs as mine. Is it obvious that
I should conciliate? I think not, and I think Hume is again helpful here. In particular,
Hume’s own constructive project regarding causality hints at a means of deciding
whether or not to conciliate in a given case of disagreement.
Hume famously argued that causal inference is not demonstratively certain,
because a priori reasoning does not in fact yield a notion of necessary connection
between cause and effect.18 In place of reason, Hume suggests that “custom,” or habit, is
the source of our belief that the future will be like the past.19 While I do not intend to
suggest that custom is also the source of our beliefs that other people are our epistemic
peers, I do think that there is a way of understanding peer judgments that is similar in
spirit to Hume’s constructive account of causal inference. That is, there is a way of
justifying the choice to maintain one’s own view in the grip of the Parity Problem. This
Humean way does not require one to think (1) that there is a “necessary connection”
between the evidence and one’s own view, or (2) that one is any more rational than one’s
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interlocutor. Moreover, this Humean path allows us to say that there is a “reasonable”
solution to the Parity Problem, that is, an epistemically appropriate response. It is
epistemically appropriate in much the same way that following the “uniformity principle”
is an epistemically appropriate thing to do in everyday life. It is appropriate, not in the
sense of being demonstrable from a priori principles, but in the sense that following our
habits of inference has in general led to beliefs that are satisfactory for us. Perhaps our
beliefs about the rationality of our peers, and of ourselves, are like this as well: not
strictly speaking demonstrable, but nonetheless useful for our overall epistemic goals.
8.2 – Moffett’s Millian Solution to Peer Disagreement

One commentator in the recent disagreement literature, Marc Moffett, has come
close to this conclusion, but by a different route. His guide is John Stuart Mill, who
argues that one ought to submit one’s views to the assessment of one’s disagreeing
peers.20 It will be helpful to consider Moffett’s view in detail here, in order to elaborate
my own Humean solution to the Parity Problem.
Moffett notes that a Mill-inspired theory of group inquiry has two principles:
(1) The Millian Platitude (MP): to be fully justified, theoretical beliefs (i.e., those
that are non-deductively inferred from other beliefs) must hold up against the
strongest counterarguments practically available at the time.
(2) The Collective Criticism Condition (CCC): one can be adequately justified in
thinking that the Millian Platitude is satisfied for some theoretical belief only if

Marc Moffett, “Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry,” Episteme: A Journal of Social
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there is “free and open critical discussion” of the belief with one’s disagreeing
epistemic peers.21
In other words, to be fully justified in our theoretical beliefs, we must engage in critical
discussion with a community of disagreeing peers--indeed, with the best among those
peers that are practically available.
Moffett argues that MP entails CCC, at least for creatures like ourselves with
limited epistemic abilities. MP says that the justification of our theoretical beliefs
depends partially (i.e., in addition to whatever positive evidence we have for them) on
our own critical evaluation of those beliefs. Moffett interprets this to mean that we are
only fully justified in these beliefs (and maybe even adequately justified) if we are able to
defend them against the strongest practically available objections.22 The strongest
practically available objections are those which are externally available to one, meaning
either that one is aware of them, or that one could be reasonably expected to be aware of
them given one’s current social situation (e.g., given the philosophical/scientific theories
of one’s community, and given one’s freedom within the community to pursue
objections). They must be externally available, because if they need only be internally
available, then one could simply avoid learning about objections, or forget them, and
thereby improve one’s epistemic situation. Because the emphasis here is on what one is
able to do (namely, respond to the best counterarguments), one may be justified in one’s
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views, even if one doesn’t have reason to believe that one can respond to the best
counterarguments, because one can be able to respond to them without believing that one
has considered the best ones or that one is able to respond to them.
This leads to a problem if we are considering only the ability of an individual
herself to come up with the best counterarguments to her views: namely, she is unlikely
to be able to do so because humans are cognitively limited and prone to bias. Hence, in
order to really have these objections available to her, she needs to interact with
disagreeing peers. Hence, MP entails CCC. As Moffett says, “In sum: from the point of
view of individual epistemology, it is an epistemic good and a practical necessity to rely
on a network of genuine critics.”23 He continues: “It follows that in the absence of
epistemic peers with whom x reasonably disagrees, x’s epistemic situation will be
significantly compromised.”24 Indeed, she would not be able to be justified in her
theoretical beliefs at all with such an absence unless (per improbable) she is unusually
gifted at predicting the counterarguments of the strongest possible interlocutors.
Unfortunately, CCC has negative epistemic consequences in the form of the peer
disagreement problem. If, for example, Conformists like Elga or Feldman are correct,
then the existence of dissenting epistemic peers entails suspension of judgment about our
own controversial beliefs. But then, a requirement for fully justified belief (i.e., CCC)
would entail that our beliefs are not even adequately justified (because according to the
Conformist view, peer disagreement undermines justification to the extent of requiring
suspension of judgment), and this is undesirable, to say the least. But why think that peer
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disagreement undermines justification? Recall Elga’s argument: peerhood, he thinks, is a
matter of likelihood to be right. This is because if a person takes herself to be right and an
interlocutor to be wrong, then she must think there is some factor F that makes her more
likely to be correct, which is just the same as saying that she does not think the
interlocutor is a peer. Moffett unfortunately accepts Elga’s understanding of peerhood,
declaring equal likelihood to be correct a “necessary condition” for peerhood.25 But, says
Moffett, Elga is mistaken to then conclude that peerhood implies that we should accord
equal weight to our interlocutor’s view, because “Elga does not adequately take into
account the holistic relation between evidence and theory.”26 By this, Moffett seems to
mean that Elga does not consider the possibility that revising one’s own belief may be
much more costly (my word) than simply rejecting one’s interlocutor’s peerhood.
Consider cases of strong evidence, such as the dean-in-the-quad case (i.e., cases
of perceptual disagreement). In such cases, says Moffett, it is more reasonable to
maintain one’s view and reject peerhood because revising one’s view would require
embracing localized perceptual skepticism. In addition, Elga assumes a false dilemma:
either we are not peers, or, if we are, I must give our views equal weight. But there are
other options: I might conclude that because we disagree, your evidence must not really
be the same as mine (because you have missed some small part of it that I’ve seen); or I
might conclude that you are simply lying about your conclusions. In these cases, we are
still peers (in the likelihood to be right sense), but I do not need to give our views equal
weight.
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Unfortunately, this strategy will not work in every case. As Moffett says:
… given that the disagreement will persist as we proceed further in our collective
inquiry we will, after a very short period of time, have to regard these critics as
simply being incapable of attaining the same quality of evidence as us. But this
amounts to positing a truth-conducive factor on which we are superior to our
critics and so, to not regard them as genuine peers after all!27
The lesson here, according to Moffett, is that the more idealized our cases of
disagreement become, the more intractable they are, because our main way of resolving
them in particular cases is to fall back on the possibility of some shortcoming in our
interlocutor. But in cases like Mill’s, “As we idealize away from those limitations, it
becomes much more difficult to avoid epistemic stalemate with our peers.”28 So then
CCC, while providing ideal grounds for the justification of our theoretical beliefs, also
simultaneously undermines those beliefs by introducing the problem of peer
disagreement.29
Moffett’s solution to this problem involves the underdetermination of theory by
evidence, which he argues allows us to avoid the dilemma posited by the Conformist:
either abandon our own view, or else downgrade the “epistemic competency of our
critics.”30 Unfortunately, Moffett’s explanation of a third option here is not as clear as
one would like. He says:
… if one were to accept that one’s current evidentiary position (perhaps including
whatever theoretical virtues one wishes to posit) does not rationally determine a
commitment to a unique theory, then one would be free to maintain the
competence of one’s critics despite their genuine disagreement. Against this
backdrop, an epistemic peer would be construed as someone who is as likely as
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we are to judge correctly given the same evidence and the same background
theoretical beliefs.31
He adds in a footnote:
In saying that the individual would judge “correctly” we cannot mean that the
individual would judge “truly” unless we are also willing to embrace some form
of anti-realism. What is intended, rather, is that an epistemic peer is as likely as
we are to arrive at the most rationally supported conclusion given those features
which fix such a conclusion uniquely.32
I interpret Moffett as saying that a peer is someone who is as likely as me to be right,
given whatever might make for a uniquely rational conclusion, including both first-order
evidence, and background theoretical beliefs. The way to avoid denying the peerhood of
an interlocutor (which I take to be synonymous with Moffett’s confusing usage of
“competence”) is to recognize that those things which would make for a uniquely rational
conclusion, namely, sameness of background theoretical beliefs, in this instance do not.
In other words, our background theoretical beliefs differ, but are equally rational, because
they are “theoretical beliefs” and so underdetermined by the evidence for them. On this
view, both interlocutors can admit that the evidence is as consistent with the other’s
theory as it is with their own, and neither needs to abandon their own view, nor deny
peerhood to the other. “In this way,” he says, “underdetermination appears to allow for
blameless (and so, reasonable) disagreement.”33
Moffett here considers an objection from Richard Feldman: underdetermination
amounts to the same thing as the Equal Weight View--the result is still suspension of
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judgment. This is because if there is no uniquely rational theory, then our choice of
theory is arbitrary and therefore cannot be preferable to our peer’s choice of theory.
Moffett responds by arguing that epistemic conservatism is true. This is the view that
underdetermination need not undermine one’s own theory because one has prima facie
justification for any belief that one holds.34 This is not to say that one was justified in
forming any belief that one happens to have formed, but rather that one has prima facie
justification for relying on one’s standing belief. As Moffett says, “For any individual x
and proposition p, x’s believing that p is both necessary and sufficient for x’s being prima
facie justified in believing that p.”35
The question then is: Does the existence of an equally adequate but incompatible
theory provide counterevidence sufficient to outweigh this prima facie justification?
Moffett answers no, because believing a theory has theoretical benefits. Believing things,
Moffett says, is a crucial part of having an overall worldview, and this in turn “is
fundamental to our ability to produce and develop new ideas and direct the course of
further investigation.”36 Note that this benefit is distinct from any concern for the theory’s
truth. As Moffett says, “what is being claimed is that genuinely believing a theory helps
us to elaborate and develop that theory even though we acknowledge that the current
evidence in support of it makes it no more likely to be true than some set of
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alternatives.”37 Referencing Kuhn, Moffett notes that elaborating and developing one’s
theories “plays a crucial role in overall theoretical progress,” the implication being that
genuine belief in one’s view encourages such progress.38 This interpretation of Moffett’s
view is confirmed when he quotes Mill to the effect that “it is genuine believers who are
best positioned to… ‘do their very utmost’ for a theory.”39
There is another benefit as well. Maintaining one’s standing beliefs is more
conducive to one’s own self-understanding as a seeker of knowledge.
From the point of view of one’s intellectual development, our theoretical
commitments shape, not just how we see things, but who we are.… Abandoning
such commitments simply because an attractive competitor, even an otherwise
equally attractive one, arises does not do justice to our status as epistemic
agents.40
I take this to mean that it is reasonable for me to maintain my standing belief in the face
of an alternative that I recognize is equally likely to be true, because failing to do so
would undermine my own goal of becoming a responsible and able epistemic agent. Or,
perhaps more accurately, a habit of failing to do so would undermine that goal, because
becoming a responsible and able epistemic agent is a long-term project that is hampered
by giving up too easily. Moffett here considers the objection that this is not a properly
“epistemic” reason to hold onto one’s belief, but is instead a “prudential” or “moral”
reason. He replies that, for two reasons, it should be considered epistemic. First, “it is our
status as epistemic agents which generate [sic] the commitments” to become good
epistemic agents.41 Second, even if a reason is prudential, it is not therefore not epistemic.
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This is because “what is morally/prudentially required ought to be epistemically
permissible and, conversely, what is epistemically prohibited ought not to be
morally/prudentially required.”42 So moral/prudential reasons can have epistemic
entailments.
So Feldman, Moffett says, is guilty of “construing the epistemic in an
inappropriately narrow manner, as reasons which make the belief itself more likely to be
true.”43 In other words, practical reasons are not precluded from playing an epistemic role
by virtue of their epistemic entailments. In this sense, something can be an epistemic
reason for belief even if it doesn’t make the belief more likely to be true.44 Because there
is this practical benefit to privileging one’s own standing beliefs, one is permitted in
holding onto them in the face of a competing, equally well justified theory. In this way,
reasonable disagreement with an epistemic peer is possible.

8.3 - Hume Again

We can now elaborate our own Humean response along similar lines, but without
Moffett’s problematic view of peerhood.
Recall the Parity Problem:
Parity: From the perspective of either party to a peer disagreement, the epistemic
situation is indistinguishable from one in which the accuracy of the assessments
are inverted. Things would appear just as they do to the correct party if she were
incorrect, and vice versa.
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As we saw above, Parity implies a conflict in one’s own evidential seemings: it appears
to one simultaneously that the first-order evidence supports p, and that one’s recognition
of that support may be erroneous. Moffett’s solution suggests that a person is reasonable
to maintain her view in a situation of parity owing to the practical benefits of resisting
habits of regular belief revision, benefits which accrue to one’s overall theoretical goals
as an epistemic agent. So far, however, Moffett is still thinking of peerhood judgments in
terms of comparing the reported seemings of another with one’s own first-person
evidential seemings. His adoption of Elga’s “equal likelihood to be correct” account of
peerhood ensures that when I judge that another person is my epistemic peer, the content
of that judgment is about our comparative capacity to be correct about p.
This, however, is not what motivates the Parity Problem. If this were all there is to
peerhood judgments, then Wedgwood’s egocentric epistemic bias discussed above would
be an adequate solution: we could simply say that my own intuitions about the disputed
proposition are presumed basically reliable, while yours are not, and justify this by appeal
to the larger epistemic goal of minimizing sources of error.45 However, the Parity
Problem arises only when the reliability of an interlocutor’s intuitions become
indistinguishable from the reliability of one’s own, after long and inconclusive dispute.
After long dispute with a potential peer, I come to see that his/her methods of evidence
assessment are very similar to mine, and this then prompts the realization that we are
epistemic peers. Moffett’s solution, intelligent and well-argued as it is, cannot help here,
burdened as it is with seeing the peer’s perspective as fundamentally different from one’s
own.
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This is where Hume is most helpful. Viewed through a Humean lens, peerhood
judgments are not just about reports of another’s point of view and its likelihood to be
correct. They are about the resemblance of another’s point of view to my own. To judge
that another is my epistemic peer is to judge that when he/she has an evidential seeming,
it is as if I had had it, and hence the reasonable response to that seeming is my own
response. Put differently, the experience of recognizing an epistemic peer entails that I
have competing, equally compelling responses to my total evidence: the response that I
would have had without the disagreement, and the response of my peer, which has
borrowed its “vivacity” from my trust in my own methods of evidence assessment.
From this Humean perspective, the Parity Problem makes sense: it is the expected
outcome of sustained disagreement with an equally qualified interlocutor. And as we saw,
a response to the problem based on demonstrative reason is not to be had, owing to the
rough nature of peerhood. But Moffett’s insight is still helpful: there may be practical
benefits to maintaining one’s standing belief--the belief one would have had without the
disagreement--which make holding that belief the overall reasonable thing to do, even in
a situation of parity.
To see as much, consider again the case of two philosophers who disagree about
free will (à la van Inwagen and Lewis). Call them A and B. A and B share all of the
evidence and arguments related to free will that they can think of over a long period of
time, and each observes the other acting as carefully, conscientiously, creatively, fairly,
thoroughly, etc., as oneself. Each consequently comes to believe the judgment of the
other resembles one’s own. A has a clear and vivid evidential seeming that the first-order
evidence E (i.e., all the evidence and arguments pertaining to free will that A can think
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of, plus the evidence and arguments that B has shared with A) supports p. A also knows
that B has a clear and vivid evidential seeming that the same body of first-order evidence
supports ~p. After long exposure to B’s habits of thought, A comes to consider B an
epistemic peer, meaning that A now takes B’s reported evidential seeming to be as
evidentially weighty as A’s own evidential seeming. That is to say, from A’s perspective,
B’s report that E supports ~p carries the same weight as A’s seeming that E supports p.
And A knows that if in fact ~p is correct, things would look just the same to A as they do,
because as things presently stand, A has the conflicting seemings that E supports p (from
A’s own first-order evidential assessment), and that E supports ~p (from A’s higher-order
evidential assessment derived from the recognition of B’s peer status, a recognition
which carries with it the weight of long observation of B’s epistemic virtue). Unlike most
cases of disagreement, then, A has more to go on than this piece of disagreeing testimony
alone--A also has the entire past history of observing B’s reasoning, which has led A to
believe that B reasons as well as A does about this kind of thing. A is thus in a situation
of parity with B.46
The Hume/Moffett solution to this problem is to see that there is practical,
epistemic benefit in maintaining one’s standing view, even though one may not think that
one is more likely to be correct about p. Why not suspend judgment in this case, as
Conformists such as Feldman would recommend? Because, Moffett says, given our
limited understanding of the world, a practice of suspending judgment in that way would
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be devastating for our project of developing a coherent worldview. The benefit of
standing one’s epistemic ground, Moffett says, accrues at two levels:
1. The group level: Ceteris paribus, the overall human project of developing a
coherent worldview works better if people stick with the theories that they hold
(even while admitting that the evidence does not tell solely in their favor).
2. The individual level: My goal of becoming a knower involves a long-term
project that requires resilience in the face of uncertainty and even epistemic
parity.
The underlying insight of both points seems to be that if one wants to know, one must
give it one’s best shot, which implies sticking with a view until there is good positive
reason to abandon it, and not merely disagreement with a person like oneself. Similarly,
our Humean approach implies that the habits of considering myself reliable (and my
seemings prima facie evidential) and of considering those who reason like me to be
similarly reliable (and so their seemings also prima facie evidential) are ultimately
productive of knowledge. In general, I must assume that things are the way they seem to
me to be, even if I can’t demonstrate that they are, and I am reasonable in trusting those
who see things the way that I do.
The danger here is that this will result in a situation in which the justification of
any belief is unlikely to be challenged because the people that one is likely to consider
worthy dialogue partners are those with whom one already agrees.47 But this can be
mitigated by building in the Millian expectation that one is seeking out the most informed

See Chapter Seven, fn. 20 for an argument that Elga’s Equal Weight View really does have this
undesirable consequence.
47

185
disagreeing peers for dialogue, as well as doing one’s best to maximize one’s standing in
such dialogues by developing all the relevant cognitive virtues--care, thoroughness,
conscientiousness, etc. One will, as a matter of course, encounter evidence, both firstorder and higher-order, that counts against one’s standing view, especially if one is
engaged in this Millian project. In most cases, a new standing view will naturally
develop. It is only when one forms an unjustified attachment to a view, for reasons other
than any of the peer factors, that the danger mentioned above becomes salient. But our
Hume/Moffett solution neither implies nor recommends such an approach to belief.
So, there is at least one way out of the Parity Problem. Briefly, it is that there are
practical reasons to maintain one’s view that are properly epistemic reasons without
being truth-conducive reasons. Essentially, this is to interpret the notion of “reasonable”
as “epistemically blameless” with respect to what can be expected of knowers, given their
overall epistemic goals. As Moffett says, “underdetermination appears to allow for
blameless (and so, reasonable) disagreement.”48 While blameless does not entail
reasonable in the usual sense of “believing appropriately”--one might, after all, believe
wrongly through no fault of one’s own--nonetheless, blamelessness might be the best one
can hope for in a situation of parity with underdetermined beliefs. To be reasonable in
this sense does not entail being right, or even thinking that one’s position is more likely
to be right than any other position that one is aware of; it is merely doing the best one can
in the circumstances. One is “reasonable” in this weaker sense insofar as one is blameless
with respect to the dispute one is involved in, given one’s overall epistemic goals and the
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norms that govern those goals. To have a reasonable disagreement is to engage
blamelessly with an equally blameless peer.
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Chapter Nine – Proposed Solutions II: Kant’s Contribution
9.1 – Kant’s Categories of Judgments and Disagreement

Just as the Humean solution to the Parity Problem argued for above was inspired
by a contemporary figure (Moffett), so too the Kantian solution is inspired by another
recent philosopher: William P. Alston. Specifically, it is inspired by a remark about
Alston that Thomas Kelly makes in a footnote in “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order
Evidence.”49 At the place in question, Kelly is considering a potential objection from the
Equal Weight theorist regarding a situation of peer disagreement in which one party has
in fact evaluated the evidence more accurately than another. Representing the Equal
Weight View, he says:
Even if things are asymmetrical at the bottom level (one’s belief reflects the
evidence better than one’s peer’s belief…), things are symmetrical one level up:
one has no justification for thinking that one’s belief better reflects the evidence…
One is thus no more justified in thinking that one’s own belief accurately reflects
the evidence than one’s peer is in thinking that his belief accurately reflects the
evidence. Therefore, given the higher level normative symmetry, it would be
unreasonable to favor one’s own belief over the belief of one’s peer.50
Kelly then adds this suggestive footnote:
In response to this objection, a proponent of the Total Evidence View might
contend that it rests on a ‘level confusion,’ in the sense of Alston (1980): in
particular, that it falsely assumes that, in order to be justified in believing p, one
must be justified in believing that one is justified in believing p. In effect, such a
response concedes, at least for the sake of argument, that there is a higher-level
normative symmetry between the peers but denies that anything directly follows
from this about the epistemic statuses of their first-order beliefs. Here I simply
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want to note the possibility of such a response without exploring its prospects; the
response that I offer in the main text proceeds along quite different lines.51
I think this is a potentially fruitful avenue of response. Just as, according to Alston, in
order to be justified in believing p, I do not need to also be justified in believing that I am
justified in believing p, I can judge that p, based on reasons, without needing to be able to
demonstrate that I have judged correctly, even if I think it’s possible that I haven’t judged
correctly. Applying this to a situation of parity, I can believe simultaneously that
proposition p is true because of evidence E, and that I cannot demonstrate this, nor
provide any more reason to think p is true than my peer can provide to think that p is
false, because we both appeal to the same shared evidence E. So, to return once more to
one of the key questions of this study: Is it rational for me to hold onto my first-order
view of p when I recognize that I am in a situation of parity, and that things would
therefore seem just the same to me if I were mistaken as they would if I were correct? An
Alston-inspired response would suggest that the answer is yes, owing to the level
confusion involved in assuming that higher-order symmetry must alter apparent firstorder asymmetry. But we should like to know more about why this is a “confusion,”
since, especially in Parity cases, it seems that the higher-order symmetry should make a
difference to the lower-order asymmetrical justification for p.
Kant is helpful here, as he provides a theoretical framework for possible analyses
of peerhood judgments--judgments that so-and-so is my peer--which provide two distinct
ways of explaining how it may be appropriate (and in what sense) to maintain one’s view
in the face of higher-order epistemic parity. Kant thinks that judgments, while always
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essentially propositional, can play various roles that are not reality-focused. In other
words, some judgments may not be directed at “mapping the world,” that is, recording
facts about the world. Robert Hanna describes such non-reality-focused roles as “uses” of
judgments, which include pragmatic, moral, aesthetic, and teleological uses.52 According
to Hanna, a “non-truth-theoretic,” or simply non-theoretical, use of a judgment has an
overall purpose other than knowing the truth about the world.
…non-theoretical judgments… are used non-truth-theoretically. For example, the
overall rational purpose of a non-theoretical judgment might be to make
instrumental or non-instrumental free choices or decisions… Or it might be to
evaluate the beauty or sublimity of phenomenal objects (aesthetic judgments of
taste)… Or it might be to treat natural things as if they had goal-directed or
purposive structure, as a heuristic guide for the construction of better mechanistic
explanations of physical phenomena (teleological judgments)…53
The important thing to note about a non-theoretical use of judgment is that its “rational
purpose or function… can be realized even if its propositional content is false. What
matters for a non-theoretical judgment is how things seem to the judger, not how they
actually are.”54 In support of this claim, Hanna cites the passage in the third Critique in
which Kant explains the disinterestedness of judgments of taste.55 There, Kant argues that
the existence of an object is irrelevant to the judgment of its beauty, and that all that
matters is that the representation of the object gives one satisfaction. “If the question is
whether something is beautiful,” Kant says,
One only wants to know whether the mere representation of the object is
accompanied with satisfaction in me, however indifferent I might be with regard
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to the existence of the object of this representation. It is readily seen that to say
that it is beautiful and to prove that I have taste what matters is what I make of
this representation in myself, not how I depend on the existence of the object.…
One must not be in the least biased in favor of the existence of the thing, but must
be entirely indifferent in this respect in order to play the judge in matters of
taste.56
This would make judgments of taste analogous to peerhood judgments, as these too are
rooted in how things seem to the judger. How things are, at least in Parity cases, is of no
justificatory importance, since that information is unavailable to both parties.
On the other hand, Kant also distinguishes between various uses of theoretical
judgments, judgments that are directed at recording facts about the world. The primary
distinction, for our purposes, is that between constitutive and regulative uses of
theoretical judgments. According to Hanna, a constitutive use of judgment is one for
which “its meaning, truth, or legitimacy as a ‘principle’ (Grundsatz, Prinzip) is not based
on any further assumptions, hypothetical conditions, or suppositions.” Alternatively, a
regulative use of judgment is one for which “its meaning, truth, or legitimacy as a
principle is based on some further assumptions, hypothetical conditions, or
suppositions.”57 Michael Friedman helps to clarify this distinction within the context of
Kant’s larger critical project:
In the Critique of Pure Reason this distinction marks the division between the
faculty of reason and the faculty of understanding. The understanding--together
with its pure concepts or categories--is constitutive of the possibility of
experience. All experience must conform to the concepts and principles of the
understanding, which, accordingly, are necessarily realized or instantiated in
experience: experience necessarily contains substances, causal connections, and
so on. The faculty of reason, by contrast, is merely regulative in relation to
experience. Although reason too plays an indispensable role in experience, the
concepts proper to it--the so-called ideas of reason, such as the idea of God, or the
idea of the world as a complete totality--cannot be realized or instantiated in
56
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experience at all. Nevertheless, ideas of reason--the idea of a highest intelligence
or wise Author of the world, for example--still function legitimately to guide
empirical enquiry into the objects that can be given in experience.58
Friedman here quotes Kant:
… it is said, e.g., that the things in the world must be considered as if they had
gotten their existence from a highest intelligence. In such a way the idea is only a
heuristic and not an ostensive concept; and it shows not how an object is
constituted but how, under the guidance of that concept, we ought to seek after
the constitution and connection of objects of experience in general.59
Friedman continues:
Regulative concepts and principles therefore present us, not with objects
corresponding to them, but rather with a task: the never ending progress of
empirical enquiry whose ideal terminus--the complete understanding of “the
constitution and connection of the objects of experience”--can only be approached
asymptotically.60
So constitutive judgments pertain to the necessary features of all possible experience.
Regulative judgments, on the other hand, “fill in the general form of pure natural science
with actual empirical content, which can only be done in a progressive and asymptotic
fashion.”61
A further feature of regulative judgments is that they may be empty, in the sense
of “lacking objective validity,” even though they have the same theoretic form as
judgments which are not empty (like objectively valid synthetic a priori judgments). For
example, the proposition “God exists,” while having no proper constitutive use--since it
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refers to a concept of a noumenal object--nonetheless has a legitimate regulative use in
morality. As Hanna says, the proposition “God exists” is
… a “postulate of practical reason,” which in turn is a basic propositional target of
moral belief or Glauben, according to which our moral lives are to be conducted
as if we could epistemically believe or scientifically know that God benevolently
guarantees that all and only the happy people are morally virtuous, in order to
strengthen our otherwise naturally flawed and shifting moral resolve, and make
our moral lives fully meaningful (A633-634/B661-662, A812-819/B840-847).62
Cases like this, Hanna says, show that
… otherwise empty or non-objectively-valid judgments are used regulatively
when their legitimacy as principles depends on their being adopted solely for the
purpose of making scientific inquiry or moral life into a coherent, meaningful
whole.63
With these distinctions in mind, two Kantian solutions to the Parity Problem are
possible. The first assumes that peerhood judgments, judgments of the form “so-and-so is
my epistemic peer,” are theoretical; the second assumes that they are not.
The first possible Kantian solution is this. Assume that peerhood judgments are
theoretical. They thus may be construed as possibly empty regulative theoretical
judgments. Due to underdetermination and the vague nature of peerhood, such judgments
lack objective validity, but we treat them as if they were objectively valid for the purpose
of making our epistemic lives into “coherent, meaningful wholes.” How is this
accomplished? It is important for me to be able to judge that another is my epistemic peer
on the basis of our similar past reasoning (keep in mind that we are considering situations
of Parity, which are rooted in such observations), since this helps to justify my beliefs
about the world by giving me reason to believe that others who implement habits of
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thought similar to mine come to similar conclusions.64 Via this route, peerhood
judgments are one way in which my understanding of “the constitution and connection of
the objects of experience” are approached asymptotically, as Friedman says. Nonetheless,
in the case of prolonged disagreement with a recognized epistemic peer I have recourse to
the fact that my judgment of his/her peerhood is merely regulative and empty, and so may
fail to guide my beliefs about how the world is in any given instance, even as it helps me
to justify such beliefs overall. By way of analogy, while for Kant the judgment that God
will reward moral virtue plays an important regulative role, nonetheless it may be
epistemically appropriate that one should doubt more specific claims about how God
metes out reward and punishment. Similarly, while it is important for the reasons just
mentioned that I judge that some others are my epistemic peers, it is epistemically
appropriate that I should doubt in a specific instance of disagreement that someone’s
view of p in this case is just as good as mine. Moreover, the justification for the doubt is
similar in both cases: the claims conflict with how things seem to me given my own
processes of reasoning about the propositions in question--processes I must trust to
deliver justified beliefs about the world.
But there is also the second Kantian possibility. Assume that peerhood judgments
are non-theoretical. It may then be reasonable to maintain one’s first-order view in the
context of Parity because the judgment that someone is a peer does not entail that his/her
view should make a difference with respect to the truth of a disputed proposition. By way
of analogy, consider judgments of taste, which Kant also takes to be non-theoretical. As
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we saw above, for Kant what matters in a judgment of taste is “what I make of this
representation in myself, not how I depend on the existence of the object.”65 As Hanna
says, “A visual experience of that thing over there, which you take to be a beautiful rose,
can be a genuine experience of the beautiful, even if in fact it is not a rose or does not
even exist.”66 The analogy with peerhood judgments is that they, like aesthetic
judgments, may be appropriate (rational) even if false, because their function is not to
produce true beliefs about the world.
This is not, however, to say that such judgments make no demands on others. For
Kant, aesthetic judgments are both subjective (based on feelings of pleasure) and
universal, in the sense that they call for universal agreement. As Kant says:
It would be ridiculous if… someone who prided himself on his taste thought to
justify himself thus: “This object (the building we are looking at, the clothing
someone is wearing, the poem that is presented for judging) is beautiful for me.”
For he must not call it beautiful if it pleases merely him. Many things may have
charm and agreeableness for him, no one will be bothered about that; but if he
pronounces that something is beautiful, then he expects the very same satisfaction
of others: he judges not merely for himself, but for everyone, and speaks of
beauty as if it were a property of things. Hence he says that the thing is beautiful,
and does not count on the agreement of others with his judgment of satisfaction
because he has frequently found them to be agreeable with his own, but rather
demands it from them. He rebukes
them if they judge otherwise, and denies that they have taste, though he
nevertheless requires that they ought to have it; and to this extent one cannot say,
“Everyone has his special taste.” This would be as much as to say that there is no
taste at all, i.e., no aesthetic judgment that could make a rightful claim to the
assent of everyone.67
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But because the judgment is also subjective, it is not really about a feature of the world,
but rather about a relation between ourselves and something in the world. But the fact
that I find it pleasurable is also an indicator that the beautiful object has a certain fit with
my cognitive faculties, and so I can demand that others with similar faculties also find it
pleasurable. This is the difference between a beautiful object and a merely pleasing object
for Kant. With a beautiful object, I can reasonably demand a similar response from others
with similar faculties.
This is also the place at which the analogy with peerhood judgments arises: the
judgment that another is my peer is the judgment that he/she has similar faculties as
myself with respect to assessing evidence. I can thus reasonably demand agreement about
p on the basis of our shared evidence E. However, as with judgments of taste, if a dispute
cannot be settled, this does not entail that either party is judging irrationally. This is
because of the vague nature of the concepts involved in such judgments. As David Stern
notes,
This claim to necessity [of an aesthetic judgment] is a sure sign that concepts play
a role in the judgment. But this is immediately counterbalanced by the claim that
the concepts in question cannot be determined--and so they do not permit a proof
that the object is beautiful or not. And that, in outline, is the approach Kant
adopts: aesthetic judgments are conceptual, and so can claim universal validity,
but the concepts are intrinsically indeterminate, and so we cannot settle aesthetic
disputes.68
Something similar can be said for peerhood judgments based on “disagreement factors.”
These concepts (conscientiousness, thoughtfulness, carefulness, etc.) are not
indeterminate, but they are vague, and so even though the judgments based on them are
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conceptual (i.e., “S is my peer” is a claim that aspires to universal validity), they cannot
be demonstrated in the way that a theoretical judgment can be.69 Owing to this inability to
demonstrate the conceptual bases of one’s judgments, the parties in a dispute about taste
may both be reasonable to persist in their disagreement, both because--contra Hume--the
truth about whose taste judgments are best cannot be established, and because the
awareness of another’s differing aesthetic experience does not outweigh my own.70
Similarly, in Parity situations, the parties in a dispute about what their shared evidence
supports may both be reasonable to persist in their disagreement, and their peerhood
judgments do not entail that either should revise his/her view in the direction of the peer.
9.2 – Conclusion

Thus, reasonable disagreement in Parity situations is possible in three ways:
(1) The Humean Solution. Justified belief is maintained in order to pursue our
larger epistemic goals, even though we don’t have sufficient reason to believe that we are
right, and indeed do have sufficient reason to believe that things would look just the same
to us if we were not right.
(2) The First Kantian Solution. We classify peerhood judgments as empty
regulative theoretical judgments, with the result that they do not entail that a peer’s view
must be as weighty as our own view.
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(3) The Second Kantian Solution. We take peer disagreement to be analogous to
disagreement about taste, with the result that we believe appropriately, and are justified in
expecting others to believe as we do, even though we cannot demonstrate that, and even
though we know that our peers are similarly justified.
There are objections that could be brought against all three of these solutions to
the Parity Problem. With respect to (1), one may press the objection that even though one
may be “blameless” in one’s disagreement with an epistemic peer (given one’s overall
epistemic goals and so on), it does not follow that it is reasonable to maintain one’s
belief. Perhaps a better view of Parity cases is this: while no one should be expected to
act any differently than they do, nonetheless one party must be less reasonable than the
other, even if we cannot tell which.
With respect to (2), one may object that considering peerhood judgments to be
regulative leads to negative epistemic consequences. Recall that the thought here is that
the recognition that others who implement habits of thought similar to mine come to
similar conclusions would help to confirm my beliefs, thus strengthening my resolve
about them. This is similar to believing that God rewards dutiful action, for that can
“strengthen [my] otherwise naturally flawed and shifting moral resolve.”71 The objector
might say, however, that this view suffers from a similar problem to the one earlier
leveled against Elga’s Equal Weight View: peer status will be granted to those who
reason like myself, which is likely to be determined by who agrees most often with me.
That in turn will lead to an insular, parochial system of beliefs that is unlikely to be
seriously challenged by new evidence.
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With respect to (3), one may deny the analogy between peerhood judgments and
judgments of taste, arguing that the former are clearly theoretical, i.e., clearly claims
about the world. While many would grant that there may not be an objectively valid
answer to the question whether a particular painting is beautiful, can we say the same for
the question whether two people are epistemic peers with respect to a proposition? As
with the Humean solution, perhaps there is an answer to this question, even if no one is in
a position to know what it is.
Where does this leave us with respect to peer disagreement? Some response can
be made to these objections. With respect to (1), the objector should be reminded that
what motivates interest in the peer disagreement problem is the desire to respond well to
capable interlocutors who disagree with us. Whether or not responding well amounts to
the same thing as being reasonable is largely a semantic matter, and at any rate would not
tell us what to do in a real-life case of disagreement under conditions of Parity. The
Humean solution at least provides some help here.
With respect to (2), we can reiterate a point made above: avoiding a
problematically self-referential belief system depends largely on a good faith effort to
practice the intellectual virtues which one uses to determine peerhood in the first place.72
While it is probably true that taking peerhood judgments to be regulative is consistent
with a narrow, self-referential system of belief, I do not think that this view makes such a
system epistemically superior.73
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With respect to (3), I confess that I am not sure whether the question “Is so-and-so
my epistemic peer?” has an objectively valid answer, or whether there is a fact of the
matter about peerhood in a given case (i.e., whether peerhood judgments are theoretical).
As such, I am not sure how far the analogy between peerhood judgments and judgments
of taste should be carried. But I am also not sure that this question does have an
objectively valid answer, because the factors used to determine peerhood are often quite
indefinite indeed, even in the best of real-life prolonged disagreement cases. Perhaps
there are other pertinent differences between taste judgments and peerhood judgments
that would ultimately undermine this analogy, but recall that the point of the analogy was
to illustrate one way that non-theoretical judgments could have implications for the
relationship between higher-order and lower-order beliefs. This point is not defeated even
if the analogy with taste cannot be carried very far.
In conclusion, I believe that peer disagreement in Parity contexts presents a real
epistemic problem that has not yet been adequately addressed in the literature, and that
the Humean and Kantian solutions lightly canvassed above go some way towards
mitigating this problem. Nonetheless, even if all three of these solutions are ultimately
untenable, it is worth keeping in mind the points made above about the skeptical nature of
the disagreement problem.74 While the possibility of Parity may yet entail that many
controversial beliefs are unjustified, it remains true that Parity is likely a rare
phenomenon for most people, including experts.
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See pp. 92-93.
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Conclusion

In the Introduction, I distinguished between several questions in the literature on
peer disagreement, and distilled them into three Main Questions:
(MQ1) What expectations can one reasonably have of a body of evidence for a
proposition?
(MQ2) What is the relevance of private evidence to peer disagreement?
(MQ3) What are one’s epistemic responsibilities in the context of disagreement?
In this study I have also argued for answers to each of them. In response to
(MQ1), I argued in Chapter One that Feldman and van Inwagen’s respective versions of
the Uniqueness Thesis--the view that “a body of evidence justiﬁes at most one
proposition out of a competing set of propositions”--are untenable.75 Consequently, we
do not have prima facie reason to rule out the possibility of rational disagreement by
virtue of the nature of evidence alone.
In response to (MQ2), I argued in Chapters Two and Three that there is
unshareable, “private,” evidence that is relevant to the justification of one’s belief in a
proposition, and that it is best understood in terms of evidential seemings--the felt sense
that some evidence supports a proposition. Further, these seemings are analogous to
perceptual seemings in important ways that have not previously been spelled out in the
disagreement literature. I argued that such seemings have evidential significance in a way
similar to that of perceptual seemings, and that this significance does not disappear on the
discovery of disagreement, though the seemings do of course remain defeasible. I then

Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations
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considered how evidential seemings might be overcome by the higher-order evidence
against one’s view provided by peer disagreement.
In Chapters Four through Six, I considered and rejected several ways in which
disagreement may defeat one’s evidential seemings, such as by providing evidence of the
contingency of one’s belief (à la Gideon Rosen), by creating epistemic symmetry
between peers so that a peer has no way to identify which peer’s seemings are correct (à
la David Christensen and Adam Elga), or by constituting meta-evidence: evidence that
there is evidence for p (à la Richard Feldman). I concluded that the fact of disagreement
itself does not necessarily provide defeating evidence regarding what one should believe
about p, and that meta-evidence may not in fact constitute evidence for a subject that is
directly relevant to the disputed proposition. However, I argued that there is something
important about higher-order evidence: insofar as one is dealing with a perspective that is
constituted by certain features of epistemic excellence, the views of a person with that
perspective may count as evidence for a disputed proposition. In the context of Parity, I
argued, prolonged disagreement with such a person may provide evidence sufficient to
counterbalance one’s own evidential seemings.
I also considered the related issue of the relationship between the epistemological
problems of testimony and disagreement, as well as the problem of merely possible
rational disagreements. With respect to the former, I argued that thinking of testimony in
a virtue-theoretic way helps to clarify when disagreement, as known through testimony,
carries evidential weight (namely, when the peer is recognized as trustworthy). Regarding
the latter, I argued that the problem of possible rational disagreement, while initially

202
puzzling, does not actually create a unique epistemic problem, nor does it worsen the
standard problem of disagreement rooted in real-world disputes between peers.
In response to (MQ3), I argued that once the notion of epistemic peerhood is
clarified, both the Conformist and Nonconformist positions on the disagreement problem
can be seen to be inadequate to deal with the problem of prolonged disagreement under
Parity. To this end, in Chapter Seven I argued that an influential view of peerhood
advanced by Adam Elga is mistaken. I then argued that Conformist views (e.g., those
defended by David Christensen, Richard Feldman, and Adam Elga) place too much
emphasis on the evidential value of disagreement itself, mistakenly taking the fact of
disagreement to have some defeating power that it does not in fact have. They also tend
to assume (e.g., Christensen) that peer disagreement is epistemically similar to
disagreement with a superior, which is unwarranted. On the other hand, Nonconformist
views (e.g., those defended by Thomas Kelly, Marc Moffett, and Michael Bergmann)
tend to underestimate the significance of epistemic parity produced by long disagreement
with someone one takes to be a peer.
In Chapters Eight and Nine, I proposed and discussed three possible solutions to
the Parity Problem, one inspired by David Hume, and two inspired by Immanuel Kant.
The Humean solution (Chapter Eight) held that practical considerations stemming from
the underdetermination of one’s views by the available evidence, as well as one’s larger
epistemic goals, can justify maintaining one’s view in a Parity situation. I argued that
Hume helps us to see that it can be epistemically appropriate to maintain a view even
when one knows that it cannot be demonstrated to be the uniquely rational conclusion to
draw on the basis of some evidence set. Alternatively, in Chapter Nine I drew on Kant’s
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theory of judgment to argue that judgments that someone else is an epistemic peer may
be classified as either (1) empty regulative theoretical judgments, or (2) non-theoretic
judgments (analogous to judgments of taste). In either case, I argued, rational
disagreement under Parity may be possible.
We are left, then, with the view that rational disagreement between recognized
epistemic peers who have shared their evidence with one another is indeed possible. In
fact, in a typical case of peer disagreement, such as most people may find themselves in
with a colleague, a family member, or a stranger, rational disagreement is not even very
difficult to achieve. It requires merely that one is justified in not weighing the second- or
third-person testimonial report of a peer’s evidential seeming, in the present case, as
heavily as one’s own first-person evidential seeming to the contrary. I argued above (§
2.2, § 4.2) that one is typically so justified. In most cases of peer disagreement, either the
disagreement itself or the granting of peer status to one’s interlocutor is short-lived. This
is because considering someone else an epistemic peer is an inexact approximation, and
given the choice between weighing someone’s evidential seemings the same as my own,
or simply not considering them a peer in this case, it is nearly always rational to
temporarily revoke peer status.
With respect to typical cases of peer disagreement, then, Nonconformists like
Kelly are generally correct: one is under no epistemic obligation to alter one’s views in
most peer disagreement situations. On the other hand, exceptional cases can always be
dreamt up by a clever philosopher. For this reason, Feldman, a Conformist, is also correct
to point out that there are no general principles regarding what is rational that hold for all
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possible peer disagreement cases. Nonetheless, the Nonconformist approach is likely
sufficient for most real-life cases.
However, the peer-revoking policy recommended by Nonconformism is not
justified in cases of prolonged disagreement about the same issue, in which one continues
to recognize the peer status of the other about that issue. While relatively unusual, such
cases do occur, and they are, I argue, the seminal cases in the peer disagreement debate,
which has its roots in discussions of religious pluralism within the philosophy of religion.
I have argued that these cases present a unique challenge that has been largely
overlooked, or paid only scant attention, in the disagreement literature. By creating a
situation of Parity, prolonged disagreement with a recognized peer, where both parties are
doing their best to share their evidence and to understand the point of view of the other,
can lead to a situation in which it is rationally required that one weigh the evidential
seemings of a peer the same as one’s own (§ 4.2, § 8.3). The Hume and Kant-inspired
approaches to peer disagreement are meant to ameliorate this worry, and to explain how
we can maintain a Nonconformist stance even in situations of Parity.
I must confess here that I am less than fully confident about my own solutions to
the Parity Problem, for the reasons I gave in the last chapter. I have personally
experienced at least one disagreement that I would describe as peer disagreement under
Parity, and I find that the Humean and Kantian solutions I’ve offered, while somewhat
helpful, do not ultimately remove the discomfort I feel in continuing to believe as I do,
when I know that my peer understands the issue as well as I do and disagrees. Here I
believe it is worth remembering something that commentators on all sides of the peer
disagreement debate agree about: most people are too confident about their controversial
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beliefs. Insofar, then, as the epistemology of disagreement discussion encourages some
epistemic humility, it is a worthwhile endeavor.
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